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Preface
When I first set out to write this thesis, I hoped to translate the complexity of modern genomics
into a couple telling sentences that could describe across readerships exactly what genetics can
and cannot conclusively tell us about ancestry.
As I delved into the history of scientific racism, trying to decipher lines of continuity between
past and present rhetoric used in primary literature, I contemplated the limitations of my
perspective. Making constant decisions, whether large or small, on which topics to cover and
how to orient my message, I thought about how my identity as a white woman informed those
decisions. I wondered how my decisions would have changed, which histories I would have
highlighted.
There is a complex relationship between the idea of genes and personal origin. Both have ties to
inheritance, the passing down of genetic code, cultural tradition or family history. Our sense of
origin, and its relationship to identity, lives within a social world. It is formed and informed by
experience, how we navigate the world. Genes lack intrinsic social meaning but, in many cases,
have been endowed social authority.
For me, personal origin arrives with a bit of ambiguity. It seems logical that answering the
question of “who am I” necessarily follows “where did I come from?” But how long ago is still
relevant to my everyday realities? Growing up, I learned to view my heritage is an assemblage
of German, Venezuelan, English, Portuguese, Trinidadian - each story conceptualized as a
nationality. I don’t feel I can make full claim to any of these as component to my identity. I am
not bilingual like my mom and her mom and her mom. I never experienced the reformation of
national identity through immigration, like my mother. And at the same time, I do feel that my
upbringing was impacted by the cultural differences between my mother and my father. I’ve
always held my mom’s Trinidadian origins with a sense of pride and a sort of distant closeness.
But I have ultimately navigated this world as a white American in a hegemonic system.
The conversation is one of the most complex concepts I have ever engaged with. It is a gateway
into discussions of race and racism throughout history, of science as imbued with authority, of
personal origin tied to culture versus genealogy versus DNA, of critical examinations centering
semantics and discourse, of continuity in seemingly cyclical reproductions of the past in the
present, of how ancestry is imagined and reimagined in the era of commercialized genetics.
While I cannot feasibly capture them all, giving each the nuanced attentiveness and breadth of
research they require, I hope that my conversations throughout this thesis lead to more and
highlight the inter-connectivity of ideas spanning the humanities, history, social sciences,
memory studies, etc. that can be found in any research question, even one prodding at the
assumed detached objectivity of natural science.
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INTRODUCTION
When Elizabeth Warren Said…
When Elizabeth Warren released her personal DNA test report to corroborate family folklore of
Native American ancestry, she landed herself at the intersection of a complex cultural,
sociological, and biological debate that exposed a deep, conceptual fissure based in false, or at
least oversimplified, understandings of race, nation, and culture.
This decision positioned genetic testing on par with cultural identity, implying that identity is
“discoverable” via test reports, rather than crafted through community, embedded in
experience, and sustained by collective memory. Slurs espoused by Donald Trump, who called
her “Pocahontas” in a slipshod attempt of defamation, further incited tensions surrounding
Warren’s ancestral claims (Astor, 2018). Her decision to get genetic testing led to the revelation
that she had a Native American ancestor likely six generations ago. But Warren’s misconceived
intention to embrace an imagined ancestry that she believed might be confirmed by science led
to a damaging double bind. If her priority was to placate the President’s taunts, she neglected
the negative connotation and caricature that critically underly white conceptions of Indigenous
peoples. If her purpose was to prove her family's stories and claims to Native American ancestry,
then she undermined what Native American, and more specifically Cherokee, identity means,
delegitimizing tribal citizenship. Cherokee Nation citizenship is founded upon established laws
and culture as well as genealogy. DNA test results are insubstantial according to this
understanding, reflecting neither the formality of law nor the reality of human experience.
Cultural identity is not inherently tied to genetic ancestry, as the former is an active embodiment
and a way of life while the latter traces vestiges of biological data in an attempt to systematize a
social construct. Genetic testing has a crucial historical dimension, and although increasingly
advanced technology has shifted its mechanisms and reframed the conversation , the rhetoric
surrounding genetic ancestry is reminiscent of outmoded taxonomies that were leveraged to
justify racism. Typically, the strong association of blood relations being the sole determinant of
race is a principle upheld by white supremacists and exists as the backbone of racial hierarchies.
Theft of identity is a systemic pattern of oppression that has impacted Indigenous tribes
historically (Herndon, 2018). Thus, there is continuity in the reification of inheritance in modern
genetic study.
We live in an era of commercialized genomics, where ancestral profiles can be delivered to our
doorstep. Genetic ancestry complicates ideas of identity, heritage, and race in many ways far
more than it clarifies. While it can yield a “discovery”, a restoration of roots, a confirmation of
origin, a license for citizenship depending on who, where, and when, lurking beneath ancestral
science are assumptions about race, nation, and culture framed by an imperialist and racist past.
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CHAPTER ONE

A Brief Introduction to Modern Genomics

Following the sequencing of the human genome, geneticists derived two striking
observations. First, about 99% of the genome proved identical across all people (Batai & Kittles,
2013; Fine et al., 2005; Rosenberg et al., 2002). Second, of the remaining one percent, ~87-95%
of sequential differences arise from intrapopulation genetic variation, or the variability within
groups (Batai & Kittles, 2013; Fine et al., 2005; Rosenberg et al., 2002). Though several authors
cite slightly different percentages, they collectively describe interpopulation genetic variation
within the approximate window of 5-13% (Batai & Kittles, 2013; Fine et al., 2005; Holsinger &
Weir, 2009; Rosenberg et al., 2002). Essentially, under the circumstance that ancestry is a
component factor of human genetic variation, differences between ancestral lineages could only
be identifiable in 5-13% of 1% of the human genome. Genetic distinctions between human
populations extrapolate from a small percentage of one percent of detectable difference. The
remarkable similarities of our genomes swiftly undermined notions of biological determinism,
countering a heinous past of erroneously exploiting race in science; however, geneticists quickly
pivoted toward investigations of population structure1, pursuing the promise of ancestry-linked
disease risk theoretically encoded within genome-wide variation.
This focus of genomics on ancestry and population, while maintaining risks of
misapplication and misinterpretation, has advanced considerably, translating hypothetical
approaches surmised in the mid-1900s into numerous genotyping methodologies by 2005 and
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Population structure describes patterns of genetic variation within and across populations (Henn et al., 2010;
Rosenberg et al., 2002).
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new computational metrics throughout the 2010s. Several moving parts form the technical
scaffolding of modern genomics, including independent reference databases, analytical
techniques, statistical models and correction factors, and genetic marker panels as well as poststudy validation through replication and meta-analysis. The present chapter will overview the
ideas and mechanisms behind modern genomics, deciphering how geneticists conceptualize
genetic ancestry, demarcate human evolution, and apply population genetics to real people.
When it comes to the science of genetics, most of us start from, and end with, a basic
understanding of Mendel’s laws. Gregor Mendel, a 19th century scientist, modeled laws of
inheritance through his famed pea plant experiments. He revealed the existence of discrete,
heritable elements that govern how organisms pass down visible traits to offspring (Westerlund
& Fairbanks, 2010). Most notably, he discovered that these elements, or alleles, segregate and
randomly reassort during the genesis of reproductive cells into a set of predictable outcomes
(Westerlund & Fairbanks, 2010). Although his work predates chromosomal theory, the discovery
of DNA structure and meiotic function further revealed his laws of inheritance at work within the
cell (Gayon, 2016). And so the story goes—combinations of alleles form genotypes that express
observable traits through the transcription and translation of DNA into proteins and other
molecules. Together, these cellular products form our metabolic pathways, construct our tissues,
regulate our physiology, and interdependently sustain life. Punnett squares, pedigrees, and other
tools accurately model Mendelian traits, enabling scientists to infer parental genotypes or project
the expected genotypic and phenotypic ratios of a subsequent generation. Today, students
continue to visualize Mendelian inheritance by crafting Punnett squares and tracing the strangely
succinct patterns of allele segregation and random assortment to predict simulated genotypic
combinations; however, simple inheritance is limited in scope, unable to fully encapsulate the
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nuances of heredity at a chromosomal level. In fact, it is the deviations from Mendel’s laws that
actually proved crucial for the development of modern analytical techniques and theoretical
underpinnings.
After Mendel’s pea plants, geneticists soon noticed unexpected patterns in genotypic
ratios that seemed to challenge Mendel’s laws; this phenomenon would eventually be explained
by the concept of genetic linkage, which developed alongside the chromosomal theory of
inheritance. Chromosomal theory enabled geneticists to figure out that, on a molecular level,
genes comprise fixed stretches of DNA, called genetic loci, on the chromosomes. During
meiosis, homologous chromosomes trade genetic material in a process called crossing over, or
recombination, yielding new combinations of alleles from parental building blocks that will be
inherited by the offspring (Lobo & Shaw, 2008). Crossing over typically transfers each gene
independently and randomly; however, when two genetic loci are physically proximal on the
same chromosome, there is a probability that the genes will be inherited together, or genetically
linked (Lobo & Shaw, 2008). Thus, genetic linkage is a function of gene proximity that can skew
the randomness of crossover events as well as the expected allelic combinations of simple
Mendelian inheritance. Grasping the theory of genetic linkage, geneticists developed linkage
analysis, a statistical method for mapping inheritance and discerning the chromosomal location
of genes (Smith & O’Brien, 2005). To do this, geneticists look to genetic markers, which are
specific DNA sequences that occupy known locations throughout the human genome. This
technique leverages the co-segregation of genetic markers with traits-of-interest to trace the
chromosomal region that contains the associated gene(s). By analyzing co-segregation,
geneticists can associate a trait-of-interest with a genetic marker and search nearby for causal
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genes (Darvasi, 2005). The concept of linkage, and specifically the linkage of genetic markers
with gene variants, form the conceptual basis of most modern analytical techniques in genetics.
Genetic markers are essential tools in modern genomics. Both convenient and naturallyoccurring, these microscopic signals proliferate throughout the human genome. Genetic markers
are highly polymorphic, meaning they can take on variable forms in different individuals
(NHGRI, n.d., para. 1). Different classes of polymorphisms occur throughout the genome, and
new forms typically emerge through benign mutations.

Figure 1. Diagram displaying single nucleotide polymorphism and short tandem repeat
polymorphism marker classes. Individuals might differ in the nucleotide base (A, T, C, or G)
present in an SNP or the number of repeats in an STRP. Reprinted from the National Human
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Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), Retrieved April 23 2020 from
https://www.genome.gov/genetics-glossary/Polymorphism

Microsatellites, or short tandem repeats, result from DNA replication malfunction,
disproportionate recombination, or other mutations that either disrupt or elongate sequential
repeats (Gilson & Tassis, 2007). Conversely, single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) are point
mutations that produce variants via single base-pair alterations in DNA (Bush & Moore, 2012;
Gilson & Tassis, 2007). New microsatellites recur more regularly than new SNPs, but the total
number of SNP variants exceeds those of microsatellites by ~1000x, making them the most
common type of human genetic variation (Bush & Moore, 2012; Gilson & Tassis, 2007). In a
group of individuals, the majority might possess one form of a microsatellite or SNP while a
small percentage might possess a detectably different form. Combine this natural phenomenon
with knowledge of their chromosomal locations and genetic markers prove to be ideal locators
for undiscovered genes; however, because vast multitudes of polymorphisms occur across the
genome, genotyping large numbers of them can become challenging and costly. Some geneticists
might employ haplotypes, which are extended regions of DNA that are inherited as a unit; these
regions contain groups of polymorphisms, such as several SNPs that display patterns of coinheritance (Gilson & Tassis, 2007, Smith & O’Brien 2005). Haplotypes allow geneticists to
follow sets of linked genetic markers without genotyping them individually (Smith & O’Brien,
2005). Ultimately, different marker classes are advantageous for different modalities of analysis,
but genetic markers overall are an integral part of modern genomic analysis.
The ability to locate, mark, and correlate both known and unknown segments of the
genome opened the doors to inferring genetic ancestry. Genetic ancestry generally defines as

6

“the origin or background of our genomes ” (Pardo-Seco et al., 2014, p.1), where the genome is
an amalgam of discrete segments that each possess its own ancestral origin and evolutionary
history. Geneticists cite multiple purposes for the investigation of genetic ancestry, including
biomedical research, forensics analysis, and the general study of human evolutionary history.
Each focus rests on the premise that demographic events over the course of history produced
detectable allele frequency differences in specific cohorts of people and have been passed down
over generations, comprising the estimated margin of human interpopulation differentiation. In
essence, various evolutionary processes may have been unintended byproducts of our
demographic histories, although in much more complex and interweaving ways than other
species. For example, genetic drift describes events that randomly restructure the allele
frequencies throughout the entire genome (Elhaik, 2012; Holsinger & Weir, 2009). These allele
frequency changes can occur through various means, such as a founder effect, whereby a
subpopulation migrates out of its original population and reestablishes a geographically or
otherwise distinct community, or a bottleneck event, during which natural disasters, famines,
plagues, or other sweeping external impetuses result in the survival of a genetically random
cohort; if the new cohort is small enough, certain allelic forms may become fixed or completely
lost simply due to chance (Kliman et al., 2008). Whenever a group of individuals become
sequestered from their original communities, whether voluntarily or forcibly, their gene pool will
contain new proportions of randomly up- and down-regulated allele frequencies.
Geneticists have been trying to interpret and visualize the small, estimated range of
human interpopulation differentiation for the past several decades. They estimate 7.6% of all
allelic differences detected among geographic regions to be circumscribed to a single region,
most of which are rare variants typifying relative frequencies of 1.0% within each region
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(Rosenberg et al., 2002). Amidst the early findings of population structure research, Rosenberg
et al. (2002) make the crucial distinction that “most studies of human variation begin by
sampling from predefined ‘populations.’ These populations are usually defined on the basis of
culture or geography and might not reflect underlying genetic relationships” (p.2381).
Chronology is pivotal in genetic studies that correlate populations with genetic variation, and
several of the limitations discussed in subsequent chapters will center chronological paradoxes.
Many studies delineate populations according to descriptive metrics, such as geographic or
demographic characteristics, before they collect DNA samples from the individuals within the
populations. Studies of population structure convey a conspicuous endeavor to systematize
humans according to empirical genetic boundaries, so the context of their methodological
structure is highly important. Geneticists have also made decisions regarding which processes
have most likely impacted human population structure, which diverge from models pertaining to
other organisms.
In order for interpopulation genetic ancestry to be relevant, historic human groups must
have met certain evolutionary parameters. Namely, human “population” differentiation occurs
when a community subsists within reproductive barriers for a significant span of generational
time (Henn et al., 2010). Population structure research typically establishes relevant boundaries
according to broad geographical regions. Some geneticists have honed in on fine-scale
population structure, which studies multi-generational pedigrees stemming from endogamous
familial structures (Henn et al., 2010). Broadly, “endogamy” refers to the convention of
marrying only within one’s community affiliation. In essence, geneticists might argue that, while
geographic boundaries are likely influential in human population structure, sociocultural factors
that surround concepts of family, marriage, and community may also play a role. For example,
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the Indian Genome Variation database (IGVdb) project (2005) describes the endogamous
marriage practices within the castes of the majority Hindu population in India. Some researchers
have cited evidence for population structure using specific case studies. Henn et al. (2010)
reference the Tibetan peoples in the Qinghai Tibet Plateau region, as the gene pool of this
community shows higher frequencies of rare alleles (which actually appear to be adapted to highaltitude hypoxic conditions) compared to the surrounding lowland Han Chinese individuals
(Henn, 2010). Henn et al. (2010) also relay that “many models predict that only a limited amount
of migration is required to largely eliminate differences in population frequencies” (p. R224),
complicating the role of geographic or endogamous boundaries. While conceptual theories and
case studies might reflect how diverging ancestral histories may surface in genetic analyses,
there are significant challenges to extrapolating these patterns across all humankind.
Quantifying population structure hinges on the range and resolution of computational
methods. Early studies attempted different kinds of associations, such as between gene trees and
language groupings, as linguistic and geographical distinctions appeared to correlate (Henn et al.,
2010). A later development was the use of mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) and Y-chromosome
DNA rather than autosomal DNA (Henn et al., 2010). Some ancestry tests still leverage mtDNA
and Y-chromosome DNA, both of which are passed down largely unchanged from maternal and
paternal lines respectively. Geneticists across focuses have extensively employed polymorphic
genetic markers, including autosomal microsatellites, SNPs, and haplotypes, trying to construct
ancestry informative marker (AIM)2 panels that are more informative when used in specific
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AIMs are population-specific genetic markers that comprise polymorphisms of known locations and relative
population frequencies (Batai & Kittles, 2013). Geneticists use statistics to compute and publish the relative
“informativeness” of AIM panels in different populations. Pardo-Seco et al. (2014) argue via their AIM evaluation
across three continental groups that the number of AIMs in a panel is more important than their informativeness for
estimating genetic ancestry. Ideally, the designation of AIMs should facilitate the ability of geneticists to account for
potential population structure within association studies.

9

populations (Batai & Kittles, 2013; Henn et al., 2010). The development of genetic marker
panels has coincided with advancing statistical methods used to compare their relative
performance. To add another layer of complexity, the selection of statistical metrics proves a
crucial component of methodology and guides the interpretation of data3. Essentially, robust
analytical methods, genetic marker panels, reduced costs, and other advancements in the field
have allowed geneticists to investigate the minute window of interpopulation difference with
more precision than ever before, fueling the study and application of genetic ancestry.
Biomedical research is one of the contexts where genetic ancestry is most prominently
applied. Geneticists believe that studying interpopulation difference could shed light on
differential risk and enhance preventative medicine. Linkage analysis provides insights into
disease risk within family pedigrees, proving useful for simple, Mendelian patterns of inheritance
and monogenic pathologies4 (Smith & O’Brien, 2005). Yet, this analytical technique cannot
capture the complexity of common diseases and their underlying mechanisms of inheritance
(Bush & Moore, 2012; Smith & O’Brien, 2005). Instead, geneticists implement analytical tools
tailored to population genetics, including genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and

3

Geneticists have developed statistics and estimators to describe genetic marker information content as well as
analyze genome maps. F-statistics, which are among the most pertinent metrics of interpopulation variation, measure
marker information and quantify interpopulation differentiation. Developed in the early 1900s, Wright’s F-statistics
comprise an umbrella of fixation indices that capture heterozygosity, or the level of genetic variability, within
different population stratifications, such as at the level of the individual, subpopulation, or total population. (Elhaik,
2012; Holsinger & Weir, 2009). While the three constituent F-statistics (FST, FIS, and FIT) all describe populations on
the basis of variance, or deviation about a mean value, each designates a particular ratio (Holsinger & Weir, 2009).
For example, the subscript of FST denotes “subpopulations within total” while that of FIS describes “individuals
within populations” (Holsinger & Weir, 2009, p.5). FST is markedly used in population genetics to quantify
interpopulation allele frequency variance, indirectly reflecting the degree of genetic similarity among individuals
within a population (Elhaik, 2012; Holsinger & Weir, 2009). When interpreting Fst statistics, a low Fst value means
that two populations have intersecting gene pools while a high Fst indicates that two populations are relatively
isolated from each other. AIMs typically display notably high FST values, but this value fluctuates depending on
genetic marker type (e.g. microsatellites versus SNPs) (Betai & Kittles, 2013). In their patent publication on best
practices for AIM selection, Frudakis and Shriver (2004) designated marker panels that display significant frequency
differences (FST > 0.4) between populations as informative of ancestry.
4
Monogenic refers to traits expressed by a single gene rather than multiple genetic loci (Smith, 2005).
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mapping by admixture linkage disequilibrium (MALD or “admixture mapping”). These methods
have been developed with a keen focus on inferring disease-causing gene variants by correlating
chromosomal regions and disease prevalence. Both mapping techniques have also investigated
population structure, pursuing the notion that ancestry could be an important contributor to the
inheritance of certain disease variants, but MALD designates more specific focus to differential
ancestry.
Initially a theoretical idea, MALD, or admixture mapping, has become widely used to
genetically compare ancestries. Geneticists believe certain groups of people, or “admixed
populations”, to represent the recent convergence of two or more ancestries, termed “parent” or
“progenitor” populations. Assuming that parent populations have genetically differentiated from
each other overtime, geneticists will assign genomic segments in admixed individuals to specific
ancestries using the concept of linkage disequilibrium (LD)5 (Darvasi, 2005). In an applied
setting, geneticists believe that shorter LD blocks exist among Pan-African individuals,
theorizing that humankind originated in modern-day continental Africa (Bush & Moore, 2012;
Zheng-Bradley & Flicek, 2017). They describe the dispersal of groups to Europe, Asia, and
America as created by founder effects that altered population size and generational age, resulting
in longer LD regions in descendent individuals today (Bush & Moore, 2012; Zheng-Bradley &
Flicek, 2017). In simple terms, MALD uses the concepts surrounding LD to help identify which
chromosomal regions come from which ancestries, expecting to find different sizes of LD blocks

5

Linkage disequilibrium (LD) is a function of the linkage between alleles across the genome; when a population is
in high LD, alleles are frequently linked when passed from generation to generation (Bush & Moore, 2012). During
the process of LD, multiple instances of recombination occur with each new generation, fragmenting chromosomal
regions (LD blocks) over time (Bush & Moore, 2012). The splitting of these chromosomal regions amplifies as the
number of generations increases (Bush & Moore, 2012). If a population remains relatively fixed in size and sustains
random mating patterns, crossover events will continue to split apart contiguous chromosomal segments containing
linked alleles until every allele within the gene pool of the population reaches linkage equilibrium, or essentially
become unlinked (Bush & Moore, 2012).
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depending upon the degree of admixture in a sample population. Geneticists use MALD to
identify polymorphism proportions across human populations, help construct ancestry
informative genetic marker panels (AIMs), and characterize genetic differences between
ancestries.
In a biomedical context, admixture mapping is designed to extract evidence for
“differential risk by ancestry” (Shriner, 2013, p. 1.23.2). Using admixture mapping, geneticists
will try to discern whether an allele frequency difference between two ancestral groups
associates with disease prevalence. Detecting “differential risk by ancestry” requires the
following criteria to be met: there is a measurable difference in the prevalence of a diseasecausing allele between parent populations, admixture has occurred over the course of at least two
generations, and there is a usable marker set that can differentiate chromosomal regions from
each parent population (Smith & O’Brien, 2005).
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Figure 2. Diagram comparing the same chromosome across several individuals in an admixed
population, separated into case (carrying the disease) and control groups. The dotted line
represents the disease-causing locus. For admixture mapping to work, the parent populations (red
and blue) must have displayed different allele frequencies at the disease-causing locus. This
diagram suggests that Population 2 (red) has a higher prevalence of the disease allele, leading
geneticists to conclude that Population 2 ancestry possesses a higher risk for the disease-ofinterest and carries a higher frequency of the causal allele. Reprinted from “The Beauty of
Admixture”, by Darvasi & Shifman, 2005, Nature Genetics, 37(2), 118.

In an ideal scenario, geneticists will collect DNA samples from a group of disease-carrying
individuals and a group of healthy individuals within an admixed population (Smith & O’Brien,
2005). Then, they will use a highly-informative genetic marker panel6 to examine chromosomal
segments across every individual (Smith & O’Brien, 2005). Finally, by comparing across
chromosomal segments, researchers will try to detect a genetic locus in the disease case group
that displays a disproportionate prevalence of ancestral DNA from one or the other parent
population (Smith & O’Brien, 2005). The result is an association between a chromosomal region
or genetic locus and an ancestral group, which cannot alone indicate whether the locus actually
causes the disease. Geneticists must use (or have previously used) GWAS to discern whether a
given genetic locus is linked to disease risk. In joint testing methods, GWAS can be used to
increase the resolution of admixture signals (Shriner, 2013). For example, several studies have
attempted to locate contributory genes for heart disease and related risk factors, such as blood

6

For MALD, it is recommended that a marker panel has been previously tested and displays frequency differences
above 60% between parent populations (Smith & O’Brien, 2005). Markers that are considered fully informative,
which are 100% prevalent in one parent population and 0% in the other, exist in an ideal situation; yet, the human
genome contains a minute number of fully informative markers (Shriner, 2013).
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pressure and cholesterol levels, as well as evaluate and reevaluate the role of ancestry by
controlling for non-genetic factors (Batai & Kittles, 2013; Bush & Moore 2012; Zhu et al.,
2011). So, admixture mapping correlates phenotype7 to ancestry while association studies
correlate phenotype with causal genes.
Similarly to the other methods, geneticists using GWAS start by discerning associations
between chromosomal regions and disease prevalence. Different disease types inform the
methodology and overall investigation of genetic risk factors. A disease can either be considered
a binary variable, described in terms of case versus control, or a quantitative variable that arises
from continuous, quantifiable factors (Shriner, 2013). In circumstances where a single genetic
variant correlates directly with the disease incidence, the variant is often classified as a casecontrol variable. Mendelian diseases, which are typically rare, are simplistic in that researchers
can reasonably predict genotype based on a given phenotypic value (Shriner, 2103). For
example, Cystic Fibrosis is a Mendelian, autosomal recessive disorder, which means that the
combination of two recessive alleles at a single genetic locus on an autosomal chromosome is an
all-or-none determinant of whether an individual inherits the disease (Chial, 2008). Complex
diseases are generally more commonly prevalent but also may include certain rare disorders. The
leading hypothesis among disease susceptibility research purports that common genetic variants,
rather than uncommon alleles, are likely contributory to common diseases (Bush & Moore,
2012). These disease phenotypes possess more convoluted inheritance patterns, as they might
involve a few or many genes as well as classify as multifactorial8.

7

Broadly, phenotype refers to an expressed trait that is observable in an individual (Shriner, 2013). Phenotypes can
include visible attributes, physiological characteristics, or any trait that arises from the interaction genes and the
environment.
8
Multifactorial diseases arise from the combined effect of multiple genes, environmental factors, and geneenvironment interactions (Shriner, 2013). Multifactorial traits may also be continuous, meaning they display
phenotypic gradations rather than binary incidence (Lobo & Shaw, 2008).
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Complementary case-control and quantitative study structures exist, both rendering
important distinctions and limitations. When studying a case-control model, geneticists do not
test for associations between a potentially causal locus and partitioned risk factors beyond the
overarching disease-incidence (Bush & Moore, 2012). Associations are solely made between
case and causal variant(s). In quantitative studies, geneticists have more specifically defined
phenotypic contributors to disease (Bush & Moore, 2013). For example, under the heart disease
umbrella exist several observable phenotypic risk factors, such as the role of HDL and LDL
levels (Bush & Moore, 2012). Thus, quantitative studies might specifically search for causal
variants that associate with HDL and LDL levels and other risk factors rather than only with the
case of heart disease (Bush & Moore, 2012). Overall, case-control studies, while informative for
simple patterns of inheritance, may overlook the branching complexity or more common
diseases. As a result, quantitative and case-control studies have vastly different statistical power
and measurement errors (Bush & Moore, 2012). While genome-wide association studies into
genetic disease susceptibility offer promise into furthering public health research, they offer
associative values rather than discretely conclusive data.
The clinical promise of genomics incentivizes modern geneticists but poses significant
challenges.Varying correlative and statistical measures offer a lens into the role of inheritance
and genetic-linkage in human diseases; however, genetic analysis cannot provide conclusive
results, as it primarily functions as a probabilistic science. It is crucially important to understand
the relationship between disease-incidence and the interactivity of underlying genetic loci. In
effect, we must understand the necessary assumptions and distinctions within the phenotypegenotype relationship. An observable trait may possess a genetic underpinning, but several
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interrelated factors intercept a direct one-to-one relationship between genotypic expression and
observable phenotypes (Shriner, 2013). Although a non-scientific audience may conceptualize
genetics according to Mendel’s simple patterns and rare disease variants, modern genomics has
uncovered important complexities. Most common human diseases, such as coronary artery
disease, are multifactorial. While Mendel proposed that genetic elements are discrete and
independent, multifactorial studies have indicated that genes can regulate the expression of other
genes through their allelic pairs or the molecular products they encode (Lobo & Shaw, 2008).
Certain disease phenotypes may observably correlate with different populations, but phenotypic
distributions do not inherently reveal an equivalent genotypic distribution within the underlying
genetic structure (Shriner, 2013). In parallel, analytical methods that attempt to associate traits or
disease types with a causal genetic locus cannot assume that risk factors distribute evenly across
a given genomic region (Shriner, 2013). Phenotype is an emergent phenomenon, a whole greater
than the sum of its components. Regardless of associative value, geneticists cannot assume the
relative contribution of genetic versus environmental factors on differential risk by ancestry
(Shriner, 2013), a limitation that will be closely examined in Chapter 5. These assumptions help
inform the degree of information that genome maps provide. Geneticists must either control for
multiple variables or clearly cite limitations when conjecturing the root of phenotypic
interpopulation differences.
Genetics is a tricky probabilistic science that relies upon sound methodology and
statistical power. It speaks a language of comparisons and associations rather than strict
causality, which can be easily misinterpreted. When referring to genetic ancestry, geneticists
have a central role in refracting how we organize and ultimately “see” the data, as gene pools
exist within a constant and dynamic continuum of cross-generational change. Several analytical

16

limitations can also impede study design. In GWAS or MALD, genetic markers can show a
false-positive association with a disease case (Bush & Moore, 2012). Admixture mapping
requires population-specific marker panels, and researchers can over- or under-estimate the
extent of ancestry in a chromosomal region if they miscalculate allele frequencies within one of
the parental populations (Smith & O’Brien, 2005) Furthermore, MALD rests on a slew of
assumptions that greatly diminishes mapping power if they are not met. If inclusion criteria are
unsound, sampling effects can predispose error when the genotypic makeup of DNA samples
have their own unique allelic proportions that do not reflect the population from whom they were
collected (Holsinger & Weir, 2009). Nonetheless, the field has seen strides in technical capacity
but faltered in the ability to consistently and intentionally define what a human population is.
Further, the complexity of study design and probabilistic nuance of findings are often glazed
over amidst the translation of study to its applicable context. Geneticists are not devoting
attention to the implications of their rhetoric surrounding human difference, and the dense pool
of primary literature fails to provide needed transparency. Modern genomics, and science at
large, has emerged from an entrenched history of malintention and maluse, whereby concepts of
heredity were leveraged to argue natural schemas of superiority and inferiority based on
perceived and imagined human differences. Chapter 2 will delve into the scaffolding of scientific
racism while Chapter 3 will trace lines of continuity through genetic discourses today.
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CHAPTER TWO

Imagining and Reimagining
A History of Heredity, Science and The Race Concept

While today’s field of genomics fundamentally differs from pseudo-scientific ideas of
purity, creationism, and species fixity, scientific racism still persists, using new arguments and
analogies to support deterministic fallacies. While the ever-increasing and intriguing intricacy of
genetic study has made simplistic fabrications of innate racial difference progressively more
difficult to argue, people continue to use genetics to support binary understandings of inheritance
and make reductive claims of morality, intelligence, or aptitude as intergroup biological entities.
It is vital to be aware of this context and the potential for advancements in the field or its theories
to be falsely contorted. For instance, Michael Levin’s book, Why Race Matters, makes the
philosophical argument that “if breeds of dog may differ in intelligence and temperament, there
seems to be no reason evolution could not have differentiated human groups along similar lines”
(as cited in Garrod, 2006, p.56). Another book, entitled Race: The Reality of Human Differences,
tries to procure social and scientific evidence of discrete races (as cited in Garrod, 2006).
Authors Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele make the same dog breed analogy to postulate intraspecies variation (as cited in Garrod, 2006). Alongside the glaringly obvious realities that dogs
were intentionally bred by humans and are not cognitively or behaviorally analogous to
humankind, these authors make the fundamental fallacy of forgetting that traits are inherited noncontiguously rather than “as a group” (Garrod, 2006, p.56). Scientists and geneticists have an
intellectual and moral responsibility to prevent modern genetic research, and human evolutionary
sub-disciplines, such as admixture mapping, to be easily manipulated as corroborating evidence
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for racist ideology. If researchers are not actively contending, or informed by, racialization
processes, they risk predisposing modern reinventions of biological race and scientific racism;
additionally, study designs implicitly devoid of the perspective that racism manifests
systemically as a political structure and “socio-economic order” (Azarmandi, 2017, p.22) will
not be sensitive to the real consequences faced by the implicated communities. The idea that
intelligence and temperament evolves “along similar lines” is fundamentally wrong but
demonstrates an important instance of continuity. The presumptuous nature of these ideas is
neither unprecedented nor happenstance but is a perspective that reverberates against an all too
familiar past. Why is continuity important for us to consider? To shed light on such a complex
cornerstone of collective consciousness, we must examine the history of race in the scientific
imagination.
2.1 The Social Process of Racialization
Several researchers have attempted to dissect the process of racialization and the roots of
racism in the Western gaze by studying concepts of group difference throughout time, from
ancient societies through recent centuries; however, race as it exists today is fundamentally tied
to colonialism and slavery, which catalyzed the social and political formation of the race concept
by mobilizing systems of oppression and structural injustices (Azarmandi, 2017). Racialization
refers to the sociological understanding of race as a social process of organization rather than an
inherent property or preexisting entity. This idea makes sense considering that race cannot be
coherently schematized, as it changes across spans of time and space as well as in relation to
self-concept and extrinsic perception. Race has historically been delineated according to
perceived physical attributes, which were then attributed to immutable group traits and
associated with cognitive or moral dispositions (Crichlow, 1993). Given that race is constructed,
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affixed to status, relative to time and location, and causal of social realities, sociologists have
come to understand individuals as racialized rather than race existing as a necessary truth or
biological given (Crichlow, 1993). Race is thus a socio-historic rather than biological concept.
Appropriations of power and delimitations of status generate superior-inferior racial
stratifications within a society (Crichlow, 1993). An important element of racialization is the
creation of a default “normal” that designates one group as implicitly and explicitly
representative of humanity, or some peak of humanity. In America, whiteness was positioned as
the societal norm and formed as a racial identity by comparison to its deviations, perceived by
white Americans to be displaced Native Americans, enslaved African peoples, and different
groups of immigrants over time (Guess, 2006). What, or who, a society deems abnormal
becomes “othered”, facing increased exposure to stigmatization, or a “disapproval for
nonconformity” (Crichlow, 1993, para. 38). Whiteness operates as the norm but is also
racialized, as social, political, and legal processes enable individuals to be classified as, access,
and maintain being white. Since racialization has embedded structural consequences and social
realities, omissions of racial categories do not merely expose race as a social construct but
engage in a collective amnesia of the socio-historic processes of racialization, rendering
whiteness a “racialized form of privilege” (Azarmandi, 2017, p.28). We will see discourses
fixate on explaining divergence from the norm, both a response to and ingredient of the
racialization process itself.
On the other hand, ethnicity, while also socially constructed, characterizes how one
identifies with a collective based on shared values, cultures, institutions, as well as language or
religion (Crichlow, 1993; Deng, 1997). Ancestry, and a sense of heritage, often also intertwines
with belonging. An important facet of ethnicity is shared consciousness (Crichlow, 1993), or
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collective memory. Forming and sustaining collective memory across familial or geographic
boundaries fosters intrinsic feelings of kinship with other people, even those we do not
personally know. The socio-historic processes of racialization and ethnic formation have been at
interplay within our world systems. Certain communities that are considered ethnicities or
nationalities today have at one point, in different places, been considered races (Crichlow, 1993).
National signifiers (i.e. Irish) and religious-cultural markers (i.e. Jewish) have historically been
used as racial designations (Crichlow, 1993; Azarmandi, 2017). Past forms of “othering” and
their continuity today are not equivalent across ethnic groups, as the historical oppression of
Jews is not level with the racial conceptualization of all other “ethnic whites” (Azarmandi, 2017,
p26), and only certain groups have been allowed white status over time; these differences relate
to the continued role of coloniality in modern racialization. Several concurrent perspectives on
racialization pervade both historical and modern contexts in a continuous evolution of process,
incentive, and materialization. Thinking about radicalization abstractly will help us critically
analyze the race concept and its historical continuity in the following overview of scientific
racism.
2.2 An Abridged History of Scientific Racism
Ensuing debate surrounds the intellectual foundation of racism in the colonial,
neocolonial, and modern ages, leading some researchers to survey concepts of group difference
through the years of the common era and beyond; however, pre-colonial sources did not
conceive race but were mobilized later on in both the formation of European identity and
justification of colonial exploitation. Greek and Roman ideas became cornerstones of philosophy
and society in Europe. These ideas carried forward through the medieval period and the
Enlightenment, eventually pervading into the colonial era. The ancient Greeks’ outgroup
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designations centered on culture and politics rather than physical appearance, viewing non-Greek
culture as barbaric; but, Greek society allowed persons to “shed” inferior status by assimilating
with the polis (Graves, 2003; Yudell, 2011). We see an opaquely similar notion appear in the
colonial concept of modernity, viewing colonized land as uncivilized and tamable only by
Europeans, but racial status was seen as innate and could bar access to assimilation9.
Imaginations of inherent European modernity were also embedded in environmental
determinism, or the belief that the environment shapes the disposition and ability of entire
groups, which we will see in 19th century naturalist characterizations of Latin America. But, the
roots of environmental determinism are detectable in Hippocrates’s argument that soil infertility
in Greek civilizations produced a self-reliant and superior people while tropical fertility and
abundance “led to softness and lack of war spirit”, specifically of the Asiatics (Graves, 2003,
p.17). Conversely, the Romans cast northern Europeans as intellectually inferior due to cold and
humidity (Graves, 2013). We can also look to the Romans for pre-scientific suppositions of
interpopulation variation. As early as the fourth century AD, Roman Emperor Julian the
Apostate observed that the physical appearance of human bodies varied across geographical
locales and conjectured that temperament and cognitive capacity likely did as well (Graves,
2013). He proceeded to classify several civilizations according to psychological attributes,
inherited by the different gods who fathered them (Graves, 2013). We will see this notion of
group genealogy and contiguous inheritance resurface as biological concepts in the 19th century
and beyond. Finally, Graves (2013) argues that certain key Greco-Roman concepts, such as
Aristotle’s belief that some people were born natural slaves versus natural rulers, were reapplied
later on to justify racist hierarchies. Aristotle’s natural slave concept would eventually be cited
9

Nonetheless, assimilation is also a form of erasure and social control that was forcibly leveraged against
Indigenous peoples, such as in 19th century America (Tallbear, 2013).
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by Spanish humanist Juan Gínes de Sepúlveda during the Valladolid debates in 1500-1 to
rationalize slavery within the colonial project (Brunstetter & Zartner, 2011). Sources of
perceived philosophical credibility were retroactively tapped as the race concept materialized
during colonial exploitation and intersected with scientific development
Concepts of group difference as tied to blood and lineage amplified during the Middle
Ages, specifically within the consolidation of anti-Semitism. In Medieval Europe, virulent
disdain of the Jewish faith adopted a new framework of “blood kinship” and evolved from the
hatred of a religion into “hatred of a people” (Yudell, 2011, p.15). Gross constructions of Jewish
people as physically, cognitively, and morally derelict legitimized widespread persecution
(Graves, 2013). Such constructs were often sensationalized caricatures, some rooted in
superstitious hysteria, describing Jewish people as having horns, emitting foul smells, or
ritualistically murdering youths or Christians for their uncompromised blood (Graves, 2013).
Calls to action by various Catholic popes during the years 1000-1300 prompted the genocide of
Jewish communities in Worms10 by Crusaders as well as requirements that Jews wear identifying
badges and live in ghettos (Graves, 2013). There is obvious contintuity between these oppressive
policies and those reinvented during the Nazi regime; understanding that history is prone to
repeat, we can analyze past constructions of group difference and positionality with attentiveness
to trends of the present.
We can look to colonialism to observe how Eurocentric imaginations of race acquire a
notably naturalistic tone. The “Age of Discovery”, spanning from the 15th to 17th centuries, saw
more frequent in-person encounters between European, Indigenous and African peoples and
cultures (Graves, 2013). “Discovery” of the Americas piqued European colonizers’ interest in
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Located in modern-day Germany
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examining “uncharted” territory, enticed by the prospect of novel research settings and the
prestige of exploration. With European fixation on an imagined “New World'' came conquest
and colonization. Crimes against humanity advanced under the guise of enterprise and became
business as usual, embedded through a promulgation of ideas that cultivated popular notions of
exoticism and race in the Americas. Naturalist inquiry and colonial travel writing proved to be
arms of the colonial project, playing a significant role in justifying the subjugation of human
beings by reinforcing a superior European image through contrast with a designated “other”. The
slave trade pervaded conquest of the Americas, resulting in devastating losses of lives as well as
attacks on culture, severing ties between families and communities. Graves (2013) denotes how
translocating slavery to American colonies built an evironment of self-sustaining racism:
The slave trade not only brought together populations that previously had been
geographically separated but also brought them together under conditions of manifest
social inequality. That is, phenotypic characteristics were used to symbolize social
status…. The absence of well-validated theories of heredity meant that no one really
understood which features of human beings were innate…. ( p.30)
Oppressive systems manipulate different theories, whether religious, philosophical, or eventually
scientific, to naturalize oppression, assuming a naturalistic lens as phenotypes were racialized
and assigned social meaning by colonizers in the Americas. Although early colonizers did not
understand concepts of heredity, they recurrently distorted successive scientific theories of
inheritance and evolution to argue inherent inferiority. Their ideas circulated widely and fueled
the racialization process throughout European colonies and homelands. We can look to
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colonization and exploration11 in Latin America as a case study for the dissemination of ideas on
European superiority and normativity.
European colonizers positioned political and economic interests under the guise of
conquest and progress, forming their “empires'' atop the infrastructure of the already existing,
culturally rich, and sophisticated civilizations of Latin America. In order to both justify the
marginalization of non-white communities as well as ensure political and economic strategems,
colonizers methodically constructed evolving versions of racial hierarchies through naturalist
discouses as travel to Latin America was popularized in the 18th and 19th centuries. Stepan
(2001) proposes the key theory that travel accounts proved integral to the formation of European
identity via the “othering” of the Tropics of Latin America. This theory reflects the idea that
racialization simultaneously normalizes and “others” and nods to travel writing as the primary
modality that shaped the race concept during this time period (Stepan, 2001). Naturalists were
keenly descriptive, conveying reports of what and who they witnessed. They were often key
figures of the European Enlightenment, a pivotal intellectual campaign that promoted precepts of
reason and empiricism as well as shaped Western concepts of the natural sciences; the
Enlightenment thinkers set the tone for scientific naturalism, as philosophers like René Descartes
(1596–1650) reimagined science as a “deductive procedure” (Vartanian, 1953, p.24) and Denis
Diderot (1713–1784) held that discernable laws of matter governed all things, including
“intricate organic details” (p.291). Through the medium of travelogues, white colonists
rationalized entitlement to Indigenous land and African enslavement by imagining themselves to

11

By exploration, I am referring to a 15th through 18th c. European idyllic notion, whereby Europeans investigated
lands previously unknown to them and documented natural sites for the accumulation of knowledge; the ideal of
exploration goes hand-in-hand with the colonial project, incentivized by the prospect of capitalizing new regions of
the world through exploitation and displacement.
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be racially superior; they normalized their own narratives of identity, and naturalist racial
hierarchies ingrained into the collective consciousness of Europeans abroad.
The academic missions of European naturalists generated descriptive profiles of
difference; these descriptions were often strikingly morphological, dehumanizing individuals as
objects of scientific scrutiny. Alexander von Humboldt was among the most prominent
characters of his time, a Prussian naturalist who wrote numerous romantic works on Latin
American landscapes and peoples at the turn of the 19th century. He traveled throughout
modern-day Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, crafting a first-hand witness account of
everything he observed (Stepan, 2001). Within his travelogues, Humboldt encountered various
Indigenous nations, positioning his reflections on them as empirical study. For example, he
delineates the Chaima Indigenous nation using markedly physical indicators, describing them as
“short and thickset, with extremely broad shoulders and flat chests…” (von Humboldt, 1995,
p.120). He also purports that each individual visually resembled one another, maintaining a close
relatedness stemming from what he believed to be a “blood link” that endowed each a “lack of
intellectual culture” (von Humboldt, 1995, p.120). By marking physical traits and perceived
relatedness as indicative of the cognitive capacity of an entire group of people, Humbolt implies
that there is a biological or predeterministic underpinning to the human race. Humboldt reports
that the individuals he observed retained a “moral inflexibility, a stubbornness”, which he
believed “[characterized] the whole race from the equator to Hudson’s Bay and the Strait of
Magellan” (von Humboldt, 1995, p.119). Humbolt reveals his own hubris in believing he is
capable of not only discerning the character, moral beliefs, and intellect of Indigenous
communities but also generalizing his claims to entire populations based on his own
interpretations of what ties people together. The morphological nature of naturalist discourse
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helped convey intergroup difference as a perceptibly physical, and by the early 19th century, the
racialization process oriented race as a physical category that could be functionally delineated
according to biological differences (Murji & Solomos, 2005). Humboldt’s prolific narratives,
which are credited with inspiring 19th century German natural science (Reill, 2005) and
prominent European scientists (i.e. Darwin) (Costa, 2009), exemplify how explicit physical
description in and of itself plays a role in depersonalizing and othering groups of people as well
as distancing one’s own sense of self and normalcy, and it is this keen descriptiveness that
characterized Enlightenment empiricism. In addition to their widespread circulation, the
philosophical ideas purported by travel writers maintained a certain intellectual authority among
domestic Europeans as supposed first-person accounts.
Naturalistic explanations for human difference pervaded successive scientific pools of
literature. In parallel, environmental and biological determinism were imagined and reinforced
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Byrd and Hughey (2015) summarize the emergence of
biologically deterministic ideologies in the following:
The seeds for biological determinism and racial essentialism took root in intellectual and
societal discussions of race and inequality well over 500 years ago during the emerging
era of colonialism. Over the centuries, the belief in the race concept—a concept that
could apply to groups around the world and relate to immutable and heritage traits—was
further entrenched with the development of science and medicine, particularly in the
nineteenth century. (p.16)
Deterministic ideas were accepted as logical explanations for the differences Europeans observed
in both the landscapes and communities they invaded. Graves (2015) defines biological
determinism as the belief that social positionality is biologically ordained, emerging from the
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traits inherited by advantaged versus disadvantaged peoples. Gould (as cited in Graves, 2015)
proposes an antecedent iteration that biological determinism perceives socioeconomic rifts across
racial groups (as well as class and gender) as emerging from innate biological dispositions,
starkly contrasting the logical chronology of racialization by conjecturing that “society, in this
sense, is an accurate reflection of biology” (p. 25). Biological determinism simplifies personhood
and life chances as rooted in organic components, such as the size of one’s brain, and eventually
also heritable qualities with the advent of genetics. Byrd and Hughey (2015) define racial
essentialism as the “belief that certain biological traits and social behaviors were linked and
constituted the ‘essence’ of a certain racial group” (p.10), forming a liaison whereby biologically
deterministic notions fundamentally underlie an entire social identity.
Environmental determinism relates to biological determinism and racial essentialist
thinking, reasoning that differential risk by environment physically and psychologically shapes
inhabitants due to the natural barriers, or lack thereof, they must overcome. For example, in
1885, a Boston journalist named Maturin M. Ballou switched from believing in the capacity,
masculinity, and resources of Cubans to casting them as dearth of “self-reliance and true
manhood” (as cited in Skwiot, 2010, p.53). Importantly, Ballou attributed his change of opinion
to the humid climate of the Tropics, yielding over time a lavish abundance of natural foods and
persistent temperature that served to dispirit its inhabitants (Skwiot, 2010). Stepan (2001) also
describes popular ideas surrounding the Tropics as appearing overabundant, warm, and giving of
all the natural resources humans need to survive, thus instilling idleness over industriousness. In
contrast, Europeans believed the cold, temperate climate of their country fostered industriousness
and collaboration due to the need to both command and shelter from their environment for
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survival (Stepan, 2001). Deterministic and essentialist theories craft a direct bridge between
natural science and social life, creating a philosophical scapegoat for difference and disparity.
These ideas pervaded naturalist discourse, both well-read within the public sphere and
carried by European colonizers. In her work, “European Travelers and the Writing of the
Brazilian Nation”, Costa (2010) characterizes the archetypal 19th century traveler as a
professional, one who was learned on the current pool of literature and traveled “in the service of
the Academy of Sciences or the Geographical society” on accredited “missions” (p.210). Costa
(2010) also notes that readership was not restricted to members or officials of missions and
societies. Amidst the advancement of journalism and increasing “autonomy” of universities in
the 1830s, travel writing reached progressively broader readerships among the educated, and
scientific journalism developed in situ European source countries; travel writing opened the door
to specialized occupations back home, including scientific journalism, university professorship,
diplomacy, and government appointment (Costa, 2010). Given the intellectual foundation and
ubiquity of deterministic theories, we will see the process of racialization intertwine with the
fabric of scientific development as well as fuel pseudo-scientific inquiries. While genuine
discoveries and theories emerged during this period, simultaneous conjectures of the human race
concept took fallacious leaps from these foundations. These leaps characterize the development
of scientific racism, the antithesis of the scientific process purposed with deriving foundationally
unsound evidence to establish racial “types”12 and hierarchies (Garrod, 2006). Scientifically
racist theories argued that “nature, and not social forces, created divisions in society” (Garrod,
2006, p.55) and that the socioeconomic conditions, cognitive outcomes, and resource accessiblity
of non-white individuals were “‘scientifically ordained by Nature’” (p.55). Proponents tried to
12

Use of the word “type” emphasizes the schematizing or taxonomic nature of naturalist and pseudo-scientific racial
categories, which attempted to assign fundamental or inborn attributes to racial identities.
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ascertain “evidence” to prove ideologies of biological and environmental determinism as well as
further new concepts of innate superiority versus inferiority.
Understanding the broad readership as well as the role of travel writing in crafting an
identity of European superiority, we can pivot to the pseudo-scientific work of 19th century
traveling scientists. Race concepts of the 19th century were built upon an existing conceptual
basis of kinship, ancestry, and inheritance, as even pre-Darwin philosophers focused on biblical
lineages and differentiation between human groups. Polygenism emerged around 1520, when
Paracelsus, a Swiss scientist and alchemist, traced European roots to Adam and assigned nonEuropean peoples completely separate origins, such as to Cain, the sinning son of Adam (Graves,
2013). The theory of polygenism became a combined religious and sociopolitical claim that God
intentionally created separate races and endowed an inborn hierarchy of race; while it was not a
scientific theory, this idea was intentionally reinforced by pseudo-scientific tactics, such as
measurements of cranial volume and lithographs contrasting racial types (Garrod, 2006). Several
19th century polygenist thinkers, such as Louis Agassiz, Samuel Morton, Josiah Nott, and
George Robin Gliddon, were simultaneously pseudo-anthropologists and natural scientists who
used anthropometry, skull measurements, lithographs, and photographs to craft and archive
distorted depictions of a racialized other (Garrod, 2006). Agassiz and Morton were two key
contributors to the development of scientific racism during this time.
Agassiz, an noted anti-Darwinist, set out to prove his belief in the fixity of race, or the
idea that there existed distinct human races that could not be diluted over generations (Stepan,
2001). He led an anthropological study that used photography to archive people he assigned as
either “pure” race or a “hybrid” combination of indivisible categories—specifically European,
Indigenous, and African ancestry—within Brazil (Stepan, 2001, p.110). He used exploitative
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tactics to take and archive primarily nude photos, attempting to delineate morphological
differences that he could use to characterize racial “types” (Stepan, 2001). His discourse created
dangerous concepts of people as “purebred” or otherwise mixed, arguing that “hybrid”
individuals would always try to have children with a pure racial type to reverse this conceived
hybridization (Stepan, 2001). Furthermore, Agassiz asserted that “hybrid” persons were prone to
progressive degeneration across generations (Stepan, 2001). While Agassiz collected
photographs, others recorded drawings and lithographs, which were also prone to curatorial bias.
Samuel Morton’s 1839 craniological atlas, Crania Americana, includes a lithographic
comparison of two skulls, one from a Peruvian individual and one from a European. Morton
attempted to visually delineate inherent differences between members of an “ancient race” and
those of European modernity (Stepan, 2001, p.95). Lithographs were extensively used as an
analytical tool, but could be distorted to create racist constructions (Stepan, 2001). Such analyses
center the skull to evidence brain capacity and thus cognition or aptitude. His atlas makes
flagrant, and heinous, scientific errors, such as the artistic contortion of the skulls as well as the
reliance upon one skull, or one individual, to generalize to an entire community or race (Stepan,
2001). These focal points and methodological choices are not benign nor random; what
distinguishes pseudo-scientific thinkers from scientific breakthrough is retroactivity rather than
falsification.
While all realms of science must contend with confirmation bias, pseudo-science is
inherently plagued by it, characterized by a premeditated selection of evidence and lack of
controls or comparisons to justify what is already believed to be true. Conversely, scientific
theory operates on the premise that no hypothesis or theory is ever confirmed but only
corroborated by further evidence and always subject to potential falsification by new
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observations. Even so, we also know that scientists who made valid contributions to their fields
often additionally surmised racist applications of their ideas. Swedish scientist Carolus Linnaeus,
who preceded the aforementioned polygenists and founded the taxonomic system that evolved
into the biological classification system we use today, designated subtypes within Homo sapiens,
including H. sapiens europaeus, H. sapiens afer, H. sapiens asiaticus, and H. sapiens
americanus (Graves, 2013). He, like other 18th and 19th century naturalists, attached hierarchal
meaning to these classifications, casting H. sapiens europaeus as “active and acute” and H.
sapiens afer as “crafty, lazy, and careless” (as cited in Graves, 2013, p. 39). Fast forward to
today’s intra-species analogies to dog breed temperament and intelligence, and we can see an
eerie preservation of continuity. There is a potency to the collective imagination, especially the
scientific imagination, as people mistake scientific progress to be linear.
In contrast to the work of polygenistic and naturalist writers in Latin America, Charles
Darwin was working on his evolutionary theorems from the mid to late 1800s by coalescing
numerous observations and critical examinations that challenged contemporaneous explanations
of naturally occurring species. While he may have originally believed in the fixity of species,
Darwin overturned this idea by recording, during his travels and voyages, empirical evidence to
the contrary (Costa, 2009). Most commonly cited today are his records of unique Galapagos
species and the environmentally-tied advantages of finch, tortoise, and other animal variations
within their Island niches; however, his thought process began to fundamentally diverge from
ideas of fixity during his contemplations on domestic breeders. Costa (2009) describes Darwin’s
conceptual link between the breeding process and speciation:
A key insight appears to be the breeders' assertion that “picking” over a period of time is
sufficient to create new varieties—crossing, or hybridization, is unnecessary. Darwin’s
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Malthusian insight comes about three-quarters of the way through the D Notebook, in
passages dating to September 1838. (p.889)
This observation formed the basis for Darwin's next step, the idea that naturally occurring
phenomena could produce the same nascence of variety as human intervention through this
gradual “picking” of traits (Costa, 2009). Darwin eventually produced such a strong critique
because, like Mendel, he provided extensive deductive evidence, researching not to prove but to
discover. Nonetheless, like other naturalists of his time, Darwin looked up to Alexander von
Humboldt as a highly influential figure (Costa, 2009; Garrod, 2006) as well as speaks of
civilized and uncivilized races and links between skull capacity, “intellectual faculties” (p.145),
and the “[proven]” (p.146) cranial differences between “Europeans”, “Americans”,
“Australians”, and “Asiatics” (Darwin, 1871, p.146). Humboldt’s demeaning ideas of Indigenous
peoples and the Tropical “other” subsisted in the popular consciousness, Darwin held onto
foundationally racist conjectures, and fallacious social adaptations of Darwin’s theory emerged.
The phrase “survival of the fittest” was crafted by Herbert Spencer, a sociologist who
attributed the “growing social inequality in both England and the United States” (as cited in
Garrod, 2006, p.56) to societal competition and differential human fitness. Overlapping concepts
characterize Social Darwinism, an umbrella term encapsulating varying ideologies that apply
Darwinian evolution to human sociology (Bowler, 2016). The basic idea argues that aspects of
human nature are biologically ingrained and arose gradually over the course of past survivalist
necessity. This concept has been applied to explain political systems, war, and race relations. In
her chapter section discussing the “rising tide of white world supremacy”, McWhorter (2009)
argues that “science… portrayed racial conflict as an inevitable subplot in an evolutionary
narrative” (p.142), and recurrent studies that described Indigenous peoples as “dying out” added
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“more empirical weight to the claim that white world domination was imminent” (McWhorter,
2009, p.144). Evolution was employed to imagine race as a long-term process of human
differentiation, supposing that groups of primordial humans broke away from a once unified
species, sustained insulated civilizations, and independently evolved into contemporary racial
groups with adapted, inborn characteristics (McWhorter, 2009). This idea reified environmental
deterministic in a new context of heritability, supposing that the harsh, temperate landscapes of
Europe enabled the European subgroup to become inherently civilized through evolutionary
mechanisms (McWhorter, 2009).
Evolution proved to be a theory that was readily and falsely manipulated from the time
of Darwin and through the 20th century. In 1962, Carelton Coon published The Origin of Races,
arguing that different subgroups of people ascended the ladder of human evolution, and process
of civilization, at different rates (as cited in Jackson, 2001). Using evolution to fabricate the
innateness of biological difference and ingroup traits, scientific racism conveyed race as the
product of a lengthy evolutionary process spanning far beyond the reach of scientific evidence
and through the earliest beginnings of Homo sapiens—making the theoretical argument
empirically inaccessible. And, this argument could be furthered by an imagined need to protect
the evolutionary process from compromised bloodlines (McWhorter, 2009). And so, race
relations, or racial conflict, were explained by Social Darwinists as evolutionarily codified over
time, attempting to naturalize white supremacy, and its violence, as natural and inevitable. Social
Darwinism lended to the development of “eugenics, pseudoscience, and psychometry” (Garrod,
2006, p.56) by Sir Francis Galton.With the advent of genetics in the 20th century, racialization
adopted a new genetic language that cited invisible “factors of heredity” (Yudell, 2011, p.17)
instead of the skull, skin, and other physical traits to establish race as inherent. These
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rudimentary understandings of genetics further fettered race to biology and heredity and were
solidified within eugenic ideology:
This geneticization of race—the idea that racial differences in appearance and complex
social behaviors can be understood as genetic distinctions between so-called racial
groups—was shaped, in large part, by the eugenics movement. (Yudell, 2011, p.17)
The logic follows that if race, and the social factors it supposedly predisposes, is an inherent and
inheritable genetic characteristic, then different races can be extricated from the human gene
pool. Two coexisting branches stemmed from this movement, including the idea of positive
eugenics, which promoted selective breeding between certain groups, and negative eugenics,
which “denied the right to reproduce” (Yudell, 2011, p.18) from certain groups. Both were
vehemently racist, ableist, and queerphobic at their core, representing strategies to create the
idyllic version of humankind—the white supremacist version.
Eugenics is inseparable from fallacious concepts of heredity. In a perspective piece, Ryan
(2015) describes eugenicists to believe that physical traits, and more specifically race, were
indivisible from moral character, temperament, and aptitude, all inherited congruently unless
diluted by dissimilar blood. In the United States, promoters of eugenics, such as R. W. Shufeldt
(1915), disseminated the idea that the increasing social and political presence of Black
communities should be America’s primary concern, sensationalizing that the “aim and highest
ambition” (p.124) of Black women was to have children with white men because “the superior
intelligence coming from their white fathers, will command better positions… powerfully
[furthering] the interests, political and otherwise” (p.124) of African Americans. Shufeldt
attempted to fuel a racist hysteria against Black Americans while also reinforcing the idea that
racially superior and inferior genetics existed. Charles Davenport tried to justify institutional
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racism by fabricating the existence of a “constitutional, hereditary, genetic basis for the
difference between the two races in mental tests” (Yudell, 2011, p.18), referring to Black and
white Americans. Again, Davenport cites heredity and genetics as evidence for inherent racial
disparity, and ideas like his formed a statutory basis for legalized eugenics. In the 20th century,
the United States saw the advent of forcible sterilization laws, rooted in these false ideas of
genetics and heredity, that amassed anywhere from 30,000 to 60,000 cases (Stern, 2016; Yudell,
2011). Many sterilizations were aimed at women deemed “feebleminded” or “insane”, but
coercive tactics were disproportionately applied to “Mexican American (Guitierrez 2008), Puerto
Rican (Lopez 2008), Native American, and Black women (Solinger 2005)” (as cited in Shreffler
et al., 2015, p.3) during the early to mid 1900s. Eugenicists also helped fashion segregation laws
in the United States throughout the early 1900s. Among the most prominent voices of resistance
were African American scholars and activists Kelly Miller, the Dean of Howard University, and
W. E. B. Du Bois, who fought for humanity, scourged the flagrant scientific fallacies of
eugenicists and challenged biological concepts of race as, instead, socially constructed (Yudell,
2011). Indeed, understanding race as scientifically imagined, but with social consequences, is the
key to dismantling ideologies of biological race. Ironically, the conceptual products of
racialization that were reinforced by scientific racism during the 18th through 20th centuries
actually serve as prime examples of how race is non-contiguous.
The social construction of the American race concept is apparent in contrasts between
peoples within the US as well as in comparison to other countries, calling upon a common thread
of blood, purity, heredity, and ancestry. Over the course of American history, Euro-American
colonizers racialized Native American tribal membership, and antimiscegenation laws regulating
racial distinctions remained intact until around 1968 (Tallbear, 2013). The 19th century saw
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political efforts to “detribalize” Native Americans through assimilation projects requiring
boarding-school education, prohibiting religious practices, and dismantling communal living
infrastructures, all backed by the pseudo-scientific idea that Native American blood could be
“diluted” over multiple generations (Tallbear, 2013, p.47). This notion of dilution perhaps
harkens back to the ideas of Christopher Columbus and his contemporaries during preliminary
encounters with the Americas:
Columbus’s descriptions of weak innocents and fierce cannibals established a dichotomy
that framed most European characterizations of the Native people of the Americas for the
next five centuries and more. Despite depictions that distinguished sharply between
Europeans and misnamed ‘Indians’ at the outset of colonization, many Europeans
believed the latter could be transformed. Three “sauage men” from northeastern North
America arrived in England in the 1490s “in their demeanour like to bruite beastes,’
Robert Fabian related, but after two years he “coulde not discerne [them] from
Englishmen.” (as cited in Harvey, 2016, p. 3)
Fabian’s racist statements and caricatures reflect the later notion that Native American identity
could disappear, or be assimilated, into European whiteness over the course of subsequent
generations; the social and political factors surrounding this theory will be discussed more
deeply in Chapter 6. In the 20th century, the US also conjured the one-drop rule for African
Americans, whereby “racial distinctions were based strictly on skin colour” that categorized
“anyone visibly ‘non-white’ as ‘black’” (Stepan, 2001, p.94). This rule was born in the South
and eventually pervaded nationally, classifying Blackness based on the presence of a single
African ancestor in one’s lineage (Davis, 1991). The rule was a manifestation of racist Jim Crow
anxieties that further barricaded African Americans from resource access and societal
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participation in spite of pushes for the assimilation of other groups (Davis, 1991). The one-drop
rule contrasts the dilution theory applied to Native Americans, evidencing that the social
malleability of racialization depends upon interests of the hegemonic group. A key difference
between the two race concepts centers tribal land sovereignty within colonial America, as a
deemed loss of Indigenous identity could be leveraged to diminish land ownership (SteersMccrum, 2018). Thus, race could be constructed differently depending on place and as shaped by
history, naturalist discourse, colonialism, and sociopolitical interests. Brazilian race structure
differed from the “white/non-white dichotomy” of the United States and instead held quandrants
of varying racial intersections and component proprotions (Stepan, 2001, p.105). Numerous
terms emerged to describe different peoples, such as “pardon, cafuzos, mestiços, and morenos”
(Stepan, 2001, p.105). Specificity of language often reflects the social legitimacy as well as
societal relevance of termed identities, and that reigns true for the race concept of Brazil as well
as other Latin American countries post-independence. In a study on the “Ideology Of White
Racial Supremacy: Colonization And De-colonization Processes” in Brazil, Nogueira (2013)
explains racism as a more nuanced color gradient whereby “the darker the skin color, the more
one suffers discrimination” (p.25). Moreover, whiteness is less tied to ancestry and more strictly
ascribed to phenotype and social status in Brazil (Nogueira, 2013). The process of racialization,
and histories of racism and colonization, manifested differently in both countries, enabling the
social and interactional nature of race to be evidenced through comparison.
Scientific racism culminated on a global scale when negative eugenics manifested as
genocide by the Nazi regime, feuling a war for so called ‘Aryan’ (white) supremacy (Yudell,
2011). Eugenics and genocide clearly visualized the evils of scientific racism (queer, disabled,
Polish, Catholic, Serbian, Soviet, and all other persons targted by the Nazi regime should not be
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forgetten here) at the cost of immense suffering and innumerable lost lives. Following World
War II, efforts to critically analyze and decisively sever notions of biological race emerged. New
developments in genetics, such as the discovery of the structure of DNA, study of multifactorial
and epistatic genes, the mapping of the human genome, and the nascence of epigenetics
undermined simplistic and unsound ideas of human heredity. In 1954, the Brown v. the Board of
Education US Supreme Court decision cited key evidence in an influential text by Gunnar
Myrdal, an economist from Sweden, who attested to the “great variability of traits among
individuals in every population group… and the considerable amount of overlapping between all
existing groups” (Yudell, 2011 p.21). The revelation that human genomes showed 99%
similarity across all communities prompted non-scientific world leaders, such as Bill Clinton
(Human Genome Sequencing, 2000), to announce that “all human beings, regardless of race, are
more than 99.9 percent the same”. Genetics appeared to now be unraveling ideologies of
difference entrenched in scientific racism—yet, it took the perceived final authority of science
for people to reimagine race.
Again, we pivoted. We discerned a minute, but detectable, window of allele frequencies
that were unique to specific cohorts, and, as it follows, certain ancestral lineages. We honed in
once again on the science—the genetics—of difference. The process of racialization has
delimited people by physical appearance and ancestry, emphasizing the collective, but fabricated,
inheritance of intellectual, moral, and otherwise immutable traits. Such ideas fundamentally
center heritability, paralleling in concept the immutable nature of alleles and the vocabulary
genetics at large (albeit a grossly fallacious version of genetics). Perhaps we should come to
understand the history of race in science not as a subsection of the race concept, or a byproduct
of Eurocentric scientific histories, but as fundamental to creating much of the scaffolding of
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racialization itself. Biological race was not only purported by pseudo-scientists (i.e. Agassiz) but
also reinforced by those who produced work deemed legitimate and preliminary to currently
accepted theories but nonetheless injected heinously racist ideas (i.e. Linnaeus). While authentic
displays of the scientific method will always fail to delineate biological race, the field of human
population genetics is running into complex problems of racial conflations because, amidst
searching for the tie between allele frequency clusters and probabilistic inheritance, the field is
having trouble emerging from a racialized lens. This difficulty is especially apparent in attempts
to construct scientifically relevant organizations and cross-comparisons of genetic ancestry.
Today we see a resurgence in genetic discourse surrounding perhaps not explicitly
biological race but proxies of genetic ancestry, continental origin, and admixture. Steadily
advancing genotyping and chip technology has enabled geneticists to investigate the minute
window of potential interpopulation differences that were previously inaccessible. Furthermore,
there is a pressure within disease-susceptibility research to control for genetic substructure that
may have arisen overtime. As we have seen in Chapter 1, geneticists uphold an intricate, logical
basis for the study of genetic ancestry. Human cohorts have likely at different points in time and
different places experienced random effects of genetic drift or selective effects of regional
pressures13, but the descendent imprints of these effects do not fit neatly within any existing
concept of either race or ethnicity. Geographical origin might provide a comparatively better
predictive quality but still bears technical errors and can easily be conflated with or erroneously
used in place of race. But, if ancestral substructure does exist, we are likely asking the wrong
questions - looking from within the wrong framework. The ways in which we are talking about
human populations and genetic admixture are echoing antecedent ideas of racial types, subtypes,
13

Selective pressures could refer to instances such as the relationship between sickle-cell anemia heterozygosity and
Malaria, where the codominant expression of sickle-cell anemia confers immunity from Malaria.
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and proportions. We are not effectively capturing new, quantitative concepts of allele frequency
differences in terms of how they could arise over space and time but rather focusing on a static
image of ancestral vestiges in modern day differences. We are not talking about population
genetics in a way that decisively eradicates race from scientific discourse. The next chapter will
take a comparative approach to the scientific rhetoric of modern genomics. Drawing upon
rhetoric of the past, I will investigate how genetics discourse today sustains the continuity of or
re-conceptualizes the race concept, both explicitly and implicitly, in primary literature, patent
applications, and scientific addresses from the late 20th century to present day.
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CHAPTER THREE

Continuity
Critical Examinations of Present Genetics Discourse

Past scientific imaginations of the race concept continue to inform how the natural
sciences discuss, or selectively omit, race, ethnicity, and ancestry. From the late 1900s and
through modern day, primary literature, database projects, and institutional statements have
addressed the intersection of genetics and race, among other sociocultural identities. Whether
aiming to combat scientific racism or define a new kind of intergroup difference, modern
genetics contends with a racialized framework reinforced by the past several hundred years.
Most geneticists try to decisively separate their research from race, but lines of continuity have
resurfaced, specifically amidst the language surrounding human populations. Within their
primary literature, researchers grapple from within the confines of an accustomed scientific
vocabulary bred from past ways of organizing difference and taxonomizing race. The
International HapMap Consortium, a collection of scientists and funding agencies collaborating
on one of the largest genetic database projects to date, made a statement in 2004 discrediting
specious interpretations or uses of their project data:
...the lack of precise population definitions and ancestral geographical self-assignment is
not problematic for developing the HapMap because exact demarcations are not
necessary for the way that the HapMap will be used, and the Project does not aim to
define populations. No claims are made about the genetic ‘purity’ of the sample sets or
the populations of which donors are members; such claims would be scientifically
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spurious, as human populations are the products of countless social, historical and
demographic processes, and therefore can never be sharply defined. (box 2, p.469)
The International HapMap Consortium takes an important position that denies genetic “purity”
and emphasizes the complexity of heritage. But, the researchers that use genetic databases must
be able to affirm that they have gathered samples representative of different populations for
comparative analysis of interpopulation allele frequencies to make sense. Likewise, projects such
as HapMap still have to make selective decisions about who they will study and create working
definitions of human populations. In fact, the Coriell Institute for Medical Research outlined
“Guidelines for Referring to Populations” that stated:
The way that a population is named in studies of genetic variation, such as in the
HapMap or 1000 Genomes Projects, has important ramifications scientifically, culturally,
and ethically. From a scientific standpoint, precision in describing the population from
which the samples were collected is an essential component of sound study design; the
source of the data must be accurately described in order for the data to be interpreted
correctly. From a cultural standpoint, precision in labeling reflects respect for the local
norms of the communities that agreed to participate in the research, and an
acknowledgement that populations in one part of the world are not all the same.
(Guidelines for Referring to Populations, n.d., para. 2)
The guidelines, which surround the use of the Coriell Institute’s NHGRI Sample Repository that
draws from HapMap and 1000 Genomes populations, go on to emphasize the ethical importance
of precision in preventing under- and over-generalization of results as well as promoting
language consistency across studies (Guidelines for Referring to Populations, n.d.). These
guidelines paradoxically contrast the International HapMap Consortium’s viewpoint, the former
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emphasizing the need for precision while the latter conceives imprecision as relatively
unproblematic.
In their study on the “Application of Genome-Wide Single Nucleotide Polymorphism
Typing: Simple Association and Beyond”, Gibbs and Singleton (2006) review the genome-wide
SNP assay, a robust and efficient technique useful for association studies and made possible by
the accumulation of SNPs for the HapMap project (p.1511). Gibbes and Singleton (2006)
reference the purpose of the HapMap project as determining how “SNP tagging approaches may
vary from population to population” by generating in their first phase “four discrete populations:
Yoruba from Ibadan, Nigeria (YRI); Japanese in Tokyo, Japan (JPT); Han Chinese in Beijing,
China (CHB); and Utah, United States, residents with ancestry from northern and western
Europe (CEU)” (p.1511). Even within a direct application of the HapMap project, human
populations are being characterized as “discrete”; furthermore, Gibbs and Singleton (2006)
elucidate that the first phase HapMap populations were distinguished observationally without
prior knowledge of genomic profiles that existed within the four communities. The study fails to
demarcate human groups as preceded by numerous “social, historical and demographic
processes” (2004, box 2, p.469) the International HapMap Consortium referenced, which would
help readers understand that attempts to identify study populations are based on extrinsic
predictions of comparative genetic difference. The purpose of a database is to supply archived
sample DNA to genetic studies, but we can see that one degree of separation already muddles the
warning message of the International HapMap Consortium. The remainder of this chapter will
look at a couple examples of primary literature, database projects, and scientific addresses as
case studies of scientific rhetoric within the field. The scope of this chapter is limited to a small
number of examples, as its primary purpose is to initiate conversations about how current

44

rhetoric reifies past racial typologies through new sociocultural conflations rather than speak
comprehensively on the study designs or intentionality of all contemporary genetic research.
With an increased focus on genetic populations, researchers in the field launched their
own diversity projects. Earlier versions were not as tied to biomedical or other forms of applied
research but took a broad interest in explorations of human history. On September 21st, 1994,
Luca Cavalli-Sforza, then a professor of genetics at Stanford University, made an address to
UNESCO regarding the Human Genome Diversity Project. At the time, the project self-defined
as an anthropological endeavor to study the “genetic richness of the entire human species”
(Cavalli-Sforza, 1994, p.1) by accumulating globally representative genetic samples, but it would
eventually evolve into genomic analysis of human variation and a cell line panel including over
1,000 individuals from 52 populations worldwide by the 21st century (Rosenberg et al., 2003).
Within the address, Cavalli-Sforza outlines its main goals and methods, citing one of the primary
roles as “[combating] the scourge of racism” (Cavalli-Sforza, 1994, p.1). He believed that
studying human population genetics was one of the best ways to prove the wrongness of racism
(Cavalli-Sforza, 1994). Scientific racism entrenched social concepts of the racialized other in
fabricated scientific “fact”; in other words, it was a social manipulation that assumed a scientific
voice. But Cavalli-Sforza, among others, believed that science was the primary, and perhaps
only, tool to reverse this trajectory, the only means of summoning counteracting proof. Concepts
like these, though well-intentioned, miss gaps filled by a sociological perspective, which
understands the human role in crafting race and power systems.
While late 20th century geneticists like Cavalli-Sforza discredited past fallacies of
biological race, they believed there was information to be drawn from scientifically-relevant
populations. Cavalli-Sforza (1994) notes the central but somewhat elusive genetic basis of
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human populations: “in general, human populations differ, with respect to a genetic marker, only
in the relative frequencies of the different forms” (p.4). He explains that any given individual in
any “population” could inherit any of the possible forms of a gene, but groups of individuals can
be characterized by the collective proportions of each form. One group could theoretically differ
from another group or the global population at large by the frequency of one or multiple gene
forms. This definition sheds light on the quantitative and probabilistic nature of genetics, as
groups could technically be defined arbitrarily by numerous different metrics, and in-group allele
frequencies are subject to constant change with each subsequent generation. We see the
distinctions of Cavalli-Sforza’s definition begin to dissolve when the HGDP translated precepts
into practice. The search for groups where allele frequencies have been structured by common
ancestry led the HGDP back to a lens of coloniality, looking to the same places where previous
naturalists perceived difference.
The HGDP prioritized groups that were “anthropologically unique” (Cavalli-Sforza,
1994, p.7) and practiced languages or cultures that made them distinct from most or every other
population. Caballi-Sforza thought that studying these groups would ultimately yield benefits for
both the community members themselves and all of humanity by learning from preserved genetic
“uniqueness” (Cavalli-Sforza, 1994). This paternalistic intent translated into the seeking out of
Indigenous tribes, clans, and communities worldwide, raising important ethical and social
concerns, specifically intersecting with boundaries of Indigenous sovereignty and identity
(Barker, 2004; Dukepoo, 1999). Cavalli-Sforza understood “isolated” populations, perceived as
culturally, linguistically, and geographically bound, to hold more information regarding human
evolutionary history; further, he worried that convergence, or mixing, of these communities with
others would curtail the information they could provide in the now (Barker, 2004). In her study
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on the cultural politics of identification in the Human Genome Project, Joanne Barker (2004)
notes the continuity in the prioritization of populations:
Regardless of the “good intents” of those involved with the HGDP, the lack of reflection
on their discourses disavowed the very realities of colonialism and racism that produced
the situations that put these various populations on the HGDP’s list in the first place.
(p.586)
Barker denotes here that their perception as a distinctive other has not dissipated, specifically
amidst the HGDP prioritization schema. The “list” she mentions refers to the potential existence
of an actual list of several hundred target groups characterized by their likelihood to “disappear”,
whether due to natural disaster, war, or merging and dispersal (Barker, 2004). Since early
contacts between colonizers and colonized land, Indigenous people have been objectified to
scrutiny, scientific dehumanization, violence, and displacement, and Indigenous tribes continue
to face power imbalances and injustices in science today. Not long before Cavalli-Sforza’s
address, Arizona State University researchers studying Type II diabetes asked members of the
Havasupai Tribe for DNA samples. Tribal members agreed with the understanding that their
donations would facilitate diabetes research, but “in 2003, it was discovered that the samples
were used for studies on schizophrenia, history of migration, and inbreeding” (Lee, p.147, 2015)
without releasing these intentions explicitly in the consent form or gaining permission from the
tribe. A lawsuit was filed (Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona Board of Regents) and the Havasupai
Tribe obtained compensation as well as the original DNA samples (Lee, 2015). The experience
of the Havasupai Tribe exemplifies the continuity between colonial exploitation and modern
genetic research, elucidating the dangers posed by the targeted scrutiny of the HGDP.
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Controversy still surrounds the HGDP, and many critics today understand it as a failed
attempt to archive culturally, linguistically, and otherwise socially diverse DNA banks that
generated ethical and consent-related concerns (Foster & Sharp, 2002). Today, genomics has
entered an era of next generation sequencing (NGS), characterized by unprecedented analytical
breadth and efficiency (Pardo-Seco et al., 2014). Marked technological advancements, such as
“chip-based genotyping” (Saeb, 2016, p.1), and reduced costs have enabled significant database
growth for projects universally, including the HGDP. NGS enabled the transformation of the
HGDP into the HGDP-CEPH human genome diversity cell line panel, which has been used in
papers from the 2000s through the present to integrate human demographic histories within
clinical and forensic genetics (Holsinger & Weir, 2009; Pereira et al., 2019; Shi et al., 2009).
Several concurring database projects exist, the HGDP representing an early version emerging
alongside first full sequencing of the human genome.
Large-scale genetic databases, which echo similar purposes of increasing sample
diversity, have normalized discourses surrounding human populations and sampling methods as
well as supported database compilation as a central interest of modern genomics. Such projects
include the HapMap project and the 1000 Genomes Project as well as fine-scale studies forming
databases within countries and among regional ethnic groups. Among other databases, NGS has
catalyzed significant developmental strides in the HapMap project, purposed with accumulating
vast population-specific SNP data to facilitate association studies; HapMap has entered its third
phase, seeing the addition of 1 million SNPs to both registered and new population
classifications, and has mapped a vast span of rare and common gene variants to enable the
continued study of population differentiation (Altshuler & Donnelly, 2005; Elhaik, 2012; Saeb &
Al-Naqeb, 2016). Applications include those by Elhaik et al. (2012), who re-examined Fst
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distributions using 3 million SNPs from eight populations and 1 million SNPs from globally
representative population compared to the upper limit of 40,000 SNPs that studies throughout the
2000s used. Pardo-Seco et al. (2014) used the entire HapMap database to proxy as a global
sample their inter-continental analysis. These kinds of database advancements are the gateway
toward more expansive study design, as studies can simply download population datasets (as
they have been classified within the particular database) directly from project web sites. Thus,
genetic databases have a central role in framing the genetic ancestry concept. Sandra Soo-Jin Lee
(2015) explores the social and political exercise of termed biobanks:
In addition to being physical repositories, biobanks are unique social artifacts that
concretize assumptions about population boundaries to organize and sort human samples.
Informed by sociohistorical taxonomies of how to distinguish human groups, policies on
categorizing biological materials stored in biobanks reveal the shifting and contingent
meanings around genetic differences and their significance for concepts of ancestry,
ethnicity, and race. (p.144)
Genetic databases, or biobanks, form the initial “taxonomies of ‘molecular difference’” (Lee,
2015, p.144) that shape how studies perform association analysis. Database groupings are often
created before the DNA samples belonging to each group are collected, allowing database
projects to actively control who is prioritized for study and who, at large, is predicted to show
genetic differences within the minute window of interpopulation variation. They perform a
racializing refraction of how we interpret the very term “interpopulation”. A major fallacy lies in
defining individual membership to groups based on genomic profiles, as any semblance of
interpopulation difference can only be examined at the group level. Nonetheless, molecular
taxonomies have led to a massive focus on ancestral inference. These databases serve as an
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integral scaffolding for the study of genetic ancestry and the standardization of rhetoric
surrounding human populations.
After HGDP evolved into the HGDP-CEPH cell line panel, contemporary uses and
applications of the Human Genome Diversity Project, among other modern databases,
reimagined past concepts of discrete genetic elements in another branching line of continuity.
While Cavalli-Sforza (1994) discredited notions of genetic “purity”, explaining the near
impossibility of generating any such thing even with plants and animals in the laboratory, his
fears of a fleeting opportunity to study isolated populations reimagined concepts of purity and
intercrossing but in terms of tapping older, undispersed, or undiluted ancestral lineages.
Reification of these concepts are majorilly apparent in the ways modern geneticists try to
categorize people. In a recent study entitled “Inference Of Human Continental Origin And
Admixture Proportions Using A Highly Discriminative Ancestry Informative 41-SNP Panel”,
Nievergelt et al. (2013) ran validity tests on an AIM panel, drawing samples from both HGDPCEPH and HapMap reference populations. The researchers wrestle with keeping concepts of
human population distinct from old notions of typology and mixing. When describing genetic
maps of “Native American populations” in the Americas, Nievergelt et al. (2013) note that
“admixed Muscogee and HapMap Mexicans” did not cluster as expected and “showed a strong
European component” (p.7). Here, the researchers try to qualify geographic origin through
genetic ancestral inference, but describing a “European component” raises ambiguity. What does
“component” mean? It implies that one’s heritage can be numericized as parts of a whole, that
convergence between ancestries yields a fractioned inheritance, and that European ancestry can
be captured as strong or weak within a genealogy.
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The answers to these questions are neither self-evident nor explicit within the body of the
article. Nievergelt et al. (2013) present their findings on “admixed Muscogee and HapMap
Mexicans” as an noteworthy exception to the predicted genetic clustering of Native American
tribes. A hundred years prior, H.M. Tomlinson, an Englishman who explored the Brazilian
Amazon in 1909, recorded his thoughts on the individuals he encountered while traveling in the
providence of Pará, expressing confusion as “one used to the features of a race of pure blood” (as
cited in Wood & Chasteen, 2009, p.147). Rooted in ignorance, Tomlinson is perplexed by people
who challenged his internalized constructs of race. He invokes ideas of pure, indivisible races,
recording (using different terms) that he saw Portuguese, Afro-Brazilian, and InginenousBrazilian components “but rarely a true type of one” (as cited in Wood & Chasteen, 2009,
p.147), as if race could be reduced as predeterministic ingredients. He tries to physically
characterize which features come from each “pure” race, observationally cataloging and
dissecting real people. In doing so, Tomlinson believes that he could discern those in whom
“[B]lack was the predominant factor” (as cited in Wood & Chasteen, 2009, p.147) and those in
whom it was not. The terminology of “predominant factor” is not too distinctive from “strong
European component”. Both make the reader visualize ancestry as an assemblage of distinct or
blended components. Thinking back to the descriptors used by Nievergelt et al., we can also pose
the following question: how many ancestors does it take for a “component” to be conceived as a
whole, or as the dominant identity within which other ancestries are “component”? Nievergelt et
al. (2013) clearly contend with the fundamental quandary of devising “more objective and
accurate methods of defining homogenous populations” for scientific study (p.2). They recognize
a need for improvement, but this statement begs the question of how to define homogeneity in
the context of humans and the scale by which relative differentiation or relatedness constitutes
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homogeneity. What is the threshold of difference, or what proportion of loci, permits a geneticist
to subdivide groups, and what is the threshold of relatedness if most genetic variation occurs
across all human individuals? Furthermore, the idea of a “European component” safeguards
geneticists from explaining the processes of European colonialism and sexual exploitation that
lent to describing a “European component” in the genealogy of Indigenous families. Identifying
where dated language resurfaces in present literature not only prods at unanswered questions but
also helps unveil the elusive framework that continues to guide studies of human difference.
Reuse of outdated scientific archetypes primes readers to conceptualize new findings
through the same racialized lens. In 2011, Dorothy Roberts accentuated this contention, drawing
focus to the advancing technical capabilities of genomics in a Human Genome Project
postmortem, indicating that “biological theories of race…” are experiencing a revival through
“cutting-edge genomic research… [modernizing] old racial typologies” (as cited in Nelson,
2016, p.13). In their 2013 article, Batai and Kittles discuss whether genetic ancestry, as it is
defined and detected using current research methods, provides practical insight into
understanding health disparities. As the founder of African Ancestry tests, Ph.D in human
genetics, and lecturer on Afrocentric genetic ancestry, Dr. Rick Kittles believes there is promise
to genetic ancestry, but he and Batai are critical about its implications and made an important
note that modern geneticists and researchers are still referencing racial categorizations from
scientific studies on race that predate modern genetics and primarily distinguished physical
characteristics (skin color, facial contour, and skull parameters) (Batai & Kittles, 2013). Roberts,
Batai and Kittles are accurate in their reference to the use of outdated constructs, as racial
typologies have resurfaced both subtly and overtly. In a 1982 article on the “Evolution of Human
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Race at the Gene Level”, Masatoshi Nei uses protein and blood group loci to try to qualify gross
genetic relatedness using past, rudimentary racial types:
Genetic distance data indicate that Caucasoid and Mongoloid are somewhat closer to
each other than to Negroid. Analysis of restriction site data for mitochondrial DNA also
shows the same genetic relationship. It seems that the Negroid and the CaucasoidMongoloid groups diverged about 110,000 + 34,000 years ago, whereas Caucasoid and
Mongoloid diverged about 41,000 + 15,000 years ago. (p.167)
These terms invoke colonial era archetypes of human origin; it seems that, amidst the advent of
molecular genetics, they were unwittingly relied upon once again, this time assumed to be
genetically-relevant categories. But, even as recent as 2005, we see an overt reinsertion of racial
typologies to characterize the “ethnic origins” and multiple identities of India for the Indian
Genome Variation Database (IGVdb) (2005):
Indian population can be, to a large extent, substructured on the basis of their ethnic
origin as well as linguistic lineages. All the four major morphological types—Caucasoid,
Mongoloid, Australoid and Negrito are present in the Indian population (Malhotra, 1978).
The “Caucasoid” and “Mongoloid” populations are mainly concentrated in the north and
northeastern parts of the country. The “Australoids” are mostly confined to the central,
western and southern India, while the “Negritos” are restricted only to the Andaman
Islands. (p.2)
Both Nei and The Indian Genome Variation Consortium refer to the same subset, generally
translating into Europe, Africa, Australia, and Asia; Nei (1982) mentions “Australoid” later in
the text. Purported racial typologies have shifted in number and scope, but seem to always center
around 3-5 main groups (interestingly, the first three ancestries HapMap intended to study were
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African, European, and Asian ancestries). The original uses of common typological terms date
back to 1795, when Johann Blumenbach published his third addition of De generis humani
varietate nativa; this edition delineated “five generic varieties” comprising “Caucasians”,
“Mongolians”, “Ethiopoians”, “Americans”, and “Malays”, whose physicalities he extensively
detailed according to the intra-group anatomical similarities he perceived (Bhopal, 2007;
Takezawa, 2012). Blumenbach tried to denote them as varieties without static bounds, but he still
construed racialized meaning from perceived physical differences14, and scientific racism later
perpetuated these types within its discourses (Takezawa, 2012). For example, we have seen
Carolus Linneaus echo a similar schema in his taxonomic conjecture of four foundational
subgroups within Homo sapiens, both linked to geography (Garrod, 2006) and entrenched in an
“ideology of race that is used to explain, predict, and ultimately control social behavior” (Lee,
2015, p.146). And, the convergence of novel genetic methods with vestiges of racial typology
becomes especially concerning in light of contemporary arguments, such as Nicholas Wade’s A
Troublesome Inheritance, a book published in 2014 that harkens back to discourses of
environmental determinism; Wade defines a set of biologically distinct human races that are tied
together by distinguishable social behaviors and temperaments, assigning Western civilization as
superior due to the entrepreneurial nature of the Caucasian race (as cited in Nelson, 2016, p. 14).
Continuing to use these terms in genetic literature reinstates their intellectual authority,
homogenizing broad continental regions as distinct racial groups.

14

Blumenbach’s (1865) works disseminated the term “Caucasian” (p.249) as representative of “the most beautiful
race of men” (p.249) due to cranial structure and whiteness, which he believed to be the primordial color of
humankinds since it is easy for white to “degenerate into brown” (p. 249). His term “Caucasian” is geographically
rooted in the individuals he observed at Mount Caucasus between Europe and Asia, yet he extrapolates such
instances as a fundamental human “variety”, conveying how easily geographic origin can be racialized.
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In more subtle cases, certain studies have assumed a central focus on five to six “main”
continental regions as genetically-relevant delineations. Along with other geneticists, Rosenberg
et al. (2002) concluded that differences between individuals within a given population accounts
for the majority of total human genetic variation. One of the earlier studies of population
structure, this article detects six major clusters of genetic similarities, with five “[corresponding]
largely to major geographic regions” (Rosenberg et al., 2002, p.2382). The study ran statistical
analyses of 4199 alleles and visualized either across all or in only one of the following regions:
Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Central/South Asia, East Asia, Oceania, and America
(Rosenberg et al., 2002). Regional geography might be a pertinent comparative lens if we think
about spatial differentiation and the random structuring effects of genetic drift; however,
researchers have a significant hand in curating as well as making sense of the selected
geographic boundaries, which interestingly often follow similar trends as the antecedent
typological locales. The sixth genetic cluster that appeared at K=6 was perceived as an outlier
because it did not conform to any of the expected “major” geographical regions:
However, the next cluster at K=6 did not match a major region but consisted largely of
individuals of the isolated Kalash group, who speak an Indo-European language and live
in northwest Pakistan. (Rosenberg et al., 2002, p. 2382)
The idea of major, minor, or outlier geographical regions and ethnic groups is an ingrained
organizational construct, built into theories of human migration across places before they were
given names. We see another equivocal definition emerge from the study by Nievergelt et al.
(2013), which references “outliers of minority ancestries” (p.14) as those existing outside of the
designated main continental groups. They do not further define “minority ancestry”, and it is
unknown whether this refers to specific locations, ethnic or multi-ethnic identities, or “outlier”
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clusters that are only apparent after “[grouping] subjects into continental clusters using a
majority criterion” (Nievergelt, 2013, p.14) and adjunct statistical methods. While the science is
vastly different and increasingly more complex, there is a critical aspect of modern genomics
that is reminiscent of past efforts to observe and produce taxonomic schemas (Hauskeller et al.,
2013). While helpful for visualizing complex theories on the history of humankind, today’s
commonplace ideas of major geographic groupings can also be constrictive, framing where we
look or expect to see patterns and differences arise as well as how we construct comparative
analysis.
As the study of human population genetics progressed, researchers had to develop
methods for defining who constitutes a given human population, producing different versions. In
their published patent application, “Computations and Methods for Inferring Ancestry”, Mark
Shriver, a biological anthropologist, and Tony Frudakis, a molecular biologist, (2004) promote
the use of “biogeographical tests” in determining the relative proportion of ancestry in an
individual. Although most versions attempt to sever controversy from genetics, Shriver and
Frudakis (2004) conflate race within the conceptualization of biogeographical ancestry. Shriver
and Frudakis (2004) precipitously assert the viability of inferring ancestry from physical traits,
disease predispositions, and drug responsiveness as well as decisively interpolate race within its
definition:
On a basic level, human population structure can be represented in terms of
BioGeographical Ancestry (BGA), which is the heritable component of “race” or
heritage, and which is relevant on any scale of resolution. For example, on a crude level,
BGA can be determined for 2 groups (e.g., European vs. others); or on a fine level, e.g., it
can refer to “race” in terms of 4 groups. Such as IndoEuropeans, East Asians, Sub-
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Saharan African and Native American; or on a finer level, e.g., it can refer to ethnicity
within the European group (for example, Mediterranean or Scandinavian).... (p.1)
Frudakis and Shriver communicate an acute, determinist testament to the heritability of race. The
language utilized to describe human population structure appears dubiously ethnocentric,
describing groups in terms of “European vs. others” or grossly clumping regional ancestry into
broad categories of “IndoEuropeans, East Asians, Sub-Saharan African and Native Americans”
(Frudakis, 2004, p.1). In describing fine-scale population structure, Frudakis and Shriver (2004)
define populations by intragroup ethnicity rather than race, sustaining an unsound semantic leap
between two sociocultural concepts as scientifically equivalent.
In one of their cited biogeographical tests, an experimental sample of participants selfreported their ancestry by classifying their parents and grandparents as the following: “‘African’,
‘American Indian’, ‘Asian’, ‘Caucasian’, ‘Hispanic' or ‘Other’” (Frudakis, 2004, p.39). Again,
we see conflations of different categorization schema outlined by the test, and a number of
incongruencies and connotations are apparent. “Hispanic” here could either refer to those of
Spanish descent, those in any Spanish-speaking countries, or anyone identifying as Latinx.
Today, some argue that the use of the word “Hispanic” inflates Spanish heritage, or Spain’s
impact as a colonizer, and dilutes the many racial and ethnic identities comprising Latin America
and Latinx communities; however, use of the terms Hispanic, Latino/a, and Latinx15 remain
debated within communities and between individuals (Simón, 2018). Caucasian again references
old racial typologies of Blumenbach and his contemporaries. “American Indian” invokes misuse
of the term “Indian” by colonizers in the Americas and serves as the only Indigenous designation
specified within the group, erasing innumerable Indigenous peoples worldwide. Finally, they

15

Latinx is a gender neutral iteration that broadens inclusivity beyond binary constructs of gender.
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create the categorical “Other”, which literally others those who do not identify with the
prescribed categories. It is as if these categories are frozen within a colonial timeline, assuming
the circumscription of these groups within their respective communities and a lack of
immigration, integration, or space for multiple identities. Although Frudakis and Shriver
recommend biogeographical ancestry (BGA) as a more scientifically objective classification
schematic in place of race or ethnicity, their attempt to describe the “biological” components of
race in the guise of BGA veils the sociopolitical realities of identity and exposes their
ethnocentric lens. These initiatives, and the messages they disseminated, are components to the
intellectual foundation of genetic ancestry in modern genomics. Frudakis and Shriver’s BGA test
raises important issues surrounding the reliability of genetic classification schema, which will be
explored further in Chapter 5.
Biogeographical ancestry is a new term for an old concept, namely biologically discrete
elements of race. A more recent study by Pardo-Seco et al. (2014) discredit genetic support for
race but continue to adapt biogeographical ancestry (BGA) as a more objective metric than other
descriptors of human populations. Aside from the more obvious noise of analytical techniques,
visualization software, high-throughput sequencing ability, Pardo-Seco et al. reference Pääbo
(2003), who distinguishes how our understanding of genetics at the level of the genome,
individual, and population diverges from past simplistic views of genetic elements and biological
human groups:
To understand what make us unique, both as individuals and as a species, we need to
consider the genome as a mosaic of discrete segments, each with its own unique history
and relatedness to different contemporary and ancestral individuals. (p.409)
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Here, Pääbo (2003) provides an interesting map to understanding the genome as a complex
process and product of inheritance, reminding us that both long-term ancestral heritage and close
relatedness contributes to the multifaceted genetics of each individual. Furthermore, this
understanding focuses on the genome rather than the individual, circumventing the idea that an
individual is holistically defined by some sort of homogenous genome. But, when genetic
ancestry translates into inclusion criteria, such as Frudakis and Shriver’s BGA test, the
standardization and consistency required for empirical study frequently gives rise to the modern
versions of “old racial typologies”, as previously described by Roberts. Rather than
understanding allele frequency differences as impermanent and, at their core, unintelligible using
sociocultural constructs, we get caught in the weeds of trying to attribute genomic segments to
modern-day signifiers, shaped by racialization, colonialism and state-building.
The study of genetic ancestry has reopened conversations on racial and ethnic identity in
science. Replacing “people” with “population” and “individual” with “sample” has become
commonplace, and as a result, makes it easier to overlook the humanness of those implicated in
genetic studies. In an interesting chronological quandary, we try to craft a working definition of
“population” to enable interpopulation analysis, as Barker (2004) argues that populations are not,
in fact, natural formations:
The truth is that populations are not naturally occurring. In part, they were produced in
the context of state efforts to classify and track various classes of people, including
criminals, the poor, the diseased, et cetera, in the development and administration of state
services and moneys (Hall et al. 1978, Foucault 1979). Within the emergence of the gene
and genome as specific fields of study in biology and anthropology, populations were put
to work in efforts to deracialize human genetics. They were called upon specifically
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during the incredible scrutiny over the role of eugenics in state programmes of genocide,
mutilation and sterilization that followed the disclosure of the inhumane atrocities
committed by Nazi scientists during World War II (Haraway, 1989; Hayden, 1998;
Peters, 1998). (p.577)
Barker hones in on continuity, positioning the attempted deracialization of human populations in
genetics as a reaction to the culminating atrocities of eugenics. The construct of populations
creates a surrogate to study group difference as a scientific object insulated from historical
context, politics of identification, and social realities. The quantitative allele frequency clusters
that geneticists are trying to discern via populations likely exist in numerous, intricate, and
transient ways but not in the static and racialized manners they are being conceptualized, which
is especially evident in the discourse surrounding admixture. In a simulated scenario, Pardo-Seco
et al. (2014) describe the conditions for admixture, using the term “hybrid AA-genomes” to
represent admixed genomic profiles. Although hybrid specifically refers to DNA segments rather
than whole persons (building off the idea of genomes as mosaics of pieces with independent
histories), the choice of the term hybrid indirectly invokes Agassiz’s ideology of pure and hybrid
racial types. Agassiz conjectured that intergroup mixture produced racial degeneration,
identifying human “hybrids” as inherently weaker or biologically unfit. Several other Age of
Discovery explorers referenced similar terminology, including Tomlinson’s flagrant use of the
dehumanizing word “half-breed” (as cited in Wood and Chasteen, 2009). With studies like
Darvasi’s “Beauty of Admixture”, we see specific applications of population mixture versus
relative isolation, such as amidst the characterization of “admixed populations” as mean
component percentages. The admixture concept creates a timeline of antecedent forms and
subsequent intersection; it's a conceptual miscalculation, one that forces the researcher or
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interpreter to think of genomic segments as having an original form within the “admixed”
individual. The idea of admixture, and how it defines personhood, will be discussed in Chapter 3.
The invention and reinventions of scientific racism were never empirically founded. They
were semantic and abstract, drawing upon decontextualized excerpts and misinterpretations of
prominent scientific theories. Excitement surrounding the Human Genome Project elevated it as
“one of mankind's greatest odysseys. It is a quest that is leading to a new understanding of what
it means to be a human being” (Hauskeller, 2013, p.875). Although both a painstaking and
monumental milestone, the Human Genome Project raised numerous more questions than it
answered—a healthy impact to have on the research community, even if perplexing.
Nonetheless, discourse surrounding the HGP revitalized the ability of scientists, and specifically
geneticists, to “speak authoritatively about what makes us who we are, challenging the position
held by the social scientists” (Hauskeller, 2013, p.875). In her book, The Social Life of DNA,
Alondra Nelson (2016) explores how society has shifted its perception of personal origin to lie
not decisively with one’s narrative voice or oral tradition but ultimately within one’s “DNA as
the final arbiter of truth and identity” (p.4). Relinquishing this role to DNA and its interpreters
not only minimizes the social, interactional, and abstract truths we create but also lends to
scientific misuse. Today’s sociological thinkers, such as Barbara Katz Rothman and Troy Duster,
have recognized continuity and cautioned against a resurgence in the form of genetic
determinism, a phenomenon where “one’s biological inheritance [is] believed to indelibly shape
one’s health, and other attributes” (Nelson, 2016, p.12). While genetic inheritance and geneenvironment interactions shape our physiology, metabolism, and health, we only understand a
small window of the vastly complex, molecular interactivity of our cells. There is danger, and
hubris, in assuming predictive power over one’s outcome based on a genetic profile. Genetic
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determinism would provide a novel way to retroactively inform today’s disparities and
rationalize complicity by understanding genes to predispose life trajectories. But, genetics does
not override context, personal growth and experience, individual autonomy, or the elusive step
from corporeal to abstract and body to mind that we have yet to understand. Humans exist in an
abstract world, in which we construct our own realities, milestones, credentials, transactions,
interactions, identities, stories, and meaning. Nature is not on a tier higher than nurture. But, if
we are not careful, giving authority to DNA as the “final arbiter of truth”, we begin to lay the
foundation for a resurgence of lessons still unlearned from previous centuries of colonialism,
repression, and reliance on biological explanations for social processes.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Genetic Admixture Mapping
A Close Look at Operationalized Personhood

Admixture mapping, a steadily advancing technique used to discern genomic ancestry,
exemplifies the quandary of capturing personal origin in scientific rhetoric. Geneticists are
walking a tenuous line between race and “genetic ancestry”, “biogeographic ancestry”,
“continental ancestry”, etc. They edge ever closer to outdated racial typologies with the
conceptualization of admixture, and specifically of “admixed populations”, which links groups
of people to particular demographic histories; so far, the admixed populations they have derived
include specific racial and ethnic communities whose heritage they describe in terms of
continental ancestry. Prior to the development of admixture mapping, most genetic association
studies primarily included participants of European descent with the idea that European ancestry,
on average, produced genomes of longer linkage disequilibrium blocks that, in turn, required
fewer resources and markers to analyze (Nievergelt et al., 2013). Geneticists then began to
surmise that allelic differences within that margin of human genetic variation could potentially
confound association studies, misleading geneticists to correlate disease prevalence with allele
frequencies that are unrelated to the disease, a circumstance known as a false-positive
association.
Geneticists today believe that the ability to control for population structure is a
prerequisite for GWAS and is necessary to prevent false-positives (Nievergelt et al., 2013). Since
false-positive error effects increase with sample size, Nievergelt et al. argue that large-scale
GWAS, especially those studying multifactorial diseases, cannot ignore population structure
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(Nievergelt et al., 2013). In response, geneticists supported that robust scientific research
requires diversity of participants as well as population-specific research methods. Diversity is
vital in any scientific study striving to represent humanity but is seldom prioritized. When
geneticists set out to increase diversity, they meant genetic diversity rather than diversity of
identity. Since there is no way to genetically screen donors for the unique polymorphisms they
carry from past ancestral communities16, the means of increasing diversity became tied to social
identity. And, the social identities they tapped were those they predicted to have the most
“divergent” ancestors. Translated into race and ethnicity, this meant they pivoted to African
American, Latinx, and Indigenous communities. While the intention of increasing diversity
makes sense at a conceptual level, the curation of who belongs to an “admixed population” is
reminiscent of the early HGDP’s targeting of Indigenous peoples and “untouched” lineages.
Ironically, admixture mapping has become characterized by disproportionate rather than diverse
focus. The theory of admixture mapping had to be actualized through real people—“admixed
populations”. This move, how it manifests in studies, and its potential implications will be
discussed below.
Researchers view admixed populations as coincidentally useful because of their
demographic histories, or the preceding life events that have presumably led to a detectable
convergence of diverse lineages. In an applied context, admixture17 can refer to a variety of
events that, whether voluntarily or forcibly, brought together different communities. The historic
enterprises as well as crimes against humanity that technically explain genetic admixture, as it

16

The chronology dilemma is at play again. If we already knew which polymorphism or allele frequencies were
upregulated in which ancestral communities, groups which may not even coincide with how we socially describe
ancestry, admixture mapping would be an obsolete endeavor for geneticists.
17
Recall that, conceptually, admixture refers to the intersection of different ancestries, described as parent
populations. These parent populations often include broad continental groups (i.e African and European), and
admixed populations descend from the “admixture” of two or more parent populations.
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has been abstractly conceived, could include the following: the perpetration of slavery,
colonialism and neocolonialism from the 15th through 19th centuries, state-building in the 20th
century, and the effects of a more cosmopolitan modern era lending to a multi-ethnic and
changing world (Garrod, 2006). Let’s recall the foundational underpinning of admixture
mapping from Chapter 1.
4.1 From Concept to Practice
The theory is that, for admixed populations, too few generations have passed since the
beginning of admixture for allele frequencies to experience the random effects of genetic drift or
restructuring events of migration, marriage, and descendant generations (Shriner, 2013).
Theoretically, admixture confounds genetic studies, as expansive immigration and global
admixture diminishes the primacy of geography as a determinant of genetic variation; however,
it has been reappropriated as a strategic tool (Novembre & Peter, 2016). The admixed
populations that geneticists are pursuing for studies are supposed to be descended from “deeply
divergent ancestries” (p. R224), bearing haplotypes or other polymorphisms that are attributable
to distinct parent populations (Henn et al., 2010). Ultimately, geneticists try to compare allelic
patterns of ancestors through the genomes of their descendants (Henn et al., 2010). While the
vast majority of gene variants exist everywhere, there are specific allele frequencies with notable
differences. For example, within certain communities in Western Africa, the null Duffy antigen18
is at a fixed frequency of 100% while it remains near 0% prevalent outside of this geographic

18

The Duffy antigen binds to human red blood cells, while the absence of the Duffy antigen from red blood cells is
described as the null Duffy antigen phenotype. The null Duffy antigen phenotype appears to relate to environmental
pressures; in order to infect individuals, the malaria parasite Plasmodium vivax relies on the presence of the Duffy
antigen (Howes et al., 2011). So, null Duffy antigen phenotypes generate resistance to infection. Geneticists have
located the chromosomal location of the gene that creates the Duffy antigen as well as discerned four allelic
variations and ten possible genotypes (Howes et al., 2011).

65

location (Shriner, 2013). When such stark proportions exist, if an individual carried the alleles
for the null Duffy phenotype, a geneticist could reasonably infer that the individual likely had
ancestors from one of the regions where the null phenotype is fixed. In fact, some studies have
used the Duffy antigen to evaluate the degree of admixture in a sample of individuals to
determine if they are suitable for MALD because of its known and distinctive allele frequencies
(Smith & O’Brien, 2005).
Interestingly, Duffy antigen variants are often described as blood groups, which reinvokes racialized ideas of bloodedness. We should not confuse the null Duffy antigen as
defining West-African communities or as a West-African gene. The causal genotype likely arose
because it makes red blood cells resistant to the malaria parasite Plasmodium vivax, a deadly
pathology that exists in several continents and countries (Howes et al, 2011; Howes et al., 2016).
Genetic markers that are considered fully informative, which are 100% prevalent in one parent
population and 0% in the other, exist in an ideal situation, but the human genome contains a
minute number of fully informative markers (Shriner, 2013). Alleles become fixed or lost in
unpredictable ways (i.e. random structuring effects of a bottleneck event or even a mutation that
leads to disease immunity), and it is a very rare occurrence that can be simply due to chance;
furthermore, the impacted allele frequencies can again be restructured relatively rapidly as
individuals move into and out of the affected group. Therefore, it is challenging to know where
to look for stark allelic proportions. More often, ancestral inferences in admixture mapping are
tenuously probabilistic because almost all alleles are equivalently prevalent across parent
populations (Shriner, 2013). Furthermore, trying to classify “deeply divergent ancestries'' orients
the convergence of peoples relative to a specific time period pre-globalization, marking an
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antecedent timeframe as evolutionarily relevant while using modern nationalities to describe
ancestral groups.
4.2 Itemizing and Decontextualizing Identity
So, through the lens of genomics, who represents admixture of divergent ancestries?
African American and Latin designations are the two most prominently identified and studied
“admixed populations” to date, alongside which geneticists are currently trying to decipher
classification criteria for other potential “admixed populations”, such as among Native
Americans and the First Nations of Canada (Grind et al., 2019; Henn et al., 2010; Shriner, 2013;
Smith & O’Brien, 2005; Verdu et al., 2014). For example, Nievergelt et al. (2013) summarize the
progress of concurrent admixture and GWAS studies in constructing marker panels “for Hispanic
populations, African Americans, or three-way admixture in the Americas” (p.2) alongside other
panels dedicated to global samples. While geneticists project admixture to become increasingly
ubiquitous over time, they understand certain “major population groups, such as Latino or
Hispanic,” to “already represent an admixture of ancestry” today (Bonham et al., 2018 p.1534).
In essence, they view Latinx communities as notably admixed due to the long-term impacts of
colonialism and slavery that brought together African, Indigenous, and European peoples in
Latin America as well as subsequent nationalism and the attempted integration of distinct
communities under a national identity. In their study on “Interethnic Admixture and the
Evolution of Latin American Populations”, Fransisco Mauro Salzano and Mónica Sans (2014)
provide an extensive examination of the regional histories, national identities, and genetic data of
Latin American communities, regions, and countries. Their study is among the most
comprehensive and historically informative review articles included in this thesis, but the central
focus remains classifying each population and/or region of Latin America according to a gross
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breakdown of percent European, African, and “Amerindian” ancestry (Salzano & Sans, 2014).
Even more commonly than Latin American communities, African Americans have been
designated as the primary admixture population-of-interest (Shriner, 2013). Millions were robbed
from their families, clans, and tribes, of their freedom and lives, as a result of the Middle Passage
that forced African peoples into the Americas. Despite being the reason for admixture, these
histories are largely erased from the methods sections of genetic studies.
In order to systematize admixture studies, geneticists have essentially itemized the
genomic inheritance of admixed populations. In doing so, they implement a rhetoric of scientific
neutrality that appears to eclipse social and cultural significance. Researchers define African
Americans as admixed according to the following parameters: they project that admixture began
approximately 8 generations ago, and about 50,000 random markers, ranging from 39,000160,000 total, are needed to map chromosomal segments inherited from different ancestries
(Shriner, 2013). For individuals with Latin American roots, Shriner’s “Overview of Admixture”
(2013) estimates admixture beginning about 16 generations prior to today, requiring significantly
more genetic markers to map ancestral differentiation. Additionally, admixture mapping
necessitates a genetic map, which denotes local recombination rates, or the probability
recombination will occur and ancestry will switch at a given locus; a genetic map specific to
African Americans was reported by Hinch et al. in 2011, and project databases such as 1000
Genomes and HapMap have been used to construct these maps (as cited in Shriner, 2013). Based
on these generational parameters, geneticists have also tried to deduce and reduce complex
heritages into percent breakdowns, or continental “admixture proportions” (Nievergelt et al.,
2013, p.2). The admixture of people with Latin American roots is commonly described as 50%
European and 50% Indigenous in genetic origin with variable percentages of African heritage,
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specifically in the Caribbean and regions in South America (Smith & O’Brien, 2005). African
American ancestral lineages are commonly termed “approximately 80% African and 20%
European in genetic origin” (Smith & O’Brien, 2005, p.4). Henn et al. (2010) cite a slightly
different gross breakdown of 75% African descent and 25% European descent as well as
sometimes 5% Native American descent. Within these gross breakdowns, we not only see
through a reductive lens of what constitutes personhood, but we also conflate the “elaborate
system based on the family, the lineage, the clan” (Deng, 1997, para. 3), the distinct ethnicities,
languages, values and institutions within Africa, the different Indigenous roots and
confederations of groups, into one single, vast continent. Commonplace notions of admixed
African Americans are not not Afrocentric but reinforce a colonial construction of Africa,
leveling it as comparable in scale and scope, in terms of both ethnicity and potential genetic
diversity, to Europe. A similar admonition can be applied to Latin America, impacted by a
complex history of colonialism, displacement, and enslavement as well as modern race relations.
Although geneticists are scrutinizing African American and Latinx communities, admixture can
apply to any intersection of groups, such as between the ethnic groups of India (IGVdb
Consortium, 2005). This calls into question how scale, or different levels of organization across
different time spans, impacts the concept of admixture. How do geneticists discern whether their
population distinctions actually represent groups with differing genetic substructure? How
rapidly do transient differences again restructure after reintroduction, or “admixture”, between
groups that diverged in the past hundreds or thousands of years versus tens or hundreds of
thousands? These questions rely upon far-reaching theories of human dispersal, which continue
to be scientifically debated as new fossil, ancient DNA, and archaeological evidence emerges.
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Individual variation inevitably defies the gross percentages applied to admixed
populations. Geneticists do note that, regardless of reported averages, any African American
individual could vary from 1-90% in terms of European ancestry (the same concept applies to
African, European, and/or Indigenous origin of an individual with Latin American roots),
elucidating in scientific terms that these admixed population parameters are generalizations of
mean data and neither override individual variability nor the unique intricacy of one’s own
heritage (Smith & O’Brien, 2005). Yet, despite acknowledging these technical limitations, the
operational definitions used for admixed populations normalize the oversimplification of
personhood, history, and heritage as relative percentages. This discourse also disguises race in a
scientific context, framing ancestry through raw percentages that proxy grave histories and
processes of racialization that lent to perceptions of “recent admixture”. Impassive language is
common, and often beneficial, in scientific literature, a consequence of the fundamental aim to
prevent confirmation bias and rely as much as possible upon discovery through repeated
observation. It is both practical and important for scientists to create operational definitions,
delimitations, and assumptions for their experimental variables to make the studies
understandable and enable others in the field to replicate their methodology; however, in the
numerous circumstances where natural and social sciences intersect, modelling variables can
mask the real life implications, or explanations, surrounding the research. In the context of
admixture mapping, evading historical depth about the evolutionary parameters believed to have
impacted a group of people not only desensitizes the realities of African American and Latinx
admixed heritage but also could paradoxically be a detriment to study design by overlooking
variables or misconceiving scale.
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When we decontextualize race, we engage in a collective amnesia that insulates science
from history, collective memory, and social realities. When discussing heritage as admixed, as
percentages, we are often invoking a grimmer history. Paul Brodwin (2002), a professor of
anthropology specializing in medical humanities at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
unveils this tension, often overlooked by genetic studies: “Many people have complex mixed
genealogies, created by sexual exploitation and the deliberate mixing of enslaved Africans
during the Middle Passage and on American or Caribbean plantations” (p.327). Dr. Rick Kittles
has anecdotally explored the realities of genetic admixture by sharing his own personal
genealogical findings in his lectures. Through mtDNA analysis, Kittles speculated potential
relations to the Hausa of Nigeria, but he follows this revelation with the “sobering news that his
paternal Y-DNA traced to Germany” (Nelson, 2016, p.34). Kittles goes onto attribute this result
to what he describes as the “‘Thomas Jefferson effect,’ gesturing at once to the sexual violence
of slavery and to the DNA analysis that, along with archival records, strongly suggests the third
US president fathered a child with Sally Hemings, a woman he enslaved” (Nelson, 2016, p.34).
Kittles captures the pervasiveness of sexual exploitation by white Americans as evident even
among presidents and preeminent figures, champions of liberty, still revered today; caricaturing
systemic violence as the “Thomas Jefferson effect” is especially salient considering his maxim of
“all men” being “created equal”, thereby juxtaposing purported American values against the
perpetuation of human bondage. A systematic review of racism and sexual health of African
American women from 1619-2018 cited that approximately “58% of all enslaved women aged
15-30 years were sexually assaulted by slave owners and other white men” and were barred from
legal protection against white men due to their statutory designation as property (Prather et al.,
2018). And, white slave owners often held sickeningly deliberate intentions of fathering more
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children into slavery without losing capital (Prather et al., 2018). These social realities underlie
characterization of genetic admixture as relative percentages, molding criminal acts into
scientific terms that allow researchers to bypass the conversation. We must also be wary that
common names used for groups, as well as reimaginations of heritage, are often reproductions,
adaptations or preservations of the “ways in which European Americans historically have
defined those others than of how they have defined themselves” (Foster & Sharp, 2002, p.848).
The population labels used by genetic admixture studies, including but not limited to “AfricanAmerican”, “Latino/a”, “Hispanic”, and “Native American”, dilute the innumerable possible
branching ancestries that can precede different people who socially or culturally identify
similarly, overcasting the reality of vast individual variability by the systemizing shadow of
percentage metrics. Casual uses of percentages in scientific contexts not only “[conceals] a great
deal of cultural, linguistic, and biological variation” (Foster & Sharp, 2002, p.847) but also
reflect terms colloquially used among the public to describe race or ethnicity and could
unwittingly invoke a perceived link between biology and race. Uncritical disseminations of study
results, whether to the general public or within applied settings (i.e. public health), could reify
imaginations of racial typology and associated social stigma.

4.3 The Risk of Stigmatization
An individual’s DNA, by nature, implicates other people, whether those genetically
related, the communities they are from, or the identities they carry. Critics of genetic ancestry
caution sampling from “smaller” populations, especially marginalized communities that have
“experienced the disadvantages of minority status within larger polities”, often in spite of
composing global majorities (Foster & Sharp, 2002, p.847). The prioritization of the majority,
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whether explicitly or implicitly, renders a double-edged unifying and “othering” effect that
neglects needs of communities that are not routinely considered within the normative societal
narrative. Humans, especially groups of humans, are more likely to maintain a conceptual
numbness to experiences that are neither first-person nor prominently represented in media,
policy, education, or scientific research unless they assume an intellectual responsibility of
researching and engaging with diverse perspectives. Any community diverging from the default
norm, but especially those smaller in number, experience disproportionate vulnerability to social
stigmatization (Foster & Sharp, 2002). Foster and Sharp (2002) respond to these patterns by
asserting:
...smaller social populations (particularly those that already are economically or
politically disadvantaged) should not be identified in genomic resources or publications
unless there is the potential for direct benefits to those populations, such as identifying
genetic variants that predispose members to disease…. (p.847)
How does one weigh possible downstream benefits of research participation for their
commmunity against the potential to expose more than just the donors, but also entire social
groups, to stigma or discrimination depending on how the data and sample categories are
extrapolated? Regardless of population size, numerous social identities experience
disenfranchisement, whether socially, politically, or economically, due to processes of
racialization and entrenched systemic barriers from histories of formerly and formally
legitimized discrimination. Concerns of genetic donors are often “informed by historical
experiences of mistreatment and exploitation by outside researchers” (Foster & Sharp, 2002,
p.847). As discussed in Chapter 2, the United States has integrated suppositions of biological
identity into policy, deeming Native American or African American legal identities via
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rudimentary ideas of phenotype and ancestry (Foster, 2002, p.848). Indigenous and colonized
communities are among the most susceptible to scientific hubris, which, in the realm of modern
genomics, could look like the invocation of ancestral haplotype maps to predict or “confirm”
ethnicity in lawsuits today (Foster & Sharp, 2002). As an analogy for the potential implications
of admixture mapping and ancestral inference in the United States, we can look to a national
forensics database in the United Kingdom.
The National DNA Database in Britain (NDNAD) is among the largest forensics archives
in the world. The database is created, and updated, from biological material recovered at crime
scenes and contains DNA information on ~4.9 million individuals by late 2009, including those
over 10 years of age arrested in relation to any recordable offense as well as those who have been
acquitted (Wallace, 2011). Freedom of Information requests by GeneWatch UK in 2006 revealed
that controversial and nonconsensual research unrelated to open criminal cases had been
conducted using the samples from the NDNAD (Wallace, 2011). This research included the use
of Y-chromosome DNA to develop methods of predicting ethnic appearance based on genomic
information, tapping into “both the DNA profiles on the computer Database and the stored DNA
samples” (Wallace, 2011, p.89). These backdoor, auxiliary research endeavors are especially
concerning given the disproportionate number of young Black men, and Black individuals in
general, who are stored in the bank. Biobanks, and geneticists who use them, maintain a role in
curating the demographic image of a society, and the NDNAD is undoubtedly refracted. Within
the United Kingdom, about 47% of the Black population, 42% of all Black men, and 77% of all
young Black men have had their DNA recorded in the NDNAD compared to a meager 6% of the
entire white population; these figures were approximated by comparing those identified as
“Afro-Caribbean” by police with the number of those self-identifying as an equivalent ethnic

74

category on the prior census (Wallace, 2011). Such skewed representations of a citizenry are
bound to more frequently yield skewed results, whether in the field of forensics or adjunct
genetic research studies.
Living amidst pervasive institutional trends of racial bias, potential volunteers might find
themselves contending with how their participation in a genetic study, or contribution to a
database project, might become intertwined with sociopolitical applications of genetics research
or frame social difference within medical fields (Foster & Sharp, 2002). But medicine is not the
only area where DNA research, and the sensitive information it contains, can resurface.
Hauskeller et al. (2013) shed light on the social, cultural, and political potency of DNA, often
looked to as a source of (seemingly) objective truth:
Many social institutions, including not just science and medicine but also insurance
companies, employers, government departments, policing and childcare services, all seek
to ascribe status and identity using DNA tests… test data are in effect made to matter as
determinants of identity. (p.878)
This potentiality raises three crucial points of contention; first, we must be attuned to how
genetic research, the unpacking of current findings and technical limitations, is being positioned
as an objective truth. The amount of scientific and social weight that we endow genes informs
the second point, which is how institutions are linking genes to identity or taking one step further
by conceiving identity as determinative of individual health, or even social, trajectories. Finally,
we must question how the implication of admixture mapping in applied research fields, like
public health and epidemiology, both implicitly and explicitly preserve concepts of biological
race. Blell and Hunter (2019) caution the stigmatizing potential of operationalizing human
populations in clinical settings:
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Reinscription of the notion of biological race in medical consultation, even inadvertently,
validates the idea that race and ethnicity are natural classifications and runs the risk of
encouraging racial/ethnic stereotypes and oversimplifications of the complex origins of
most disease, leading to both a naïve genetic essentialism and a misunderstanding of
human genetic diversity in society (Lee et al., 2008; Race, Ethnicity, and Genetics
Working Group, 2005). In addition, the effective disregarding of social production of
health models of understanding the ethnic patterning of ill-health, which have been
developed on the basis of epidemiological research over the past decades, in favor of an
assumption of a genetic basis, leaves ethnic groups' own supposedly shared faulty genes
as the supposed cause of their ill health. (p.4)
This argument hones in on the essentialist logic that follows the prioritization of ancestry as a
determinant of health risk, which diverts focus from social systems and scapegoats intergroup
genetics. MALD specifically sieves for genetic markers of specific ancestries, placing certain
groups under a microscope by nature of methodological convenience. While genes continue to
gain momentum in applied research, a concurring phenomenon has led to the appropriation of
genes, and semblances of genetic identity, as sociopolitical tools. The crossroads between genes,
ancestry, and identity is already being reclaimed by political activists, root-seekers, and
reconciliation projects striving to leverage genes to uplift communities (Brodwin, 2002). The
social and political potency of DNA will be further discussed in Chapter 6, which examines the
intersection of the genome with identity, policy, and concepts of personal origin. While such
projects can be powerful, they contend with the complex relationship between identity, linked to
how we personally experience and navigate the world, and genes, a raw code lacking inherent
social meaning.

76

Most geneticists invoke social identities because they believe them to be the most
accessible predictors, not conclusive indicators, of common genetic substructure; but, this fact is
not explicit in most primary literature. Editorials and review articles are more likely to indicate
this key property. Geneticists are nonetheless reporting statistically powerful analyses using
complex computations and growing genetic marker banks, opening a dangerous door of
misinterpretation. Ideally, medical professionals would understand social identities as a stand-in
that, at most, hints toward one’s probability of inheriting or developing a disease; however,
implicating sociocultural identities as informative of disease etiology may lend to gross misuse
via both public interpretation and private enterprise, news outlets, insurance companies, the
unregulated supplement industry, and even pharmaceutical companies. June 23, 2005 marked the
FDA approval of the New Drug Application (NDA) for BiDil, a modern form of racialized
medicine (Kahn, 2011). NitroMed, a Massachusetts biotech company, markets BiDil as a heart
failure drug specifically for African American patients due to its prior efficacy in a clinical
sample group of self-identified African Americans (Kahn, 2011). Race-based claims have since
been challenged due to the fact that no other demographic group was included in the African
American Heart Failure Trial (A-HeFT) and that the pill was a combination of hydralazine and
isosorbide dinitrate (H/I), two preexisting non-racial vasodilators for heart failure (Kahn, 2011).
And yet, BiDil, which did appear to reduce mortality by about 43% in its clinical trial, attained
federal approval (Kahn, 2011), gaining a legal and intellectual authority that could prompt, or be
leveraged as evidence for, interpretations of race as a biological category. A concurring fact that
BiDil sheds light on is that the vast majority of clinical trials for drugs marketed to everyone
used to predominantly test white men, insinuating that “‘white’ was coextensive with the
category ‘human being’” (Kahn, 2011, p.130). So, when a drug was tested in only African
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American subjects, it somehow was concluded as solely fit for African Americans. Kahn (2011)
explains the subliminal message of racialized medicine:
This sends the unintended but nonetheless powerful message that [B]lack people are
somehow less fully representative of humanity than are white people. (p.130)
Furthermore, Kahn (2011) poses the essential question of who constitutes an African American
for the purpose of this medication. Would efficacy diminish depending on the degree of different
racial identities in one’s ancestry? These questions could have been relevant if BiDil actually
proved more efficacious African Americans, and even though BiDil is a modern form of legally
supported pseudo-science, the inevitable emergence of these questions reifies race as a
biologically important as well as reinforces a reductive concept of ancestry as proportional.
There can be strong impetus, whether scientifically, economically, or otherwise, to jump
from new ideas to research applications, outpacing progress before building a solid foundation of
basic knowledge or assured methodology. This tendency especially relates to studies of genetic
ancestry and the potential for racialized applications. Foster and Sharp (2002) recommend that
genetic researchers take proactive measures to speak up about limitations of their studies by
routinely “[framing] subsequent public uses of race and ethnicity in relation to genetic features”
(p.848) prior to publishing literature to the public eye. Alongside severing notions of biological
race, we should also be careful of the creation of new identifiers and constructs, analogous to
HIV positive communities, and how the routinization of genetic testing might create
unprecedented markers of stigmatization (Foster & Sharp, 2002). Proactive measures and
methodological reevaluations may help reduce the rapid spread of misinformation about
genetics, which truly is promising as well as fascinating science (and has many different focuses
aside from human population genetics). The fact that DNA is an intricate natural code, or

78

scientific language, inherited by all living things leads us to contemplate the secrets it can reveal
about the history of life, about evolution, and about identity. But, as we have seen, the bridge
between biology and identity is anything but simple. If genetic research more actively
incorporated historical context, and discussions surrounding, both researchers and audiences
might be more sensitive to how they handle population classifications, discuss racial and ethnic
groups (i.e. African American), evaluate the sources of genetic samples (i.e. the NDNAD),
define ethical criteria, or critically examine data.
The general public has acclimated to perceiving genes as the holy grail of scientific
discovery, but this esteem lends to a complementary potential for grave misuse. Human beings
are composites of multiple identities, some inherited and others formed but all constructed to
some degree, and this reigns true for our branching lineages; concepts of identity will only
continue to transform in a global neighborhood. Yet, we see in modern genomics, and
specifically admixture, a fixation on empirical difference. While Francisco Mauro Salzano and
Mónica Sans (2014) provide a better genetic research model by relaying historical context and
explaining its scientific relevance in their interethnic admixture study, they do characterize Latin
American populations as “natural experiments” for examining the genetic basis of “unique
anthropological and epidemiological issues” (p.151). Criollo-Rayo et al. (2018) similarly offer
that populations in the Colombian Andes “[represent] an opportunity to study admixture
dynamics” (p.e1) of Indigenous and European heritage. There is a continuity throughout time,
and throughout scientific history, of exposing and dispossessing Indigenous peoples, of studying
the perceived “mixing” of whiteness with Black and Brown communities. Although the science
is vastly different, there is continuity in the scientific imagination of race, and this idea again
resurfaces with admixture mapping. Concepts like admixture mapping steer us to think in terms
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of racial purity versus mixing. Admixture positions European and African continents as whole
and African Americans as composed of parts—European and African.
From 19th century travelogues to admixture mapping today, scientific subdisciplines
continue to designate entire communities as specimens of disproportionate scrutiny. How can
scientists adapt a more critical lens and sensitive language as well as dismantle reifications of
racial typology and gross misinterpretations? As Michael Yudell (2011) asserts that:
...despite the best intentions… to reconceptualize the concept of race for modern biology,
evidence suggests that these geneticists and their scientific allies ultimately helped to
preserve the concept of race in science, and hence for use by both scientific and
nonscientific racists. (p.21)
This trend is noteworthy in prominent spheres, such as European countries moving to extricate
race and insert discourses on “ethnic tensions” or UNESCO cautioned race as a “social myth” (as
cited in Yudell, 2011, p.22) in its 1950-1 “Statements on Race” but also opted for ethnic
designations as a replacement (Azarmandi, 2017). The racist uses Yudell (2011) references
include those by William Shockley, a Nobel Prize recipient, professor, and physicist, who asked
the National Academies of Science to ascertain a genetic explanation for the “slum problem” he
perceived in America, wholly ignoring the structural inequalities that pervade his society and
invoking Social Darwinist causality. In reality, geneticists should only include participants if
they can affirm their best interest in the research intent. Perhaps data should not be released nor
popularized that is preliminary and still contends the inherent flaws of categorizing social
identities for the purpose of scientific study. Amidst the limitations of genetic ancestry, concepts
of heredity, genealogy, DNA, and genetics have an evolving “social life”, as termed by Alondra
Nelson (2016), and significant role in cultural concepts of personal origin. As different people
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increasingly look to genetic science for validation in social and political spheres for different
reasons, we should look critically into the validity of the tool itself, not just technical and
statistical nuances but translational limitations that lie at the intersection of genes and identity.
Chapter 5 will further discuss the quandaries of genetic ancestry in academic research,
specifically within the biomedical field and disease-susceptibility research, focusing on different
limitations that arise during the progression from concept to methodology to practical
application.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Genetic Ancestry is Socially Constructed
Translational Limitations of GWAS and MALD

In spite of the overwhelming genetic similarity present across all human genomes, we
continue to fixate on the science of difference. While the tools and techniques of genomics have
significantly advanced since the Human Genome Project, a critical evaluation of the geneticallyderived “human population” remains both crucial and neglected. Population genetics must be
understood as well as explained as a probabilistic science, one that infers conclusions from
correlations between and within predefined groups. Within all fields of science, but especially
when working with probability, defining limitations is essential for preventing gross
misinterpretation. After researching several academic studies from the past two decades, I
conceptualized two broad categories of limitations; the first set involves analytical barriers, or
those attached to the mapping techniques, statistical metrics, and computational models or
programs geneticists choose when conceiving their methodologies; various analytical limitations
were briefly overviewed in Chapter 1, but each iteration of study design presents its own
nuanced capacity for error. The second set of limitations are translational, or emerge amidst the
jump from concept to practice, statistic to inference, or sample group to human patients. The
discourse surrounding admixture mapping, discussed in Chapter 4, has covered one facet of the
most notable translational limitation, the construction of the “human population.” Geneticists are
struggling to streamline classification schematics and delineate human populations, but they
continue to report associations with ancestral groups that are, for the most part, socioculturally
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defined. Another significant barrier, especially when looking to create medicines, therapies, or
preventative approaches in the biomedical sphere, is the potential to underestimate
environmental factors in prioritizing genetic substructure. While both sets of limitations retain
important contingencies, the conceptual leaps that implicate sociocultural identities involve
tenuous logic that can potentially put entire communities at risk, opposing the principles of
reliability and consistency that are central to the scientific method.
A review of how current studies define ancestry, or genetic ancestry, will help clarify the
translational limitations of classifying human populations. First, most researchers conceptualize
genetic ancestry at the level of the genome rather than the individual. Due to the repeating
process of recombination that occurs with each generation, the genome fragments into an
amalgam of chromosomal regions, or the termed “mosaic of segments” (Royal et al., 2010,
p.665) that each bear independent inheritances. In some articles, such as those by Rosenberg et
al. (2002) or Batai and Kittles (2013), the macroscopic concept of continental ancestry is readily
used to describe people today as descendants of broad continental populations; the resolution is
high-level, and this version of ancestral organization is informed by theories of ancient human
dispersal to and from around five main continental regions (Royal, 2011). Chapter 3 discussed
how continental groupings often fit outmoded models of human racial typology, which broadly
classify humans as fundamentally African, American, European, Asian, and Australian using
typological terminology (i.e. Caucasoid). Biogeographical ancestry (BGA) is also regionallybound but might subdivide major continents; BGA typically considers other demographic
qualifiers, including ethnicity, in addition to locale. Moreover, the study of fine-scale population
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structure19, or intra-country classifications, opened the door to conflations of ethnicity, religious
affiliation, nationality, among other sociocultural identities.
While several concurring terms exist, neither the terms nor their definitions seem to
remain consistent, diminishing the reliability of results, comparisons across studies, and
extrapolations of data into the real world. In their article on the “red herring” of genetic ancestry,
Blell and Hunter (2019) cite different instances in which primary articles have grappled with the
concept of ancestry. They denote that, within the study “Genetic Structure of Human
Populations”, Rosenberg et al. reference equivocal variations of ancestry:
One clear example of this comes from the landmark Rosenberg et al. paper on the
structure of human populations (Rosenberg et al., 2002). In their paper, the authors utilize
a number of different conceptions of the term “ancestry” without providing any sort of
robust operationalizable definition of the term. Included in the article are “self-reported
ancestry,” “genetic ancestry,” “Mongol ancestry,” “self-reported population ancestry,”
and “genetically inferred ancestry” (Rosenberg et al., 2002). (Blell & Hunter, 2019, p.3)
Importantly, the paper lacks transparency, failing to define how each term is used in the study as
well as its inherent assumptions. Blell and Hunter (2019) also relay how some researchers have
differentiated levels and subdivisions within the umbrella of genetic ancestry, such as
“geographical (i.e., south-east Asian vs. northern European); geopolitical (i.e., Cambodian vs.
Swedish); and cultural (i.e., Jewish vs. Berber)” (p.3). Since DNA databases do not capture
information beyond one or two generations ago (although studies that have analyzed DNA
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Geneticists such as Novembre & Peter (2016) agree that studying fine-scale population structure is contingent on
the designation of individual origin and the sampling methods of “location, individual birthplace, or an origin based
on parental or grandparental ancestry” (Novembre & Peter, 2016, p.102). They attest that, due to the scope of human
migration, selecting a definition is important for sound study design and can complicate the interpretation of results
(Novembre & Peter, 2016).
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remnants from burial grounds do exist), genetic studies derive human populations from people
living today and infer origin through comparisons with other “contemporary populations” (Royal
et al., 2011, p.661). For example, in admixture studies centering African Americans, such as one
by Bhatia et al. (2011), HapMap participant donors from Yoruba (totalling 113 individuals in this
study) are frequently proxied as the African parent population to serve as a point of genomic
comparison (Royal et al. 2011). This facet complicates the data that geneticists have accumulated
on ancestral populations and the pool of knowledge from which they continue to build.
Ultimately, geneticists have not been able to evade the act of socially constructing the “human
population”, and the implications of this logical fallacy is apparent throughout modern analyses.
The remainder of this chapter will center the translational limitations of today’s academic
research pool, the majority of which is purposed with studying human genetic disease, discerning
ancestral disease risk, or accumulating basic knowledge to augment these goals.
5.1 Classification Conflations and Inconsistencies
Currently used human population classifications, which are instrumental to reference
databases, admixture mapping, genome-wide association studies, or informativeness statistics,
are structurally incongruent. While the study of human populations relies upon the existence of
scientifically relevant ancestral groups, no streamlined method of distinguishing populations
exists. Earlier studies adopted continental ancestry as an acceptable modality but primarily
implemented it as a proxy for colonial understandings of race, such as the use of the term
“Caucasian”20 alongside “African” or “Asian” in a 2004 AIM patent publication (Frudakis,
2004). Beyond continental ancestry, the advancement of fine-scale population structure as well
as increased mapping resolution have only caused classifiers to become more convoluted. In an
20

Again, the use of the term Caucasian invokes Johann Blumbach’s five human varieties as well as later adaptations
of his theory.
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earlier article on “Human Races and Evolutionary Medicine”, Swynghedauw (2003)
problematizes equivocal conflactions of race in scientific contexts, as researchers will assign
“several, and contradictory definitions” (p.438) that entangle geographical origins, imaginary
constructs (i.e. Caucasian), and religious affiliations. Consistency of variables is central to the
scientific method; a field of study should maintain the ability to operationally define and derive
relevant participant samples that not only reasonably reflect the individual makeup and mean
characteristics of the population that scientists are trying to vicariously study but also are defined
and selected in the same manner across all studies that are comparing the same metric (i.e.
genetic ancestry or population structure). The selection of imprecise metrics might curate
genetically-arbitrary groups and misattribute relative genetic similarity and difference, and the
relevancy of groupings likely fluctuate based on the allele being studied; furthermore, the
geographical regions that researchers gerrymander and cross-compare may not contain
equivalent genetic variance.
These problems exist because geneticists sample people rather than genomes or
genotypes; in order to study interpopulation difference, they need a way to extrinsically assign
people to different human populations. We can see a lack of consensus surrounding the “human
population” across studies. For example, Henn et al. (2010) cite West Africa as among the most
genetically diverse regions in the world. The International HapMap Consortium (2004) also
distinguishes communities in Africa as having “more genetic variation than other world
populations” (p.473). Yet, continental Africa is often diluted as a genetically-relevant population
classification. Classification schematics also oscillate from study to study, complicating the
ability of researchers to replicate study design and build up the reliability of conjectured
interpopulation comparisons. Rosenberg et al. (2003) try to compute informativeness data from
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52 different populations, each organized into intra-region designations, visible in table 1, while
Henn et al. visualize the “population structure of worldwide human populations” as seen in
figure 3:

Table 1
Comparison of Correlation Coefficients Across World and Population Data

Note. This table reports the informativeness of microsatellite markers in data subsets, separated
into regional affiliations of the 52 constituent populations that were genotyped. The correlation
coefficients of informativeness for assignment (In), optimal rate of correct assignment (ORCA),
and informativeness for ancestry coefficient (Ia) are compared for each subset of data. Reprinted
from “Informativeness of Genetic Markers for Inference of Ancestry,” by Rosenberg et al., 2003,
The American Journal of Human Genetics, 73(6), p.1410.
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Figure 3. Visualization of global population structure from compiled individual ancestry
proportions of 1112 participants and 42 populations. Individuals are represented by vertical lines
on each barplot; it is apparent that Europeans comprised the majority of the participant pool. A
clustering algorithm in the computer program ADMIXTURE was used to stratify global genome
estimates from K=5 to K=9, which refers to the number of ancestral populations inferred for
each individual. As the number of ancestral populations inferred increases, Henn et al. attest that
intracontinental fine-scale structure becomes visible. Reprinted from “Fine-scale Population
Structure and The Era of Next-generation Sequencing,” by Henn et al., 2010, Human Molecular
Genetics, 19(R2), p.R222.

Taking a closer look at the group descriptions and the figure axes, several properties
stand out. A conceptual inconsistency is apparent on the upper x-axis of figure 3 between
“Hispanic/Latinos”, an ethnic designation, with “Europeans”, “South Asians”, and other
geographic delimitations; “Hispanic/Latinos” appears to serve as a proxy for Latin America but
includes a limited set of identities, each defined by country. Although circumscribed, the
inclusion of five linguistic/ethnic groups under the “Africans” label juxtaposes both the vast
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subdivision of “Europeans” and the generalization of African Americans as a single,
comprehensive group, simplifying complex ancestries as scientifically commensurate. If
geneticists are trying to implicate histories of slavery and colonialism as relevant events in
structuring differential ancestry, then they are neglecting the full story, not only by omitting their
reasoning but also by failing to name all the other regions to where enslaved peoples were
forcibly moved (i.e. the perpetration of slavery by Spain in Latin America, most notably Brazil).
Interestingly, the greatest number of intrapopulation designations fall under “Europeans” despite
previously cited logic that West Africa alone likely maintains the most genetic diversity among
geographic regions (Henn et al., 2010). Overall, the intra-region designations that are included in
the group descriptions of table 1 and listed on the lower x-axis of figure 3 fluctuate between
ethno-linguistic, religious, and cultural constructs as well as nationalities, and the researchers
appear to grapple with a lens superimposed by the formation of nation-states.
These subcategories both simplify and conflate complex demographic histories, levelling
each to a seemingly, but erroneously, comparable level of organization. For instance, apparent in
both images are the classifications “Bantu” and “Italian”. While “Bantu” refers to the Bantu
languages, which sustains a complex history of expansion throughout Eastern and Southeastern
Africa since 1000 BC, as well as ethnic and indigenous communities today, “Italian” refers to
diasporic identities from a nation-state defined in 1861 (Isern & Fort, 2019; Viola & Verheul,
2019). Viola & Verheul (2019) attest that the “Italian” national identity was a “vacant
[abstraction]” (p.295) and had to be formed both socially and politically; it is tied to the Italian
language, but dilutes its “politically, culturally, economically, and linguistically” (p.295)
distinctive constituencies that were abruptly conflated amidst the making of a unified Italian
state. The inconsistencies of the aforementioned studies exemplify one of the fundamental
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problems of invoking social constructs of identity, which evolve across context, place, and time,
under the guise of scientific validity.
5.2 A Refracted Image: Identity Assignment and Self-Reporting in Human Population
Genetics
While the conflation of dissimilar identifiers presents inherent problems, the process of
assigning research participants to human populations adds another layer of complexity, as
geneticists primarily rely upon self-reporting. In his critical analysis of modern racialized
science, Garrod (2006) describes today’s world as increasingly cosmopolitan, lending to the
intricacy and intentionality of self-identification. He relayed an important distinction made by
Dr. John E. Clark, a Professor of Pharmacotherapeutics, former president of the Association of
Black Health-System Pharmacists (ABHP), and advocate of culturally competent health care
systems (FSHP, 2019): “For me to call someone 'black' because they [have] black skin may be
inappropriate because they may not see themselves as that” (at cited in Garrod, 2006, p.57). The
conceptual paradigm of race, or the version that has been normalized by past colonial discourses
and present census checkboxes, is being reimagined, characterized by a growing rift between
self-identification and outside perception; the infamously pervasive “other” category is ironic
given the insufficiency of the alternative blanket categories. This dynamic, among other factors,
pokes holes in the reliability of self-identification. Social constructs are relevant, real, and
dynamic, but they cannot be systematized as a classification schematic. Nonetheless, they are the
methodological fulcrum of ancestral inference and, as we will see, critically complicate human
population genetics.
Here, the question of chronology becomes central, as most studies perform analysis using
the DNA samples provided and labeled by reference databases. In their viewpoint editorial on
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ancestry and biomedical research, Bonham et al. (2018) summarize the intended purpose of
sociocultural identities as “ surrogates for ancestral background” (p.1533) in genetic studies.
There are two degrees of separation between the evolutionary processes that may have helped
shape an individual’s genome and self-reported race, ethnicity, or other identities. The logic is as
follows: first, self-reported identities have to be relatively predictive of ancestral heritage, by
which I mean the geographic origin and movement of ancestors, the communities to which
ancestors belonged, or the locations different ancestors intersected (or encroached). Ideally, they
reflect some semblance of the demographic history preceding an individual; however, the
predictive ability of any given self-reported identity is associative, unable to reveal causality, and
is not, in and of itself, indicative of ancestral heritage (Bonham et al., 2018). Second, the
ancestral heritage preceding an individual, specifically in regard to geographical origin, must be
a pertinent factor to the genetic substructure that exists today. The relative contribution of
geographical ancestry to modern genomic differences has likely been diminished by vast
intersections of peoples throughout history, since population differentiation relies upon the
relative isolation of communities over evolutionarily significant timespans (Garrod, 2006).
Nonetheless, researchers are motivated by the potentiality that our distant human history
has left a genetic imprint enabling them to derive clinically relevant populations, and they
continue to leverage self-identification as their compass. In their studies on ancestral inference,
Nievergelt et al. (2013) and Pardo-Seco et al. (2014) corroborate that self-reported ancestry is
sufficiently reliable for predicting how a sample population will continentally cluster. Yet,
contemporary studies consistently fail to report the specifics of their identification criteria, or
whether and how participants were instructed to self-report. Were they asked to report race,
ethnicity, or nationality; consider context or perceptions of others; or indicate the geographic
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origin, nationality, race, or ethnicity of their grandparents? These criteria might be outlined in the
databases they use, but criteria across databases varies. If we take a step back to the semantic
character of the questions themselves, we can investigate an inconsistency that circumvents the
reliability testing evidenced by contemporary geneticists.
The United States Census offers an interesting point of comparison for discussing data
collection of self-identified race and ethnicity. Two decades ago, the US Census encountered
methodological barriers, as approximately seven million respondents identified with more than
one race (Swynghedauw, 2003). This reality underscores the importance of data collection
metrics, especially if survey questions circumscribe rather than accommodate the ability to
define multiple identities. In any qualitative assessment, the phrasing of a question, as well as the
format of the answers, can influence how an individual chooses to respond (Strmic-Pawl, 2018).
This basic problem of data being framed by questions and answers problematizes census
derivations of race or ethnicity, as individuals hold multiple identities shaped by personal
experience, family ties, cultural heritage, citizenships, among other factors. Strmic-Pawl et al.
(2018) discuss how a respondent might contend with census self-reporting:
Respondents may see these terms as overlapping and redundant, or they may see them as
independent and thus have multiple identities. For example, someone who is Puerto
Rican could identify as Puerto Rican as an ethnicity, race, nationality, and ancestry. Or,
someone who is Puerto Rican could identify with a Hispanic ethnicity, a White race, an
American nationality, and a Taino ancestry. Thus, the terms used in the phrasing of the
question can determine the identity provided by a respondent. Moreover, relying on the
word “race” in the question does not necessarily inform as to which identity is most
salient or important to that person’s lived identity. (p.6)
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Foster and Sharp (2002) link this phenomenon to the prospect of identifying DNA donors in a
Genome Research commentary article:
An individual donor, for instance, may be known simultaneously as a resident of a
particular Indian village in Arizona, a member of the Hopi tribe, a descendant of a
Laguna family (through a paternal ancestor who is not explicitly noted in matrilineal
Hopi society), a Native American, and as someone of Spanish ancestry (owing to 18thcentury intermarriages between Lagunas and Spaniards).... (p. 847)
Race is imagined in the context of science but real in the form of experience, and the dynamic
ways in which someone navigates the world, faces barriers or prejudices, and finds community
are all components of race as well as ethnicity, nationality, ancestry and numerous other lived
identities. The modern nation-state further complicates the question, as national identities can
sometimes superimpose upon or be referred to as ethnicity or ancestry. This tendency is
historically rooted in the evolving lens of identity. Various ideas of race have been constructed in
different contexts, as we have seen in past uses of today’s religious-cultural, ethnic, and national
markers as distinct races; while the process of racialization evolves overtime and according to
place, race concepts also produce durable elements and ideas that persist through multiple
centuries. Importantly, while race can be imagined and reimagined in relation to different
peoples, the systems of oppression that have racialized people and the consequences of these
systems are not equivalent across communities, and certain communities can eventually become
perceived as assimilated into the normative culture. Whiteness, which became meaningful during
colonization, was oriented as the norm while non-white identities were racialized and othered, as
literally inscribed by the “other” category on many surveys. Factors such as the dynamic nature
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and living history of racial constructs influence how respondents conceptualize and answer
questions regarding their own race, ethnicity, ancestry, or identity.
The challenges of US Census data collection help elucidate the limitations of modern
population genetics. We must direct more focus on how DNA samples are sourced, or the
inclusion criteria used by genetic database projects and sample collection methods of primary
studies. Among the most prominent reference databases to date, the International HapMap
Project defines a “population” as “a group of people with a shared ancestry and therefore shared
history and pattern of geographical migration” (International HapMap Consortium, 2004, p.469).
The International HapMap Consortium (2004) note in an aside that major scientific and ethical
contentions exist within the field, rooted in the fact that individuals hold multiple identities or the
circumstance where individuals who identify with a specific community do not reflect the
ancestral history of the group average. In their first phase methodology, HapMap sought out
specific populations to sample; certain choices were influenced by the desire of national funding
agencies to include their own majority population and others based on practicality (i.e.
researchers at Howard University and the University of Ibadan had already established a
partnership at the time as well as created a trustful relationship with the Aba Alamu community
in Ibadan in Nigeria) (International Hapmap Consortium, 2004). Subsequently, they created
inclusion criteria to confirm membership in each population, which participant donors had to
meet based on self-identification (International Hapmap Consortium, 2004). The International
HapMap Consortium (2004) described the inconsistencies of their first phase inclusion criteria,
recognizing the limitations of self-reporting ancestry of oneself as well as of parents or
grandparents. They yielded that “as in many population genetics studies” the methods of
demarcating and sampling from the “populations themselves… were inexact” (International
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HapMap Consortium, 2004, box 2, p.469). In this research phase, the HapMap Project employed
slightly different inclusion criteria depending on the population, asking Han Chinese participants
to identify “at least three Han grandparents” and Yoruba donors to report “four Yoruba
grandparents” but omitting a questions about familial origin when speaking with the participants
from Japan in an attempt to maintain cultural awareness and avoid direct questions about
parentage; instead, they prefaced to all potential participants before they chose to donate that the
aim of the study was to collect genetic samples from individuals whose grandparents were from
Japan (International HapMap Consortium, 2004, box 2, p. 469). Inconsistencies such as these
render interpretation of data and generalization of population structure tenuous. It is difficult to
conclusively affirm whether the data acquired from these particular participants are generalizable
beyond the specific donor sample to a broader population, and, if so, how individuals would
know or report that they meet a threshold level of genetic similarity with a given population.
Large-scale projects, like HapMap, that are trying to ascertain global populations and archive
every available faction of genetic diversity run into significant problems surrounding the
equivalency of groupings, conflation of categorically different sociocultural identities, and
inconsistency of self-reporting metrics; regional projects have followed suit, more precisely
studying fine-scale population structure but face paralleling limitations.
The field of human population genetics pivoted to the study of “populations” on a finer
scale within countries and regions despite its fundamental sampling problems remaining
unsolved. Several regional database projects have been developed concurrently, each tackling the
intricacy of intra-country cultural, religious, linguistic, and socioeconomic signifiers. In “The
Indian Genome Variation database (IGVdb)”, human populations were identified on the basis of
both geographical boundaries and linguistic families by a group of anthropologists and social and
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community health workers with the help of fluent-speakers of local the languages (Indian
Genome Variation Consortium, 2005). The degree of endogamy in family genealogies was
qualified through interviews and pedigrees (Indian Genome Variation Consortium, 2005). The
researchers disseminated a questionnaire that included designations for ethnicity and family
disease history as well as phenotypic traits; although the questionnaire acquired multiple
identifiers and descriptions of marriage pedigrees, information was not provided detailing the
language of the questions themselves, the approach of the translators, anthropologists, and
social/community health workers, or the accommodation of persons who could not read or fill
out the informed consent (Indian Genome Variation Consortium, 2005). While multidimensional
recordings of identity are better than generalizations, the context and potential influencers of
self-reported metrics remain impactful contingencies regardless of the number of identification
metrics provided.
The “Iranian Human Genome Project” parallels features of the IGVdb, as well as other
regional database projects, purposed with surveying the human genomes of Iranian ethnic
identities, described as differing in culture, lifestyle, languages, and spatial distribution, for
implications in national health care throughout the country (Banihashemi, 2009). Like other
concurrent genome projects, this study outlines far-reaching goals of “illuminating our
understanding of Iranian ethnicities’ history and identity” as well as “creating a unique bridge
between science and the humanities in Iran” (Banihashemi, 2009, p.89). Interestingly, the study
reports that extensive social, historical, linguistic, and cultural knowledge was necessary to
accumulate enough data for the studied populations to be initially identified, taking the
researchers over two years and involving local leaders in the design of sampling protocol for
different communities (Banihashemi, 2009). This study appears to achieve a level of cultural
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competency and intentionality unmatched by macroscopic projects, building extensive contextual
reports rather than relying on the randomness of convenience; however, they fail to relay how
ethnic identities were confirmed, or reported, by the participant donors beyond listing that
parental birthplace was recorded and a coding method was used to categorize sample DNA by
geographical and demographic criteria. If this study is to be replicated, which would help
demonstrate the reliability of results, subsequent researchers would have difficulty maintaining
consistency without knowing these details. Both between and within these fine-scale database
projects, we can take note of apparent incongruities in design and focus. The IGVdb (2005)
placed specific emphasis on endogamous marriage practices while the Iranian Human Genome
Project (2009) used “language as the major criterion” (p.89), followed by religious-cultural
markers. Comparing and contrasting the methods between projects of different scales illustrates
the variability of deriving human “populations” for empirical study and determining who fits
these prescribed frameworks.
A threshold level of transparency in inclusion criteria is necessary to understand not only
the intended purpose of a study and the individuals studied, but also to understand limitations,
determine comparability across studies, and assess whether there is a reliable way to generalize
the results. Often, databases that compile sample DNA are caught in the same binds as the census
as when they rely upon self-reporting as a way to mark or confirm the complexity of identity.
Further, census data collects identities such as race to trace disparities and allocate resources not
because race is a biological entity but because it is real in its social and systemic consequences.
Although contemporary studies try to frame population metrics in terms of ethnicity, linguistic,
religious, or other anthropological markers intended to hint at similarities in ancestral heritage
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and descendance from communities affected by similar evolutionary processes, concepts of race
are caught within this matrix of data.

What does DNA tell us? Race? Nationality? “Ancestry”? Actually, none of the above.

It is not that DNA indicates, or can conclusively profile, any of these constructs vis-à-vis
nucleotide sequences. The chronology is the converse in that geneticists use constructs created
and sustained by human communities to hint at, predict, or proxy a higher likelihood that an
individual's ancestors had something in common in terms of geographic movement or relative
isolation and duration with others identifying similarly. Even if such qualifiers turn out to be
substantive predictors of concurrent histories (and even so, predictive ability would decrease
over time given our increasingly global society), they could never be a 1:1 ratio, as sociocultural
constructs are not causal of underlying genetic variance in any individual. Thus, the census
analogy and closer look into project methodologies raise central questions about how geneticists
retrieve information on an individual’s ancestry. Interestingly, after the 1960s, the Census
Bureau shifted from identity assignment to self-identification because 1) one’s own concept of
self is “the most accurate since anyone else’s perception is a guess (dependent on perceiver’s
experience and social context)” (p.6) and 2) race is a social construct and “not biological” so
“there is no correct answer that can be assigned” (Strmic-Pawl, 2018, p.6). The genetics
community likely standardized self-identification for similar reasons, but the information they
are retrieving is only a guide for an underlying genetic population metric that remains elusive.
They are not using sociocultural identities as social scientists might, noting their limitations and
implications as social constructs, but deriving associations between genes and peoples as well as
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conjecturing differential disease susceptibility based on these identities. Again, Strmic-Pawl et
al. (2018) provide illuminating insight:
The racial and ethnic data with which we work are never a true or accurate reflection of
society but rather a reflection of society as refracted through the categories provided.
(p.7)
They are, in short, imagined or constructed by individuals themselves in the midst of a vast array
of identities. Geneticists must understand their role in “refracting” the genetic population map
they are working to create. In the realm of forensics, we have observed the role of refraction
manifest in the coding system of the National DNA Database (NDNAD) in Britain (Wallace,
2011). The construction of these categories insinuates which communities the UK perceives as
most important in the context of criminality. These categories are externally assigned to
individuals and include Afro-Caribbean, Arab, Asian, Dark-skinned European, Oriental, and
White-skinned European (Wallace, 2011), groupings of uneven resolution and outmoded
language (i.e. “Oriental”) that are disproportionately specific in profiling Arabic and AfroCaribbean individuals. In addition to curating the image we see of genetic ancestry, geneticists
must also be aware of the potential reductive effect of self-reporting surveys in perpetuating
stereotypes of “mixed races”, as if individuals possess fractions of each of their multi-racial or
ethnic identities or that “pure” races exist and can be mixed. We cannot simply sieve
multidimensional identities into reductive categories of incongruent resolution and assume the
validity and reliability of their cross-comparison. Further, geneticists in current studies are failing
to consider and capture all facets of identity, reporting beyond self-reported race and ethnicity to
also include socioeconomic status and other environmental and social conditions; these facets
should be included in the association analyses and concurrently visualized. Extrinsic covariates
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are significantly important in epidemiology and biomedical research, and the overreliance on
discerning ancestral groups for clinical purposes can result in underestimations of non-genetic
factors.
5.3 Genes, Environment, and Human Disease
One of the primary reasons modern academic research focuses on studying genetic
ancestry is to inform disease etiology. Even studies that solely evaluate ancestral informativeness
statistics, discern population clusters, or map by admixture disequilibrium are often doing so to
serve downstream benefits of understanding differential disease risk by ancestry or controlling
for population structure. It follows that human disease research is one of the primary realms
impacted by the translational limitations and potential misattributions of genetic ancestry. The
interplay of genetic and non-genetic factors is pivotal to disease-susceptibility, and studies
involving public health should never ignore the environmental, social, and economic factors that
contribute to disease risk. Most directly confounding to genetic analysis is the relationship
between the environment and gene expression. Nature presents a conflicting natural
phenomenon, which Adams (2008) concisely summarize:
A striking example of the power of gene regulation is seen in agouti mice, in which
genetically identical twins can look entirely different in both color and size. For example,
one mouse may be small and brown, but her twin sister may be obese and yellow.
Another genetically identical sister may have a mottled look with both fur colors present
and fall in the middle of the weight range. (para. 1)
Why is it that the same genome can branch into such starkly divergent outcomes? While our
DNA encodes all of the instructions needed for growth and development, our genes are not static
blueprints. Their embedded information can be edited over time through the regulation of DNA
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itself or the molecules it creates. In fact, certain aspects of our physical appearance and
physiological attributes stem from these nuanced changes, impacted by a branching array of
extrinsic circumstances that impact us from childhood through adulthood.
During the process of gene expression, the cell’s molecular tools interpret the instructions
encoded by different genes and build proteins or other products, based on these instructions, that
are ultimately responsible for expressing phenotypes. Several steps intercede this process,
including both molecular and environmental mediators, and our bodies are in a constant and
complex relationship with the outside world. Newer genetics research is focusing on geneenvironment interactions, which describe how external stimuli can cause genotypes to express
different variations of traits, which seldom have only one possible version (Portela & Esteller,
2010). In concert, the burgeoning field of epigenetics dissects the molecular mechanisms that can
structurally and functionally alter an individual's DNA (Byrd & Hughey, 2015; Portela &
Esteller, 2010). This genetic malleability is possible because of a network of molecules that
coexists with cellular DNA and has the ability to activate or suppress genes entirely (Adams,
2008). Some epigenetic changes in the form or function of an individual's gene can be heritable,
or passed down in its altered state (Byrd & Hughey, 2015; Portela & Esteller, 2010). Basically,
gene-environment interactions describe the relationship between environmental factors and
genetic loci, catalyzing changes that are often materialized by epigenetic mechanisms.
Unsurprisingly, the paradoxical uniqueness of “identical” twins exemplifies these
mechanisms. Human monozygotic twins possess indistinguishable DNA sequences but show
different molecular patterns of epigenetic modification, some of which can impact the
development of diseases later in life (Portela & Esteller, 2010). And environment does not
simply mean climate or geography but involves numerous external influences, such as social
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experiences or psychological stresses; the relationship between epigenetics, social adversity,
chronic stress, and brain plasticity is currently being researched to chip away at the age-old
question of nature-versus-nurture (Notterman, 2015; Papadopoulos, 2011). Gene-environment
interactions and epigenetics contribute to a more dynamic understanding of genetics than ever
before, especially in the context of disease-susceptibility research (Byrd & Hughey, 2015). These
processes are among the most prominent confounders of admixture mapping and other genetic
ancestry techniques (Shriner, 2013). Importantly, gene-environment research is a relatively new
field; researchers have not yet reached consensus on the environment’s sphere of influence
(Boardman et al., 2013). Moreover, the field faces many intricate dilemmas in terms of how to
best operationalize environmental factors, distinguish individual characteristics from social
contexts, and “account for group-level behavioral, normative, and cultural processes that shape
individual health and behavior” (Boardman et al., 2013, p.S65). Environmental health
determinants are not a simple equation of cause and effect but a widely variable array of
relationships up- and downstream the multivariable path from environment to outcome.
Ultimately, researchers are discovering that genetics are not as predeterministic as previously
thought. Even on a genetic level, we can understand that our development is, to some degree,
inexorably intertwined with our surroundings and circumstance.
The past two decades have witnessed improvements in statistically powerful
computational models, genome-wide admixture mapping, database size, and other genotyping
tools. Especially relevant to the clinical application of genetic ancestry, the study of epigenetic
triggers has linked the environment to the development of cancerous, neurological, and
autoimmune diseases as well as other complex pathologies, such as cardiovascular disease
(Portela, 2010), as displayed in the following table:
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Table 2
Epigenetic Mechanisms And Modifications in Different Human Disease Classes

Note. This table outlines links between epigenetic triggers and genetic changes corresponding to
different disease types, such as cancers, neurological disorders, and autoimmune diseases.
Reprinted from “Epigenetic Modifications and Human disease,” by Portela, A. and Esteller, M.,
2010, Nature Biotechnology, 28(10), p.1064.

103

Knowing that the interaction of environmental factors and genes can influence the onset of a
disease during one’s lifetime, we can understand how epigenetics challenges basic notions of
inheritance and why geneticists caution extrapolating from single studies (Byrd & Hughey, 2015;
Simmons, 2008).21 Since these changes occur spontaneously, they do not directly reflect prior
evolutionary processes or selective pressures that curate genetic probability. The potential for an
individual’s genetic expression to become altered and possibly be passed down to their children
complicates searches for disease-causing genes, as GWAS relies upon detecting observable
phenotypes of disease-incidence. The occurrence of these changes, independent of one’s
demographic history, also obscures associations between differential disease risk and ancestry.
Consider the following hypothetical instances of false-positive results. First, a particular
sample of individuals living under parallel social, economic, or political circumstances might be
similarly impacted by gene-environment interactions but are used in an association analysis as
representative of an entire sociocultural identity or broader geographical population. Second, a
particular demographic group could be disproportionately impacted by certain systemic factors
and display a higher prevalence of a particular disease that is more likely connected to structural
barriers than ancestry. These are two hypothetical situations, and many nuances exist when
contextualized in individual experiences. When applied to admixture mapping, geneticists
acknowledge that differences in disease-incidence between parent populations may arise from
environmental factors, genetic risk factors, or their coupled effect (Smith & O’Brien, 2005). In
their review of “ Mapping by Admixture Linkage Disequilibrium: Advances, Limitations and
Guidelines”, Smith & O’Brien (2005) explain that MALD fails in a case where the frequencies
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Most common diseases are multifactorial, arising from the combined effect of genes, gene-gene interactions,
environmental factors, gene-environment interactions, and non-genetic factors. Thus, phenotypic distribution does
not inherently reveal underlying genetic structure.
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of alleles associated with a multifactorial disease are equivalent between parent populations but
disease-incidence differs between them due to social and environmental factors. In this
circumstance, geneticists would not detect the alleles that are actually related to the disease-ofinterest and might even misattribute the disease to unrelated alleles that appear to vary in
frequency between study samples. Further, Portela & Esteller (2010) denote that epigenetic
changes can enable a variety of possible phenotypic outcomes to stem from a single genotype.
Remember, any given phenotype or trait arises from a combination of genetic makeup,
environmental stimuli, and gene-environment interactions that impact an individual. (Shriner,
2013). As we already know, people who share similar phenotypes might not carry equivalent
genotypes, but we also can identify that individuals with parallel genotypes might not actually
possess the same phenotypic outcomes.
These complex relationships of gene, trait, and environment problematize studies that
grossly correlate health disparities with racial and ethnic identities. A specific example of how
public health research might misattribute causality can be gleaned from an article entitled
“Impact of Race/Ethnicity and Social Determinants of Health on Diabetes Outcomes”. Walker et.
al. (2016) investigated relationships between race, ethnicity, and social determinants of diabetes
to help the advancement of culturally-tailored medical care. Similarly to other public health
literature, they used diluted categorizations—Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, nonHispanic black Americans, American Indians/Alaskan Natives, and non-Hispanic whites—that
decontextualize the specific lived environments of different communities within these broad
groups. While they tried to address both demographic groups and social determinants, details
within their messaging insinuated that race and/or ethnicity has a directly causal impact on health
outcomes, such as the indication that “minority populations… exhibit poorer self-management
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abilities, and experience more diabetes-related complications compared to non-Hispanic Whites”
(Walker et al., 2016, p.3). Kahn (2011) vies for us to take a critical lens, one that weighs the
relativity of factors:
...what are we to make of the fact that African Americans suffer from disproportionately
high rates of hypertension, but Africans in Nigeria have among the world’s lowest rates
of hypertension, far lower than the overwhelmingly white population of Germany?
Genetics certainly plays a role in hypertension. But any role it plays in explaining such
differences must surely be vanishingly small. (p.132)
Kahn’s perspective alludes to the systemic role of structural inequality in perceived racial, or
ancestry-based, health disparities. Walker et al. (2016) coalesce and describe important metadata
on social determinants of diabetic health trajectories, covering a host of social factors, but the
scientific narrative contains gaps in its derivations of group-based science. Health disparities like
those described in Walker et al.’s study have been adapted as focuses of genetic research. In their
study, “Race, Genetic Ancestry, and Health”, Batai & Kittles (2013) shed more light on the
correlations reported by Walker et al., attesting that “for hypertension, genetic ancestry does not
appear to contribute much when you control for socioeconomic status (SES), and, as of yet, we
have been unsuccessful in using admixture mapping to explain the higher rates of diabetes
among African Americans” (p.6). An article by Cooper et al. (1997) provides further insight,
explaining that while populations of African descent in North America, the Caribbean, and West
Africa might appear to have genetic similarities, their BMI levels and the overall prevalence of
hypertension vary extensively across these groups. This variability complicates simplistic
prescriptions of causality as it relates to health disparities and genetic ancestry; Bonham et al.
(2018) more generally caution that “race and ethnicity are operationalized inappropriately when
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they serve as proxies for other demographic variables, such as an individual’s socioeconomic
status” (p.1533). If researchers detect associations between genetic or health-related variables
and ancestry that actually correlate with differences in socioeconomic status, or other
circumstances, misattribution of causality is probable.
While it is important to identify systematic disparities faced by marginalized
communities, which can be visualized differently depending on what kind of information the
researchers intend to derive, identity cannot be misinterpreted as the cause. The
multidimensional nature of genetic disease-susceptibility research requires intentionality in the
selection of variables and covariates most pertinent to a study’s intended purpose. Yet,
geneticists in current studies are failing to capture certain facets of identity with which disease
risk could be simultaneously visualized, such as socioeconomic status, income bracket, residence
location, or education level (Bonham et al., 2018). The first step toward tackling covariates is
formally recognizing them, acquiring more data points from the samples-of-interest, such as
mean data on the living conditions or sociopolitical climate of a particular study group.
Furthermore, when considering the role of identity, of race, ethnicity, heritage, and personal
origin, the question is multidimensional. Boham et al. (2018) delve into the scaffolding of selfconcept, explaining that:
...other dimensions of race should be recognized, including perceived race or ethnicity
(what others believe a person to be), reflected race (the race a person believes others
assume [them] to be), and the cumulative burden of discrimination. (p.1533)
Studies that fail to account for the impact of race in our lived environment lack an important
dimension of health and personhood. Although still an emerging realm of study, epigeneticists
such as Aroke et al. (2019) are investing whether racial and ethnic health disparities relate to
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psychosocial environments, formed by experiences of “childhood stress, racial discrimination,
economic hardship, and depression” (p. 701) that can arise from structural injustices. Aroke et al.
(2019) attest that DNA methylation, a specific process of epigenetic modification, occuring at a
glucocorticoid (relates to hormonal stress responses) receptor gene called NR3C1 “has been
associated with depression, childhood stress, low socioeconomic status, and chronic pain”
(p.701). Prolonged states of chronic stress and pain have also appeared to correlate with
methylation patterns in genes supporting the immune system (Aroke, 2019).22 When race appears
to surface as scientifically relevant, it is because of the associated challenges surrounding
identity and the impact of these challenges on health. In his lecture series, Dr. Rick Kittles
demonstrated an interplay between “histories of social isolation and discrimination” (p.33) and
DNA, and even more specifically with racial health disparities and oncogenes23 that regulate
tumor cells (Nelson, 2016). Kittles’ work on the African Ancestry DTC test, its mission, and its
use in the reconciliation projects surrounding African American cultural identity and political
discourse will be discussed further in Chapter 6. Racism is an oppressive system, and historic
processes are not static but carry forth to modern day. Institutionalized barriers, such as the
redlining of districts and refusal of housing loans to Black families to restrict them from
suburbanization, continue to impact the social, economic, and political circumstances of African
American communities today (Zenou & Boccard, 2000). In order to prevent generalized
conjectures about race and help detect false-positive correlations with ancestry, multivariable
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Studies on the relationship between health, chronic stress, racism, and discrimination exists within public health
research. Examples include Sawyer et al.’s (2012) study of physiological responses to anticipated discrimination or
Harrell et al.’s (2003) evaluation of the relationship between racism and negative health outcomes. As seen with
Aroke et al. (2019), epigenetics is also looking into how structural injustices (and states of chronic pain) relating to
racism potentially influence epigenetic triggers. Both are intricate study focuses beyond the scope of this thesis that
will likely continue to accumulate new approaches but also contend the complexities of causality and must be
cautious of reifications of biological determinism or racial essentialism.
23
Oncogenes are a specific class genes that can generate tumor cells when activated.
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analysis that controls for the numerous factors that interplay is essential. Further, we now
understand that extrinsic factors subject genetic associations to the confounding influence of
epigenetics. And, when the primary community of focus is one that shoulders a history of
persecution and continues to face resultant systemic barriers, we must especially scrutinize the
role of environment, of social processes, and of structural inequality to not magnify race or
ethnicity as more telling than context and continuity.
Health disparities can emerge from disproportionate care, economic access, or barriers in
existing healthcare systems. Life experiences from childhood through adulthood, such as longterm nutritional status, treatment by providers, general workload, and the safety of one’s living
conditions, also impact health in interrelated ways (Fine et al., 2005). Multifactorial diseases are
complicated by the interaction of genes, environment, and epigenetics. Therefore, truly
informative studies must be constructed in a manner that, by capturing a multifaceted profile of
individual donors, prevents the erasure risk factors (Smith & O’Brien, 2005). Additionally,
genetics, among other scientific fields, are falling into an individualistic framework that focuses
on curating medicine to individual profiles rather than sourcing and remedying causal factors
(Byrd, 2015), such as mitigating environmental carcinogens24. While the ability to transform an
individual's personal information into a tailored medical approach can be highly beneficial, we
should not forget to also prioritize proactivity, allocating research and resources to the complex
social, political, and economic scaffolding of health-related root causes. Such discussions are
beyond the scope of this thesis but further corroborate the need for increasingly interdisciplinary
research initiatives. For instance, in their study on gene-environment research methods,
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For example, there is an ensuing debate surrounding the airborne emissions of concentrated animal feeding
operations (CAFOs) and its impact on the health trajectory of nearby residents (Von Essen & Auvermann, 2005).
The pursuit of more research and regulations surrounding CAFOs is an example of tracking a root environmental
health risk.
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Boardman et al. (2013) argue for the benefit of framing future research with a social
epidemiological perspective, providing new insights into the current pool of primary literatury.
Genetics could similarly benefit from reframing approach or inviting outside perspectives.
Otherwise, the study of genetic ancestry, especially given the inconsistencies of population
ascertainment, risks overlooking equivalent or greater, and potentially more mendable, spheres
of public health research.
The translational limitations of this chapter problematize not only the conceptual basis of
the “human population” but the practical application of genetic studies today. The
inconsistencies of classification schema alone exemplify how race is not an inherent biological
characteristic. In an applied biomedical setting, substituting race, ethnicity, and ancestry in place
of critical health determinants (i.e. socioeconomic status), due to correlations between race and
these variables, calls into question cause and effect - a fulcrum of the public health sphere.
Proxying race, whether via demographics or geography, “opens the door to inequities in medical
care” (Swynghedauw, 2003, p.439) and can impede other fields of study, including genetic
research itself, that could catalyze the advancement of new and existing therapies. Furthermore,
the concept of genetic ancestry, and the way it is operationalized as sociocultural identities,
overshadows the institutionalized racism and cultural incompetency that contributes
disproportionate access across groups under the pseudonym of race as a determinant
(Swynghedauw, 2003). Through analysis of disease-susceptibility research, we can understand
that real danger lies within the translation of results to reality, clinical settings, or public
knowledge. Critics of genetic ancestry research caution the stigmatization of communities on the
basis of genetic associations with circumscribed numbers of participants from tenuously defined
ancestral categories (Fine et al., 2005). Genetic ancestry yields inherent inconsistencies and is
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not a scientifically discrete variable, relying heavily on societal constructs of race and ethnicity
today. Acknowledging race and ethnicity as socially-defined should not serve to delegitimize
these identities but should reframe the reliance on heuristic, genetic data as a mechanism to
prove ancestry, and thus identity as it relates to race or ethnicity through continental or other
metrics of categorization (Batai, 2013). This notion of “proving” ancestry, or “discovering”
roots, is not confined to academic research but has been popularized in public discourse
surrounding personal origin. Chapter 6 will delve into the intricacies of ancestry and identity
outside of academia as well as explore how commercially-available genetics has shaped
conversations surrounding culturally-specific concepts of personal origin.
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CHAPTER SIX

An Era of Commercialized Genetics
The Role of Genes in Concepts of Personal Origin

As individuals, each of us descends from an incredibly long, branching line of ancestors,
most of whom remain unknown to us throughout our lifetimes. While we might “inherit” who
our family is (whether biological or adopted), what we look like, where we are born, and how we
grow up, our identity, as we come to know and understand it throughout life, is neither inherent
nor static. Instead, identity is continually formed and reformed through the building blocks of
circumstance, experience, and society. And, while we begin with unchosen circumstances,
choice becomes fundamental to identity formation as we diverge from our starting point. This
chapter will investigate the meaning of genealogy, the evolving social and political life of
genetic ancestry, and contemporary sociocultural concepts of personal origin in the context of
commercialized genomics.
6.1 The Genealogy: Ideas on Heritage and the Reciprocity of Individual and Community
Questions surrounding family, affiliation, and self often lead us to knowns and unknowns
of the past. Our heritage, specifically in the form of genealogy, takes a fundamental role in
answering the central question—“where do I come from?”. The term genealogy itself also takes
on a variety of definitions, from describing accounts of ascent to or descent from an individual to
personal microhistories to the study of one’s relationships and kinship (Hatton, 2019). Most of
these understandings center how genealogy is used to explore concepts of personal origin, but
genealogy also wields a social power as a tool for group affiliation. Several different concepts of
genealogy, blood (both symbolic and scientific), and lineage have informed social, political, and
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legal frameworks of group membership, and they continue to do so in evolving ways. But, the
concept of the genealogy, and intersecting ideas of identity, is not a natural phenomenon but
emerges from the human imagination. Genealogy is a way of organizing and visualizing kinship,
thereby refracted by those who leverage it and according to their interests or goals; it is a social
process, and the role of genealogy in identity formation assumes different social and political
meaning depending upon place, time, and person. For example, some scholars argue that the
“visual representation of a pedigree chart/family tree was important in the historical process of
fixing birth as the beginning of kinship” (Hatton, 2019, p.6) rather than positioning kinship as
crafted, earned, or endowed later in life, which can influence how genealogies are implicated in
social contexts.
The individual and social purposes of the genealogy come together if we conceptualize
identity as a reciprocity of self in relation to others; in other words, personal origin informs
social belonging while group membership reinforces self-concept. In linking self to group,
Hatton (2019) positions genealogy within separate contexts of “social, economic, occupational,
and class membership” (p.8) and familial relationship. In “Community, Identity, and Cultural
Space”, Dismas Masolo merges these contexts into a single system. Masolo (2002) expresses
reciprocity in terms of individual and community, referencing personal experience while
denoting significant variability across cultures:
Valuation of knowledge, including knowledge of personal and shared histories,
sometimes differs significantly between cultures, and also between individuals within and
across cultural boundaries. When and where I grew up among the Luo of Kenya,
genealogical knowledge was important both in itself and for social and moral reasons.
Knowledge of the larger social System of which one was part, and of one’s exact location
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within it, was crucial for determining one’s own and others’ rights and duties as well as
general customary comportment toward others. Individual and community were related in
a constant mutual dependency: the specific behavior of individuals in various contexts
gave the community its cultural boundaries and identity just as much as the normative
standards of the community regulated the practices of individuals and groups within it.
As one grows up and attains the age of adulthood in this cultural environment, this
knowledge and the derivable behavioral expectations become more demanding. An adult
Luo man or woman is always expected to behaviorally relate to others – by speech and
deeds – within the limitations provided for (or expected of) the kinship relations between
them. One knew or could know her or his relatives and calculate or adjust their behavior
toward them accordingly. (p.22)
Masolo (2002) goes on to explain that a deep sense of kinship sustained the “Luo model” of
social and moral order, or organization. Developing a sense of belonging often also produces a
sense of obligation to one’s community while also connecting the community to one’s individual
identity. Thinking about cultural heritage abstractly, we can also conceive culture as inherited
only after it is formed by growing up in and/or practicing the culture of one’s ancestors in the
present, sustaining a collective memory that links members of the culture, or community,
together by performing the past in the present. Hatton (2019) again provides a different angle on
the role of kinship and lineage, explaining that the genealogical “tree preserved the memory of
ancestors, enhanced the prestige of lineage, and sustained power (Klapisch-Zuber 1991, pp. 106–
7)” (as cited in p.6). Genealogy, and specifically the social idea that kinship is inherited, could
effectively ensure power and status was a function of family line. Again, genealogy is a way of
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organizing kinship, and its role in personal origin and group affiliation is variable depending
upon context.
Genealogy, or more broadly heritage, has been used to create group membership across
antecedently arbitrary bounds, superimposing unity upon communities with vastly different
cultures, values, languages, beliefs, and institutions. This process is especially prominent among
the variety of state-building techniques implemented among nascent countries, which loosely
extrapolated and conflated ideas of common ancestry with national identity. When Porfirio Díaz,
the President of Mexico from 1877-1910, launched an initiative to excavate the Pyramid of the
Sun at Teotihuacán, an Indigenous site commonly attributed to the Aztecs, he marketed the plan
as an exploration and celebration of Mexico’s Indigenous roots (Bueno, 2010). A proponent of
neocolonialism and reverent of France as the model culture, Díaz hoped to attract outside
investors as well bring order, progress, and a unified national identity post the 19th century Civil
Wars (Bueno, 2010). This pursuit is interesting both because of its inherent irony as well as how
Díaz and Leopoldo Batres, his commissioned archaeologist, leveraged ancestral root-finding
(Bueno, 2010). See, to prepare the supposed celebration of Indigenous roots, Batres
paradoxically expropriated land from and displaced the Yaqui and Maya living at Teotihuacán in
the present day, arguing that he should not have to compensate considering that the site
“belonged to the nation since the time of the Spaniards” (as cited in Bueno, 2010, p.63).
Additionally, the state positioned the prestige of the Aztecs as the “Greeks of the yellow
American race” (as cited in Bueno, 2010, p.71), attempting to achieve Eurocentric standards of
ancient prestige and modern relevance. Díaz qualified the Aztecs in relation to the Greeks to
position Mexico’s ancestry in the same way Europeans claimed ancient Greeks as their cultural
predecessor. Through Teotihuacán, Díaz attempted to craft visual proof of a national genealogy
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that tied Mexico to “prestigious” and sophisticated Indigenous roots. This act of calling upon
elusive, distant ancestries, creating ties to people who may or may not have, at some
genealogical convergence, descended from the Aztec civilization, for decisive identity formation
mirrors the shifting tone of ancestry today.
Genealogy, heritage, and identity are becoming increasingly tied to technology; genetic
testing companies promote the purpose of their projects as “discovering” roots while the public
augments their credibility by adopting the same discourse surrounding personal identity. More
and more, people are reaching back through hundreds or thousands of years to explore what
Hatton (2019) describes as “deep ancestry” (p.8), using apparent genetic affiliations to reframe
present identities whether or not they actually share cultural traditions, familial bonds, or social
realities of the corresponding groups today. Moreover, others are generalizing scientific theories
of human origin to evidence sameness and override social disparities. Former US President Bill
Clinton has been cited as expressing “unless your ancestors, every one of you, are 100 percent,
100 percent from sub-Saharan Africa, we are all mixed-race people” (Short, 2016). Here, Clinton
refers to the out-of-Africa model, a theory of human dispersal commonly investigated by
geneticists and facing continued debate, to assert a scientifically-backed colorblindness. Like
Díaz, Clinton attempts to create a universal identity across every conceivable social boundary of
human difference by drawing upon a shared notion of “deep ancestry”and, as it logically follows,
multi-racial identity. Except, multi-racial identities exist because racialization created such
distinctions in the first place. Clinton makes the mistake of overriding social reality with
scientific “fact”, believing the theory simply and seamlessly negates race; by trying to level
human racial identity, he erases the experiences and power systems that still exist, regardless of
the science.
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In contrast to Clinton’s colorblindness and Díaz’s unification strategy, there are instances
in which genetic ancestries and genealogies have reaffirmed cultural tradition. While this use
again elevates science as the “final arbiter of truth”, we can see such instances to also be
profound for the communities impacted. Brodwin et al. (2002) describes one such instance:
...geneticists in England have used Y-chromosome markers to demonstrate that at least
one of the clans of Lemba, a tribe in South Africa and Zimbabwe, may be descended
from Semitic peoples. Lemba interpreted the genetic findings as confirming their oral
tradition of Jewish descent… [and] such practices as keeping one day of the week holy,
circumcising newboard males, and not eating pork. However, what does it mean to say
that this evidence ‘confirms’ the Jewish identity of Lemba? (p.325)
They prod at the unbalanced role of scientific evidence “confirming” identity, contemplating the
political and legal implications of the statement. Brodwin et al. (2002) then pose the question:
what if they had asked for citizenship to Israel, which offers a right of return to all Jewish
peoples? In a separate instance, Isaiah Washington, an African American actor who took the
African Ancestry DNA test during one of its early reveals, discerned genetic genealogical roots
in Sierra Leone and was able to gain dual citizenship based on the results (Nelson, 2016).
Interestingly, during the Ebola outbreak of 2014, Washington received criticism for carrying the
Sierra Leone passport but not sharing the burden of the health emergency; in response, he
lobbied at the UN for support and used the avenue of his philanthropy, the Gondobay Manga
Foundation, to help provide relief and resources to Sierra Leone (Nelson, 2016). Brodwin et al.
(2002) supposes that “to claim a certain social identity always implies certain rights and
obligations” (p.325). But, how these rights and obligations will manifest amidst the proliferation
of genetic ancestry is uncertain. The aforementioned two case studies of genetic ancestry alone
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have drawn upon interrelating ideas of race, culture, religion, tradition, obligation, and
citizenship. Such is the scope and manifesting social power of genetic ancestry.
6.2 A Technical Examination of Direct-To-Consumer Tests
The use of genetic ancestry as a tool to explore personal origin has become increasingly
commonplace with the advent of direct-to-consumer (DTC) tests. Prior to commercial
availability, genetic ancestry testing was typically confined to academic research. Now, the
average consumer can purchase an at-home ancestry kit, swab their DNA, and mail their sample
to a company laboratory, the central purpose being to trace ancestral origin.25 In return, DTC
companies provide consumers with a digitized report of their genetic genealogy, often describing
these profiles as a “ breakdown of your ethnicity by percentage” (What to Expect from
AncestryDNA®, n.d., para. 3), as stated by Ancestry.com.

25

DTC test companies also market separate genetic health kits to screen for disease-predisposing alleles, coming
with their own sets of limitations and nuances, but this facet of commercial genomics will not be covered within this
thesis.
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Figure 4. Example of an Ancestry.com ethnicity report that shows the consumer percent
compositions of personal origin subdivided by contemporary geographic states and regions.
Reprinted from What to Expect from AncestryDNA®. (n.d.). Ancestry.com. Retrieved April 16,
2020, from https://support.ancestry.com/s/article/What-to-Expect-from-AncestryDNA

Figure 5. Sample 23andMe ancestry report visualized as chromosomal regions, which leverages
the MALD concept that adjacent chromosomal segments possess different ancestral origins. This
visualization reinforces the idea that chromosomal segments can actually be assigned ethnic
values (i.e. European). Reprinted from Ancestry composition. (n.d.). 23andMe. Retrieved April
27, 2020, from https://medical.23andme.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Ancestry
Composition.pdf

119

Test results might visualize genetic origin using a map, emphasizing geography as a proxy for
ethnicity, or display the genetic composition of one’s chromosomes, building upon the
conceptual foundation that human chromosomes comprise unique ancestral origins at different
loci. In academic research, genetic ancestry typically serves a secondary function to the main
research goal, unless the goal of a study is to assess or improve methods of ancestral inference
for downstream benefits. Conversely, DTC ancestry kits serve to provide genetic genealogies,
informing individuals of their scientifically-certified origin story.
Amidst the competing voices of the humanities, social science, and science, the general
public routinely turns to the natural sciences for objective truth; in turn, there is potential for the
validity and social jurisdiction of genetic genealogy to be overstated. The tenuous science and
analytical limitations of DTC testing further complicates its role in identity, as the accuracy of
DTC ancestry kits remains contentious among academic geneticists who caution that their
limitations can skew results and mislead consumers (Pardo-Seco et al., 2014; Royal et al., 2011;
Via et al., 2009). A drastically marked increase in the use of DTC tests has occurred over the
past three years, ushering the consumer into a new era of data accessibility and commercial
genotyping technology as well as adding new dimensions to the social process of identity
formation. An article in the MIT Technology Review cited that about 29 million individuals had
taken DTC tests by the start of 2019, noting an exponential upward trend forming around 2017
and the majority of tests taken with two companies—Ancestry.com and 23andMe (Regalado,
2019).
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Figure 6. Graph displaying the exponential growth of DTC test use in the past few years. 2017 is
a notable turning point, after which the rate of increase becomes significantly greater. Reprinted
from “More Than 26 Million People Have Taken an At-Home Ancestry Test,” by Regalado, A.,
2019, MIT Technology Review. Retrieved from https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/11/
103446/more-than-26-million-people-have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test/

While about 40 companies exist, Ancestry.com and 23andMe monopolize the commercial
genetics industry due to a network effect, meaning that the more individuals who contribute their
DNA to one company’s database, the more “accurate” the test results become, as DNA from
more people and places is compiled for associative analysis (Regalado, 2019; Royal et al., 2010).
A couple DTC testing companies market to specific consumers in an effort to offer more precise
in-group results or culturally competent services (i.e. African Ancestry). Nonetheless, the
network effect exposes an important technical limitation of DTC tests. A news article by Dark
Daily cited Adam Rutherford, Ph.D, a British geneticist, expressing that tests are telling
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consumers “where on Earth [their] DNA is from today” (“The Problems with Ancestry DNA
Analyses,” 2018, para. 16) rather than conclusively discerning ancestral origins. Not only do
they compare DNA samples between consumers who have taken the test to infer ancestral
clusters (academic researchers make inferences based on people living today as well), but the
diversity of their datasets are subject to those who opt, and have the disposable funds, to
purchase kits (Regalado, 2019; Royal et al., 2011). Academic researchers intentionally select
which datasets to compare, although using questionable delineations of human populations,
while DTC databases are not regulated by a research purpose, meaning that various communities
will become, by nature of consumerism, either under- or overrepresented.
Similarly to academic research, the results reported by ancestry tests rely upon the quality
of their reference marker panels, which are used to correlate and refine genetic clusters. For
example, an alleged new algorithm and reference panel update by Ancestry.com in 2019 spurred
discontent among several customers who cited their ethnicity reports changing overnight,
significantly shifting some customers’ percentages and even erasing various regional affiliations
entirely (Pero, 2019). Such flux is a function of the available reference data as well as the chosen
statistical approaches and will likely continue to occur as test companies aim to increase
precision and database growth. The picture that consumers receive also likely depends upon the
research and development underpinning each commercial test. Thinking back to the NDNAD, a
forensics database in the UK, several of its unsanctioned auxiliary research projects were a part
of a larger field of study surrounding the development of DTC testing; remember, the samples
within the NDNAD represent a skewed profile of the UK population, retaining
disproportionately high numbers of samples from Black men compared the UK’s demographic
groups (Wallace, 2011). If DTC test accuracy is a function of its reference database, then
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representation is central, although the ability of ancestral inference to accredit geographic origin,
and more elusively ethnicity, remains contested regardless.
Beyond their database parameters, some DTC companies utilize panels that functionally
differ from academic research. Marker type plays a significant role in the curation of one’s
ancestral “percentages”. In the 2000s, the vast majority of DTC companies employed haploid, or
uniparental, mtDNA and Y-chromosome markers, contrasting the use of highly polymorphic
autosomal markers in primary research (Royal et al., 2011; Via et al., 2009). Pardo-Seco et al.
(2014) attest that mtDNA and Y-chromosome might be functional in certain “genetic contexts”
but prove erroneous when applied to inferring “global individual genome ancestry” and can “can
only reflect a very tiny portion of the genomic individual ancestry” (p.2). In parallel, Brodwin
(2002) clarifies a situation that might arise with haploid markers:
Y chromosomes are passed only through the male line, and an individual has 16 male
ancestors in the 5th preceding generation. If you had 1 European ancestor in that
generation, and the rest of your male (and female) ancestors were African, then you
would be 1/32 European... and… culturally [B]lack in the USA. But if that European man
happened to be your father’s father’s father’s father’s father, then Y-chromosome typing
would place your ancestry entirely in Europe…. (p.328)
Receiving an ancestry report with such skewed results not only provides misleading information
but also can be disconcerting to self-concept. While percent breakdowns from DTC tests neither
change how an individual navigates the world nor remove the barriers they face, tracing ancestry
taps into history; the percentages revealed by genetic genealogy are not numbers devoid of
context but can underlie stories of oppression, such as those of colonialism, on a deeply personal
level through a medium intrinsically connected to the individual taking the test.
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The impact of ancestry tests can be incredibly significant. As a result, it is important that
the test-taker understands the limitations, variable accuracy, and probability metrics of DTC tests
while evaluating, for one’s own self, the role and meaning of these tests in the social context of
personal origin. Royal et al. (2011) provides another example of the potential for
misinterpretation; they assert that haploid markers, at best, can indicate common ancestry, but
leave key questions surrounding the actual origin of that common ancestor unanswered:
... if someone lives in North America and [their] mtDNA haplotype exactly matches an
individual living in Indonesia, the only thing that can be inferred with confidence is that
they share a common ancestor. Without more information about family history and/or the
geographic distribution of closely related mtDNA haplotypes, it is impossible to say
whether this match arises via recent Indonesia ancestors in North American’s family tree,
whether both share distant ancestors who lived in entirely different part of the world, or
whether the Indonesian match has recent North American heritage. (p. 666)
This implications of this example depend upon how inferences are made by the company’s
genotyping and visualization technology but theoretically would happen if common ancestry is
reported as a percent, or shown as a hotspot, in Indonesia for the North American customer or
conversely in North America for the Indonesian customer. A consumer could unknowingly
mistake potential common ancestry with another person in the database from a different region to
mean that a portion of their ancestry, or “ethnic breakdown”, originated from that region. Despite
these ambiguities, the breadth and scope of reference data and specific inference techniques
behind DTC company tests have remained largely veiled from the public eye, ostensibly in an
effort to prevent scientists and consumers alike from dissecting the reliability of the business
(Kamala, 2018). As genotyping technology becomes increasingly less costly, more and more
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DTC companies might switch to chip-based SNP technology or conduct genome-wide arrays
with autosomal markers (Royal et al., 2011). An Ancestry.com blog post announced in 2016 that:
…we have learned that some markers, also known as SNPs, in DNA are better indicators
of ethnic and geographic origins than others, so we have created this new chip to focus on
those signals and enable further refinements to the results. This will provide further
improvements to the ethnicity results we provide. (“Customer Testing Begins on New
AncestryDNA Chip,” 2016, para. 2)
This post promotes the idea that SNPs are the key toward more informative “ethnicity” reports.
For any given test, it is ultimately impossible to know how accurately the test captures the real
human history preceding an individual, and how much the test results for one individual might
vary in accuracy from those of another individual; regardless of accuracy, the interpretation of
results, influenced partially by company marketing, by concurrent test-takers, and by one’s own
grasp of genetic ancestry, can maintain real and lasting impacts.
Beyond the nuances of marker type, the timeline of genetic ancestry, specifically among
DTC tests, also remains ambiguous, locating one’s origins somewhere in between close family
and the earliest hominid ancestors (Royal et al., 2011). Duration often plays a significant role in
how we perceive our roots; analogously, people will typically distinguish where they were born
(especially if they were moved shortly after) from where they grew up. This concept extrapolates
to the intersection of genealogy and identity, as individuals could perceive deeper roots in places
their ancestors lived for multiple, rather than one, generation or in places where their ancestors
voluntarily lived rather than to which they were displaced. Finally, unlike primary literature
pools, commercialized tests report on the individual rather than at the population or group level
(Royal et al., 2011). Recall that primary research assesses the difference between the
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frequencies, or proportions, of gene forms across sample groups rather than the presence of a
specific gene form in an individual, and that for almost all genes, any individual in a given
human group could possess any form of a particular gene. This fundamental methodological shift
imagines genetic interpopulation differences as identifiable in an individual rather than a
function of a population, framing “ethnicity”, whether intentionally or not, as more discreetly
genetic than most human population studies across academia would argue. What does a
“breakdown of your ethnicity” (What to Expect from AncestryDNA®, n.d., para. 3) mean if
ethnicity is a combination of values, institutions, community, and culture, if it is practiced and
reinforced through collective memory? Can software updates truly provide more refined insights
into ethnicity? Do test reports decontextualize ethnicity and identity? The answers to these
questions likely vary, depending upon the cultural identity that a test-taker already holds and
their intended purpose for taking the test. Positioning kinship at birth, as Hatton (2019) suggested
might lend to conceptualizing ethnicity as proportionally inherited depending on the ethnicities
of one’s ancestral kin; however, while this version of ethnicity promotes the importance of
heritage, it lacks a central interpersonal dimension. Nonetheless, DTC testing is becoming a
quintessential part of genealogical searches and identity formation, often ascribed the ability to
“discover” or “confirm” one’s ancestry.

6.3 Commercialized Genetics, Community, and Personal Origin
Direct-to-consumer tests have expanded the accessibility of genetic technology, exposing
the tools of ancestral inference to direct public interaction and transaction. While the majority of
consumers choose similar testing formats (i.e. Ancestry.com or 23andMe), experiences
interpreting results can vastly differ across individuals and communities. The DTC industry is
especially thriving in the US, where people perceive a vast array of branching personal origin
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stories (Nelson, 2016). The prevalence of ancestry testing has provoked widespread discussions
on the accuracy of genetic ancestry as well as its function in claiming and communicating
identity. Nelson argues that, today, “symbolic ethnicity” is prominent among social transactions
in America; symbolic ethnicity describes the act of summoning ancestries that are not actively
present in one’s everyday cultural practices or lived experience, maintaining a symbolic rather
than social connection to the implicated ethnicity (Alba, 1990; Nelson, 2016). Instances of
symbolic ethnicity include “[harking] back to County Cork, Ireland, while jubilating on St.
Patrick’s Day in Boston” or “[hanging] an English coat of arms in [one’s] house” (Nelson, 2016,
p.5). Symbolic ethnicity sustains a selective connection to cultural heritage, whether as distant
nostalgia, aesthetic, or social clout. Notably, symbolic ethnicity in America is usually white and
Euro-centric, which may relate to the levelling of social, political, and economic positionality of
European ethnicities (Alba, 1990) under a expanding concept of whiteness over time, rendering
white ethnic distinctions less relevant to power systems.
But, exploration of roots can vary in gravity and impact for those who have experienced
ancestral loss or displacement (Nelson, 2016). Brodwin (2002) parallels this sentiment, attesting
that genetic ancestry can help tap into a profound sense of connection for persons who “mourn
the passage from homeland to diaspora” and “whose collective identity involves the sense of
unjust dislocation and culture-loss” (p.327). He proceeds to delve into the differential
relationship of genetic ancestry, genealogy, and identity as well as their social and political
utility across communities:
...certain questions do cry out for anthropological expertise. Why does genetic evidence
prove so compelling in some cases (e.g., among diasporic Jews and certain voices in the
African American community) and not in others (notably Native Americans)? Why is it
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easily accepted by some groups, but the target of extreme suspicion in others? The
availability of genetic tracing surely alters the playing field of identity claims, but it does
so differently in each case…. (Brodwin, 2002, p.329)
There is a variable interplay of genes and identity between communities. The impact and utility
of genetic ancestry within a community appears to be informed by personal connections to one’s
origin, the history and heritage underpinning a community, the relationship of the community
with hegemonic systems, and the potential for social justice or political mobilization. For some,
genetic ancestry offers an unprecedented way to deduce untold stories of diaspora through
genealogical branches. Yet, distant and recent pasts of clandestine science targeting marginalized
communities simultaneously lends to caution surrounding genetic ancestry.
Genetic ancestry has catalyzed different reactions, understandably spurring distrust while
also lending to reconciliation projects and bearing potential for unity, community, and collective
memory. One such project is Las Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, which implemented genetic
analysis to connect children with their biological grandparents after they had been
nonconsensually displaced into adoptive families throughout post-conflict Argentina (Nelson,
2016). This initiative marks one of the many ways genetic tools have materialized real life
outcomes. In her book, Nelson (2016) takes a close look into the “efforts aimed at repairing the
social ruptures produced by transatlantic slavery” (p. 9). Nelson describes the significance and
nuance of root-finding within African American communities:
For African Americans, this search is both more elusive and more fraught. A profound
loss of social ties was an immediate outcome of the Middle Passage and racial slavery.
The ravages of the Civil War left vital records and slave-plantation paperwork degraded
or destroyed. (p.5)
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In the context of Pan-African identity and the African diaspora, DNA can be a tool for social
healing. The potential for DNA to fill in genealogical gaps and trace African ancestry offers a
way to discern distant genealogy, cutting through hundreds of years of colonialism with a new
layer of clarity. Nelson (2016) also noted that, within the African American community, genetic
ancestry has been “annexed onto unresolved and, therefore, persistent debates about national
belonging’” (p. 9), proving important for Pan-African social and political agency as well as
identity, community, resistance, and pursuit of reparations in post-colonial America. African
Ancestry, a DTC test founded by Rick A. Kittles and Gina M. Paige, offers an avenue of deeper
connection and “affiliation with nation-states and ethnic groups on the African continent”
(Nelson, 2016, p.11). On the company website, African Ancestry offers a search “not to a series
of West African REGIONS. But to an ethnic group (‘tribe’) with specific beliefs, traditions,
values and practices” (African Ancestry PatriClan Test Kit, n.d., para. 1, emphasis in original).
While other companies conflate regional affiliation with ethnicity, Kittle’s service markets the
ability to trace origin to specific ethnic groups and tribes, not simply regions devoid of cultural
heritage. The message of African Ancestry highlights a predominant feature of Ancestry.com
and 23andMe, which categorically attest to the ability to reveal “ethnic breakdowns”, relaying to
consumers a profile of ethnicities (apart from those most salient to their lived experience) they
can symbolically reference without necessarily partaking in the culture, values, and barriers of
the ethnic communities themselves.
Kittles created African Ancestry with the intention of creating a resource for root-finding
that could become a source of healing as well as a unifying social and political force. The idea of
providing genetic ancestry for African root-seeking was reported as early as 2000 in the Los
Angeles Times and proved to be a message that deeply resonated within the African American
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community (as cited in Nelson, 2016). Hundreds of individuals proceeded to seek out Kittles
while he was a co-director of the molecular genetics unit in the National Human Genome Center
at Howard University because they heard he could assist them in reconnecting with and
reestablishing “long-lost lineage[s]” (Nelson, 2016, p.11). In celebration of Black History Month
during February of 2007, Kittles invited African Americans to the Harlem temple of the Mormon
church on Malcolm X Boulevard to share in a root-finding experience, offering free MatriClan
and PatriClan (using mtDNA and Y-chromosome DNA respectively) Afrircan Ancestry tests as
compensation for research participation; at the time, Dr. Kittles was studying associations
between skin pigmentation and various genetic characteristics (Nelson, 2016). Mark Shriver, an
author of one of the review articles studied in this thesis, was a co-researcher in this initial study,
but after he began adapting it for forensic uses, Kittles stepped away from contributing further,
refusing to have a hand in sending more innocent Black people to jail (Nelson, 2016). The event
brought together numerous root-seekers, providing a new approach to both individual and
community identity formation. Nelson (2016), who was present at the event, describes the
sentiments of Kittle’s African Ancestry customers, including those she encountered personally:
...they spoke of the desire to feel complete, of craving a stronger sense of belonging in the
United States and on the continent of Africa, and of wanting in their own way to reckon
with the history of slavery…. (p.22)
Ancestral inference offered a powerful elucidation of family lineage, tapping into the pivotal
question of “what came before”, a discovery process navigating senses of split belonging,
reclaiming identity, and forming the ethnic liaisons that exist within Pan-African identity.
DNA can also be politically and legally legitimizing, as seen with Isaiah Washington’s
access to dual citizenship and assumed sense of duty to Sierra Leone. Nelson (2016) describes
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how Kittle’s scientific and social mission reaches beyond business; through African Ancestry, he
aimed to facilitate goals of racial justice, specifically the “liberation of Black communities
through ancestral knowledge” (p. 22). For instance, Kittles’ African Ancestry test had a role in a
Brooklyn federal court class-action suit in 2002; it was implemented by Deadria FarmerPaellmann, the attorney as well as founder and director of the Restitution Study Group and the
Organization of Tribal Unity in New York, and the plaintiffs to evidence roots in continental
Africa and seek restitution for their ancestors’ unpaid slave labor and the long-term loss of
wealth in the form of both “community and capital” (Nelson, 2016, p.23). While genetic ancestry
provides new inlets to both study and actualize ongoing conversations of identity, community,
and national belonging within the African American community, there are notable limitations
and potential discrepancies beyond the technical accuracy of test kits. Nelson (2016) argues that,
while genetic ancestral inference can prove to be “psychically beneficial”, DNA results alone
neither “materially address persistent structural inequality” nor are “equality, justice, and
ethics… easily tethered to or readily settled with DNA evidence” (p.25). Here, Nelson
contemplates the intricacies of DNA as a scientific versus social and political tool as well as the
utility of DTC ancestry specifically.
The implication of genetic ancestry and identity in legal proceedings opens the door to a
plethora of questions as well as restricts evidence of Pan-African identity to scientific validation.
Such questions inevitably will speak the language of the testing platform; for example, what is
the percent threshold of African ancestry that allows an individual to legally claim compensation
for the structural barriers of slavery and discrimination? If no threshold exists, then individuals
could attempt to claim marginalized statuses and compensation with only a minute percentage of
African ancestry or attempt to reinforce former President Clinton’s ideal that “we are all mixed-
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race”; however, what does establishing a threshold say about our societal stake in genetic
ancestry as well as the authority of genetic ancestry over other sources of personal origin (i.e.
oral tradition or memoir)? Additionally, regardless of one’s “ethnic percentage”, if one navigates
the United States as culturally and socially Black, they will face institutional racism and resource
inequity nonetheless. In addition to legal frameworks, Isiah Washington’s story raises interesting
questions surrounding identity and obligation based on DNA. Positioning these questions in
conjunction with the fact that the science is still tenuous in multiple facets suggests that DNA
could pose promise, but perhaps not in the way it’s being popularly mobilized or conceptualized
today.
Root-finding can be a momentous exercise for persons who have experienced diaspora
and especially significant for those who experienced ancestral loss through the crimes of
colonialism or slavery while living in post-colonial nation-states. While Native American
communities also faced theft of land and displacement during the colonial period, concepts of
personal origin, genealogy, and tribal citizenship do not readily coincide with genetic ancestry.
Indigenous communities understand that their interests have rarely been considered by the
natural sciences. Louise Erdrich, an author and member of the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians, denied an invitation to undergo genetic testing after conversing with tribal
elders because the community ultimately “understood her DNA to be communal property”
(Nelson, 2016, p.16). While this instance not only relates to conversations surrounding DNA
banks and ancestry databases as the pinnacle of big data, which are beyond the scope of this
thesis, it also reflects the reality that an individual’s DNA can impact the community to which
they belong (Nelson, 2016). Furthermore, DTC genetic genealogy operates in a sphere separate
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from the scientific, social, and legal frameworks surrounding tribal citizenship and Indigenous
identity.
A growing number of Tribes in the United States and First Nations in Canada have been
implicating DNA “profiles” or “fingerprints”, otherwise known as parentage tests, that verify
paternity or close biologically relatives to supplement enrollment applications for tribal
citizenship (Tallbear, 2013). After summoning evidence of biological relatedness, an enrollment
office might ask for the blood-quantum documentation of a parent to further process for
enrollment (Tallbear, 2013). Blood-quantum practices are historically rooted in the concepts and
policies surrounding tribal citizenship, described by many scholars as an “incisive social
technique for managing Native American lands and peoples” (Tallbear, 2013, p.55). Tallbear
(2013) explains that the General Allotment Act of 1887 (or the “Dawes Act”) partitioned
communal land into individually-owned plots on reservations, only to be inhabited by
identifiable Native Americans (Tallbear, 2013). Tallbear cites that the US project endowed
Indigenous individuals thought to have more “European blood” or to be “mixed blood” more
land because they were perceived as further along evolutionarily trajectory toward civilization
and assimilation, the idea being that they would eventually sell off their land, while those
deemed more than “half-blood” held 25 year trusts (Tallbear, 2013, p.56); thus, blood quantum
sustained a role in dispossessing land through vehemently racist systems. While it is generally
affirmed that blood-quantum practices arose due to the imposition of European colonial power
systems, codified racism, and ideologies of race and blood, Tallbear also refers to an contrasting
perspective:
[Alexandra] Harmon points out that “in the enrollment councils, federal agents did not
brainwash or impose their will on Indians; neither did Indians resolve to draw an
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economically strategic, racially defined boundary around themselves. Rather, officials
and Indians participated in a prolonged discourse that I would characterize as incomplete
mutual education and accommodation.” Harmon refers to the [Northwest Coast Indian
enrollment] commissions as “an unprecedented conversation—one that would take place
in many tribal communities and continue for decades—about what it meant to be Indian
in the twentieth-century United States. (as cited in Tallbear, 2013, p. 53)
Unlike the Euro-centric and colonial-settler lens, such concepts are not supported as biological
science, as blood rules preexisted modern conceptualizations of genetic inheritance, among tribal
citizens; when talking about full-bloodedness, an interviewee of Jill Doefler, in conjunction to
her research on the White Earth Reservation in Minnesota, explained the idea of “fullbloodedness” as a “way of living” rather than a molecular ascription (as cited in Tallbear, 2013,
p.52). Tallbear (2013) emphasizes the reality that blood-quantum practices and blood concepts
are intangible sociopolitical and legal frameworks, often interpreted as outmoded racialized ideas
of purity by both Native Americans and non-Native Americans. Societal and colloquial discourse
today oscillate between “semiotic and material meanings of blood and genes” so frequently that
many do not realize “blood quantum is a materialist practice only to the extent that it involves
paperwork” (Tallbear, 2013, p.54). And while colonialism, and its persisting structures, continue
to inform facets of blood-quantum policies, Native American blood concepts do not mold to
Euro-centric understandings of molecular relatedness. The language surrounding blood or blood
fractions are proxies for a complex cultural and legal scaffolding, as blood quantums not only
relay the reservations of one’s ancestors but invoke the stories of dispossession and movement of
grandparents and their grandparents before (Tallbear, 2013). In parallel, popular
conceptualizations of genetic ancestry and genealogy contrast Native American ideas of tribal

134

belonging and genealogy, as they exist within a scientific framework that continues to be
informed by visualizations of molecular personhood:
The DNA genealogies that are documented by ancestry tests (again, different from the
DNA parentage tests that tribes use) and that are co-constituted with hegemonic U.S. race
concepts are not yet compatible with the particular biological relationships that tribes
privilege. Yet enrollment staff from several tribes told participants at a 2010 national
tribal enrollment conference that they had received enrollment applications with
commercially purchased genetic-ancestry test results included. This happens even though
federally recognized tribes do not accept. (Tallbear, 2013, p.65)
Thus, tribal citizenship, which relies upon both genealogy and established laws, might implicate
science in the form of DNA parentage tests; however, tribal citizenship is not compatible with
genetic ancestry tests provided by DTC companies. Native American tribes maintain an intricate
yet primarily non-molecular understanding of genealogy that encompasses familial relationships
as well as “ways of living”, cultural practice, and the social processes that tie peoples to both
land and community. Discourses surrounding Indigenous identity and tribal citizenship
complicate notions of genetic genealogy, rather than the social idea of genealogy, without
diminishing the social realities of racialized identities or significance of ancestry within a
community.
While the intersection of ancestry and genetics have been manipulated as a vessel of
oppression, it has also been reclaimed as tools for reconciliation, root-finding, and restitution.
Ancestors who faced oppression as well as oppressors are embedded within genealogies—
genealogies carry these stories. It makes sense that the genealogy serves as the archetypal map
for navigating both social identity and personal origin. Amidst the era of commercialized
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genetics, this map is readily called upon through a scientific lens, often turned to in place of, or
to “confirm”, historical archive, oral tradition, or familial knowledge; however, the relationship
between genes and identity is inherently complicated. Genetic genealogy itself is a social
construction, a new method of organizing identity as curated by DTC companies and interpreted
by the general public. Companies like Ancestry.com espouse the ability to “connect you to the
places in the world where your story started” including to “unique regions,” (Ancestry®
Genealogy, Family Trees & Family History Records, n.d., para. 3) or those considered unique
through amidst an ethnocentric perspective. 23andMe relays that its “ancestry breakdown” will
help you “Dig deeper into your ancestry, providing the most comprehensive portrait of you yet”
(Ancestry + Traits Service, n.d., para. 2), or at least on the market. These testaments are
promising and enticing, igniting a sense of intrinsic discovery accessible at one’s doorstep. On
the other hand, scholars like Hatton et al. attest that “to geneticize kinship is an imaginative
refigurement of kinship” (Hatton, 2019, p.6), one that boils down oral tradition, written record,
or family tradition to seemingly objective valuations. These valuations are molded into profiles
of percent breakdowns that make it easy for test takers to quantify an ethnicity (i.e. saying I am
“X%” Irish) and qualify it to concurrent origins (i.e. I am 60% Irish but only 2% German).
On a basic level, the interpretability of DTC tests depend upon an understanding of
probability and what exactly test results can and cannot tell us about genomic origins. Beyond
these inherent limitations, the results also can play a number of different roles in identity
formation, sometimes proving to be impactful for those who connect with disrupted roots,
casually entertaining for those who unwittingly adopt new ethnic identifiers, and even shocking
or confusing for some who receive unexpected results that challenge self-concept. I would argue
that identity formation lies far beyond the rigid intervals of an ancestry test or ethnicity
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breakdown, specifically as it relates to racial or ethnic identity. Identity informs how an
individual navigates the world and experiences kinship. Identity can influence the resource
access, discrimination, and systemic barriers an indivdiual faces. Finally, choice is central to
identity formation, as it is a social practice involving the building of relationships and
community; sometimes, genetic ancestry can be a vessel of community building, but a DTC
profile does not dictate an individual’s identity. Hauskeller et al. (2013) reviewed various ideas
on the social definition of identity, enumerating that recognition by institutions, identity
performance, social interactions, power relations and personal choice are key in forming and
reinforcing identity (p.877). Receiving unexpected results from a test does not change the way
our racial or ethnic identity is perceived or lived, our social and interactional realities, the culture
of our childhood and the traditions we practice today, the languages we speak, or the chosen
family we have come to know throughout our lives. Personal origin is often a significant facet of
identity, as the practice of culture, religion, or other traditions are a way of reproducing the past
in the present and connecting with familial or cultural heritage. Origin and ancestry can also
impact our social sense of belonging through collective memory or shared history, as Brodwin
(2002) describes that “knowledge of ancestry ratifies or even creates a social connection in the
present” (p.325). Ancestry can become integrated within the social process of identity formation,
but if individuals use genetic ancestry in their toolkit, they should be well informed on what the
results can convey to help make individual choices about their meaning in relation to self,
family, community, and identity.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Research
In the same way that the earth can be described by many different kinds of maps - from
topological to economic - so, too, can the naturally occurring genetic variation among
populations be divided in numerous ways and be made to highlight any chosen similarity or
difference. (Sankar and Cho, 2002, p.5)

The strategies that geneticists have adapted for ancestral inference are not devoid of
ingenuity; they have figured out that highly polymorphic genetic markers arise from benign
mutations as well as deduced their microscopic locations for use as molecular locators.
Geneticists have developed bioinformatics to visualize the imperceptible, including metrics, such
as fixation indices, that have proven reliably functional in other species. Amidst the gaining
momentum of genomics and in light of the HGP, they have adapted these techniques to study a
detected, yet fleeting, window of human interpopulation variation. Socially informed geneticists
like Dr. Rick Kittles, who has critically examined race in genetics and identified the “racial
framework” (Batai & Kittles, 2013, p.81) existent in today’s biomedical approaches, still
continue the search for genetic ancestry, whether for root-finding (i.e. African Ancestry), disease
prevention, or other applications. Within his lectures, Kittles aims to make the elusive concept of
human variation more accessible:
So let’s say we are looking at a track of DNA:
ACTCAGTTCA
Maybe 94 percent of you guys in the room may have a C at that second-to-last position.
While about 6 percent may have a T:
ACTCAGTTTA
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That’s… a snip… A subtle change. (as cited in Nelson, 2016, p.35)
But, the mystery that surrounds his hypothetical six percent is whether and how it can be
explained by individual variability versus population difference. Swynghedauw (2003) pushes us
to consider the unconventional approach of an early study:
More recently, a model-based clustering method… was used to assign individuals to
subclusters on the basis of their genotype, ignoring their actual population or racial
affiliations (Wilson et al., 2010) … a clustering analysis was carried out to identify four
clusters, stopping when an increase in the number of clusters did not enhance the degree
of differentiation… Interestingly, 62% of Ethiopians belongs to the same cluster as
Norwegians, together with 21% of the Afro-Caribbeans, and the ethnic label ‘Asian’
inaccurately describe Chinese and Papuans who were placed almost entirely in separate
clusters. (p.440)
This study speaks a language that parallels other studies, contending the same fallacies of a
racialized framework; however, by employing widely-used techniques and computer programs
with a methodological twist, they revealed clusters that intercept the idea of reliably qualifiable
human populations. Their approach placed comparatively more limitations on confirmation bias,
the notorious crux of pseudo-science.
Genetic ancestry reignites the perceived need to biologically systematize human
difference, and geneticists are at the forefront of curating how we see, imagine, and understand
human variation, discerning how and whether intergroup differences exist, and constructing the
quintessential “human populations” of population genetics. Similarly to how the intricacies of
human history can be explored through the evolution of food, linguistics, culture, ideologies,
etc., genetics selects the medium of its associations. Geneticists have relied upon identity,

139

whether regional, ethno-linguistic, religious-cultural, or other social affiliations, to proxy for
something far more elusive, something that does not exist within one static timeframe or spatial
bounds, something we do not have the vocabulary to effectively describe nor the information to
conclusively discern. Substructure, by nature of human movement and generational change,
continually restructures. At best, identity can predict, though variably so, these stochastic
processes. What would happen if evolutionary events were not conceptualized as predisposed by
groups of people but inherited from instances in time? Consider the following hypothetical: if a
war were to spur an immense loss of young lives, a bottleneck effect might occur; it is not a
social identity but circumstance that is relevant to the gene pool. For all intents and purposes, the
gene pool could be defined as all the soldiers across every country involved. And there would be
a chance, depending on whether certain alleles were randomly up- or down-regulated within this
gene pool, for the next generation descending from the survivors to have a higher likelihood of
inheriting certain allele variants.
It is time for genetics to become interdisciplinary. A breadth of perspective is vital not
only to navigate the interrelated factors of public health or disease risk but also to recognize how
racialization can shape or manifest in their work. Perspective will help geneticists understand
their role in conceptualizing human “interpopulation” difference, redesign approach, or even
reevaluate the prospective benefit and relative priority of genetic ancestry (as it has been
conceptualized thus far) within biomedical or adjunct fields. Geneticists should understand
racialization as a socio-historic process so they can recognize continuity in study intent, design,
discourse, and application. Furthermore, researchers should neither reduce marginalized
communities as unique or convenient opportunities for study nor expose them as targets of
disproportionate scrutiny; studies involving these communities must offer full transparency,
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ascertain consent, and affirm downstream benefits to the best of their ability. Finally,
intentionality is critical regarding the translation of genetics research to the intermediaries of
public knowledge. Blell and Hunter (2019) reference a study by Baer et al., which reported how
surveyed medical practitioners expressed confusion when trying to discuss race and ethnicity,
many “[treating] these concepts as interchangeable and genetically based” (as cited in p.5).
Geneticists have a responsibility to prevent the reification of biological race and new forms of
biological determinism, racial essentialism, or scientific racism. Systems of oppression have
been manipulating scientific theories for hundreds of years because the scientists of those
theories have failed to take a decisively anti-racist position.
At the conception of this project, I had aimed to grasp the probability of population
genetics and report back what genetics can truly tell us (or not tell us) about identity. My search
proved more complex than I could have imagined, opening a floodgate of innumerable branching
questions and investigative spheres, pointing toward several opportunities for future research. An
examination of media coverage on genetics research could more thoroughly trace the translation
of academia to public knowledge. The commercialized era of DTC tests raises pointed questions
regarding big data and personal privacy, as one person’s genetic information inherently
implicates biological relatives (both known and unknown). DTC companies also offer genetic
health kits to evaluate disease susceptibility, opening another door to evaluating technical and
translational limitations. Both these facets broaden the discussion centering DTC genetic testing.
The nascent field of epigenetics is incredibly complex but highly fascinating; a sociological
perspective could dissect lines of continuity within the epigenetic realm, deciphering whether
ideas of a new “epigenetic determinism” have, or are at risk of, taking root. Finally, geneticists
have been making decisions regarding where to look for genetic substructure based on currently-
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held concepts of human movement and dispersal through the earliest hominids. These farreaching theories, which include the termed out-of-Africa model, have been recurrently changed,
adapted, dismissed, and reified as various anthropologists, archaeologists, and geneticists have
unearthed new fossil evidence. Delving into concurrent theories of human movement, including
debates surrounding the social curation of these concepts, would provide an intriguing
perspective.
What can genetic ancestry tell us about identity? Elizabeth Warren’s misconception
extends beyond scientific validity into a line of socio-historic continuity. She invokes an
ethnocentric idea of identity as tangible, engaging in the leap between “semiotic and material
meanings of blood and genes” (p.54) that Tallbear (2013) describes. She relies upon science as
the “final arbiter of truth” (p.4) as termed by Nelson (2016), who explains how society as given
intellectual weight and social authority to DNA. Individuals searching for personal origin
through the platform of DNA encounter an intensely complex question that not only necessitates
a “fairly sophisticated understanding of probability” (Royal et al., 2011, p.668) but also
“involves judging the worth of genetic knowledge against other kinds of claims to authentic
identity and group membership (oral history, written documentation, cultural practices, inner
convictions)” (Brodwin, 2002, p.324). The intersection of DNA with social identity, political
utility, and personal origin is an intricate unknown, a social construct that should be approached
as such, whereby test-takers and communities have a role in forming its relevance and meaning.
The secret of origin is not confined to the materiality of DNA; identity, community, and culture
are living concepts, imagined and reimagined, practiced and sustained, challenged and
reclaimed, by people.
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